اسناد لانه جاسوسی

شماره ۳۴

استعمار سیاسی
آمریکا

دانشجویان مسلمان پیرو خط امام

In the name of Allah
the most
Compassionate and Merciful



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SECRET

Department of State

Office of the Inspector General,
Foreign Service

Inspection Report

on

THE CONDUCT OF RELATIONS WITH IRAN

August 1976

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UNCLASSIFIED

THE CONDUCT OF RELATIONS
WITH IRAN

LIST OF PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

Embassy Tehran

Ambassador	Richard M. Helms
DCM	Jack C. Miklos

Section Chiefs:

Administrative	Roger A. Provencher
Consular	Ward L. Christensen
Economic/Commercial	Roger C. Brewin
	David E. Westley
Political	Hawthorne Q. Mills
Political/Military	Henry Precht
Science	Albert S. Chapman

Other Agencies:

Defense Department:

DefRep	Eric von Marbod
ARMISH/MAAG	Maj. Gen. Kenneth P. Miles
Defense Attache	Col. Frank B. McKenzie, USAF
Agriculture	Paul J. Ferree
Drug Enforcement	Jack L. Greene
USIS	Gordon Winkler

Consulates:

Isfahan	Gene B. Marshall
Shiraz	Michael R. Arietti
Tabriz	Ronald E. Neumann

Over time, as the Shah correctly perceives, the interests of Iran and the U.S. in energy matters are not dissimilar. Both countries will have to economize in the use of petroleum and natural gas for fuel and bring into production alternative facilities for producing energy. The U.S. and Iran are currently negotiating an agreement on atomic energy, as Iran is planning to install nuclear power plants. It is important, if the U.S. is not to be cut out of this near ten billion dollar business by foreign competitors, for the U.S. to continue to give very high priority to these negotiations and to ensure that the Embassy in Tehran is adequately staffed to back them and to deal with the full range of Iranian interests in energy, science, and technology.

Iran's ability, through OPEC, to "tax" foreign consumers of its petroleum and petroleum products by setting "artificial" prices for them enables Iran to finance its civilian and military development without official aid. The Shah sets his own priorities in the expenditure of foreign exchange. He wants and gets the latest U.S. military equipment, and he finances U.S. military and civilian advisers, technicians and instructors. The GOI also contracts for facilities and technical assistance and training in many civilian fields. The U.S. is a preferred supplier in both the military and the civilian fields. There is considerable concern among Washington agencies lest the GOI over-reach itself one way or another and leave the U.S. to share the blame for all sorts of problems of both macro- and micro-economic nature (e.g., over-expenditure on the military forces at the expense of the civilian sector; production cost over-runs on specific weapons systems).

There are, of course, risks of this kind. They can not be avoided. However, they should be minimized by careful study of the costs and impacts of the GOI's programs that involve U.S. participation so that consultation with the Government of Iran could improve its timely understanding of the possible consequences of these programs. The U.S. should see to

it that institutional arrangements for U.S.-Iranian cooperation are designed and operated so that: (a) the decisions regarding what is to be done in Iran are clearly unilateral decisions of the GOI (with the U.S. being free, of course, to extend or withhold its cooperation in specific instances); and (b) funding of direct and indirect costs of Iranian projects and developmental programs is the exclusive responsibility of the Government of Iran. The U.S. Government would assist the GOI in getting comprehensive cost estimates and in obtaining high quality material and expertise.

The U.S.-Iran Joint Commission, established in 1974, was intended to further U.S.-Iranian cooperation in non-military fields. It has not yet led to the execution of projects on the scale expected--partly because Iran's petroleum revenues have not kept pace with its expenditures and partly for other reasons (including Iran's belief that the U.S. should bear overhead expenditures for some of the reimbursable technical assistance extended to Iran). U.S. interests do not appear to have suffered as a result of the slow pace of Commission activity. The U.S. should stand ready to assist the GOI to get the best U.S. goods and services, at full cost. U.S.-Iranian collaboration rests on Iran's belief that the U.S. has the world's best array of production goods and technology. The best is, usually, expensive. The U.S. interest lies in supplying the best; in purveying (on full cost-recovery basis) goods and technology having appeal for a well-funded developing nation anxious to be one up on its neighbors.

Looking to the future, it seems probable that Iran will continue on the course it took in 1973, when OPEC took charge of world oil pricing. It is almost inevitable that Iran will continue to rely on the U.S. as the major source of the extra-regional support it needs for its security and development. Hence the U.S. presence in Iran will almost surely increase. There are now an estimated 22,000-25,000 Americans in Iran. It is believed that the number may increase to some 30,000 in 1980-81 and then level off. (Of the 30,000 in 1980-81, some two thirds will be defense contractors and their dependents.) For this and other reasons the Inspectors consider that the U.S. Mission in Iran is more likely to grow than to shrink in the coming years.

A second, paradoxical element in the situation that has generated considerable concern among some elements of the American public is that Iran's growing economic and military strength, arising in part out of our arms sales policy, may enable it to play an independent regional role running counter to U. S. interests. This concern has not been changed by U. S. efforts to balance its arms sales to Iran by similar assistance to other states in the region. It remains that Iran has either reached, or soon will reach, the point where it could pursue a regional policy at cross purposes with that of the U. S., e.g., vis-à-vis its oil-rich Gulf neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia, or Israel.

A third factor in the situation is that Iranian oil production is important to the U. S. and vital--at least for the time being--to Western Europe, Israel and Japan. American policy makers must take this into account in dealing with the Shah. Further, the U. S. - Iranian economic relationship, even the non-military portion of it, is large and expanding. In 1975, the bilateral balance of trade, excluding military sales, amounted to $1.1 billion in favor of the U. S. Iran will doubtless be an important market for the U. S. for the foreseeable future.

Finally, the evolution of U. S. policy towards Iran has resulted in a very heavy emphasis on the military and intelligence elements of the bilateral relationship between the two countries.

3. U. S. Interests

Broad U. S. interests call for the continuance of a stable, responsible and friendly Iran. They also require a great deal of practical cooperation. The United States needs certain military intelligence facilities which are essential to the American capacity to monitor and analyze Soviet missile developments and capabilities and Soviet adherence to arms control agreements. The Inspectors were told that there are no alternative locations to those the U. S. now has in Iran. The United States also needs overflight

rights so that American civil and military aircraft from Europe and the Mediterranean have access (via Turkey) to the Indian Ocean and South Asia. The only alternative is a more sensitive route over Egypt or Israel. The U. S. needs access to Iran's oil, at reasonable prices, and to its growing markets. Iranian non-military imports in 1975 were $10.3 billion, of which the U. S. supplied $2.0 billion, and it is estimated that by 1980 the Iranian (civilian) market will be in the neighborhood of $20.6 billion. Iran's oil is important to the U. S. and essential to its allies. This will remain true in the coming decade. U. S. interests also require that Iran continue to play a constructive regional role, and that Soviet influence in the region remain limited.

4. Key Policies

The U. S. policies that flow from its interests in Iran and the Gulf region have remained fairly constant over the past years. Though not embodied in any single policy document, the U. S. has sought to secure its interests in Iran through a regional policy framework which, of course, gives rise to differences in the specific policies followed in individual countries to achieve the general objectives. Main elements of this policy were reiterated by the Secretary of State as recently as August 1976. The policy framework has been:

a. To support collective security and stability by encouraging indigenous regional cooperative efforts and orderly economic progress. This has included being responsive to requests from the regional states for advice on military equipment and services they need to meet their defense and internal security needs as they perceive them, and being responsive on a case by case basis to requests to purchase equipment or services. A Presidential decision in 1972 specifically affirmed such a policy towards Iran: "... in general, decisions on the acquisition of military equipment should be left primarily to the Government of Iran.

If it has decided to buy certain equipment, the purchase of U. S. equipment should be encouraged tactfully where appropriate, and technical advice on the capabilities of the equipment in question should be provided.";

b. To obtain continued access to the region's oil at reasonable prices and in sufficient quantities to meet U. S. needs and those of its allies;

c. To encourage states in the area to resolve territorial and other disputes by peaceful means and to widen the channels of communication between them;

d. To expand the U.S. diplomatic, cultural, technical, commercial, and financial presence and activities; and

e. To assist oil exporters to employ their rapidly growing incomes in a constructive way, supportive of the international system.

The U. S. has a bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement with Iran, concluded in a CENTO context in 1959, which commits the U. S. to take mutually agreed upon action to assist Iran "in case of aggression against Iran" by a Communist country. There is also a Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, as well as an Investment Guaranty Agreement.

B. Policy Formulation System

1. Policy Formulation

As is true generally of the US foreign policy process, a variety of more or less interlocking systems and interest groups determine US policy towards Iran and the Gulf region. Major decisions are reached by the seventh floor and White House. This top level involvement in the USG mirrors, to an extent, that of the Shah in Iran. Effective execution requires, of course, timely advice to the US officials concerned of policy decisions affecting them. In the case of

Iran, the Assistant Secretary for NEA, the Ambassador and, to a lesser extent, the Country Director are usually informed and can oversee developments so as to conform to high level decisions without excessive confusion or false-stepping. In a recent case, however, Treasury officials stated that they were not informed about the US position on a possible Iranian arms-for-oil barter arrangement involving very substantail sums of money.

The Embassy and Country Directorate contribute actively to the preparation of ongoing policy assessments which, judging from results, have some impact on higher level decision makers. Other agencies can and do make their input to the policy formulation process by means of Country Team procedures in the field. In Washington this input is achieved through day-to-day contact with the Country Directorate. The Near East Inter-Departmental Group has not played the active role some previous examinations of US Gulf region policy have concluded would be desirable.

In a major attempt to illuminate some of the contradictions and dilemmas inherent in US efforts to pursue an active bilateral relationship with Iran while at the same time not foreclosing advantageous regional policy options, the Political/Military Inter-Departmental Group has produced a study (response to NSSM 238) "US Policy Towards the Persian Gulf". This is a useful compendium of the issues involved. It provides much background information and shows the complicated interaction which policy initiatives in one area may have in others. This study reaches no clear conclusions about the desirability of various policy "mixes" and its usefulness may remain, in consequence, chiefly as a reference work.

Affecting the development of policy, but outside the formal system, are the meetings of US officials of several agencies with Iranian officials, occasionally including the Shah. Such meetings are necessary for the conduct of much Government business. They are desirable to the extent that the results fit in with US policy and are known to those principally responsible for the execution of that policy. Inevitably, this is not always the case. There has been at least one instance in which contact with the Shah by high level US military officials resulted in what could be, and apparently was, regarded as a US commitment to use certain facilities in the Iranian Indian Ocean port of Chah Bahar if they were developed. It was not an inconsequential matter as there was no Iranian need for them (aircraft carrier turnaround basin, large submarine repair facilities) and the Inspectors were told that they could have added as much as several hundred million dollars to the cost of developing the port.

It is not clear, on the basis of information available to the Inspectors, whether this apparent departure from US policy was the result of misunderstanding, ignorance or a lack of awareness of the implications of the specific measures proposed. In any event, had the Shah gone ahead with the development plan, incorporating facilities which could logically only be used by the U. S. Navy, it would have cast doubt on the Administration's publicly declared Indian Ocean policy, which stresses the limited nature of U. S. naval deployment plans. It would have had adverse effects on a number of bilateral and regional relationships, to say nothing of the credibility of the Executive Branch on the Hill at a time when the upgrading of the US naval facility at Diego Garcia was the subject of some controversy. In the event, it appears that the case has been handled so that the potential adverse impact may be minimal. Nevertheless, it would seem that there was either some looseness in operations or lack of control and understanding of US policy by those involved.

Increased Congressional involvement in the foreign affairs processes generally has an effect on the formulation of policy affecting Iran. The country's strategic importance, huge purchases of US arms, potential Middle East role, oil pricing policies and authoritarian form of government have all been the object of questioning by one or another element of the Congress. Particular Congressional attention has been focused in the past on the oil price issue, and currently on the long range commitments and possibly dangerous consequences arising from US arms sales to Iran and other Gulf states. The Inspectors consider that the Executive Branch has been attentive to these concerns and has engaged in a process of consultation --as reflected, especially recently, in the record of the Hamilton Subcommittee hearings--which has gone some way to explain and justify official policy. This process has not, of course, reconciled the intractable problems of our policy nor fully satisfied members of Congress that their concerns have been taken into account adequately. Nevertheless, the process has been a useful and, in the Inspectors' view, a constructive one.

C. Policy Effectiveness

US policy towards Iran has been highly effective in securing most US interests. The only significant US objective not attained has been in the area of oil pricing policy. To be fully effective, whether in a bilateral or multilateral context, US efforts to achieve lower oil prices will have to be part of a national energy policy, properly integrated with effective multilateral negotiations. The absence of such a policy, conversely, makes it unlikely that US representations to the Shah on this subject will achieve desired results.

The US policy of supporting regional efforts to achieve collective security through security assistance, arms sales and other support--i.e., the Nixon Doctrine--would appear to have contributed to a situation in the Gulf region today that is more satisfactory from the US viewpoint than it has been for many years. The area is relatively peaceful. Iran and Iraq have patched up their relations and Iran has moved to improve its relations with other Arab governments. The rebellion in Dhofar is under control as a result of Iranian armed intervention. However fragile the foundations of the present quiet and uncertain the future, it is a fact that there is relative political stability and rapid economic development taking place throughout the region and that the US benefits in commercial and political terms from this situation.

If U.S. policies may be judged to have been successful in securing key US interests, they have also produced some paradoxical results. One of these, already mentioned, is that Iran is becoming a power--thanks in part to US arms sales policy--capable of playing a regional role opposing, as well as furthering, US interests. Another is that the Iranian desire to purchase US arms and US willingness to go far in permitting these purchases has had the practical and distorting effect of making the military element the key factor in the bilateral relationship. In the longer run, this may not be the best basis for a constructive relationship. US policy recognizes this and calls for expanded contact in the cultural, trade, and other areas; but this has not altered the facts. Also, in an increasingly nationalistic Iran, the US has become identified as the principal external support for a ruler who, however enlightened and progressive his aspirations for his people, is nevertheless master of an authoritarian and undemocratic regime. This promises to present the US with future problems.

Finally, a deficiency which reduces the effectiveness of and public support for our arms sales policy is the absence of agreed and reasonably comprehensive criteria to define its limits. All US officials appear to agree there must be limits, but where they are or should be remains a gray area which needs clarification. The traditional distinctions between offensive and defensive weapons are inadequate guides. Also, the question arises as to the limit which Iran, in its own interest, should place on its use of scarce resources for military purposes--at the expense of its social and economic development.

II. MANAGEMENT

A. Policy Execution

Iran's Government is highly centralized in the person of the Shah. Accordingly, the effective execution of U.S. policy in Iran depends to a remarkable degree upon the access of the Ambassador and ranking members of his Mission staff to the Shah and to the small circle of Iranian officials who have influence with him. The Ambassador has excellent personal access to the Shah and other key Iranian officials. There are other high ranking Mission officers who also have this access, which they exercise with the Ambassador's knowledge and full control, thus assuring adequate and effective communication with the Government of Iran at top levels. In the Ambassador's absence, the DCM has like access to the Shah, the Minister of Court, and other Iranian Ministers and effectively fills the Chargé role.

B. Bilateral Relations

Since World War II U.S. relations with Iran have been close and have expanded in recent years to cover a broad spectrum of political, military, intelligence, economic/financial/investment, and technical matters. Iran's geographic position and oil resources and the Shah's geopolitical perceptions of Iran's leadership have led Iran to intimate collaboration with the United States on many key issues. The United States has been prepared to reciprocate this collaboration, as it is U.S. policy under the Guam Doctrine to favor those countries, such as Iran, which are ready, willing and able to assume regional security responsibilities.

Relations between the Embassy and the Government of Iran reflect the excellent relationship between the two countries. Not only do the Ambassador and other designated officials have close and friendly

relationships with the Shah and other senior officials of the Government of Iran, but other officers of the Mission have good access to Iranian Government officials and to important leaders in the private sector. These contacts are not always as useful as they might be, however, because all major decisions in Iran are made at the top. Even relatively senior officials are not well informed about policies and plans and have little influence on them. The Embassy also has difficulty in developing information about dissidence and about attitudes among the military because of Iranian sensitivities and the Government of Iran's disapproval of foreign contacts with these groups.

C. Resources

The nature of the US-Iranian bilateral relationship, described above, is such that the pattern of U.S. official resources devoted to Iran responds to Iranian decisions as to what Iran needs and can afford.

There have been adequate resources--except for physical plant--to carry out the policy objectives of the Mission. These resources should continue to suffice for the time being, pending possible Iranian decisions to request more reimbursable technical assistance. The Ambassador has sought to keep the official presence in Iran at the minimum consistent with operational effectiveness. Even so, the non-official presence has continued to grow and--given Iran's increased income and its propensity to rely on the United States for military and civilian goods and services--the American presence in Iran will continue to increase. So, too, will the flow of Iranian visitors (especially students, officials and trainees) to the United States. These factors, plus inflationary pressures in Iran, make inevitable some increase in the resources the Embassy will require in the future.

As the Mission has grown, the Embassy Chancery building has become grossly inadequate to meet office needs. The efficiency and security of a number of

Mission elements (notably those of the Consular Section) are hampered by their having to occupy inconvenient and make-shift quarters. The major immediate resource requirement of the Embassy is for suitable offices for these elements until such time as the Chancery is expanded. Plans for expansion of the Chancery have been approved; the current need is for budgetary provision to carry them out.

D. Management of the Mission

The authority and responsibility of the Ambassador for all official American activities in Iran are understood and accepted by every subordinate element. His control over the diverse military units in Iran was strengthened in 1975 by the creation of the position of Senior Defense Representative, who has coordinating authority over the entire military establishment. The Defense Representative reports directly to and takes policy guidance from the Ambassador, as do all other agency representatives. The Ambassador meets daily with Heads of Section, weekly with the Country Team, and whenever required with all other U.S. agencies and representatives in the Mission in order to maintain essential communications and coordination. Many day-to-day management problems are left to the DCM and to Heads of Section and other Mission elements.

E. Management of State Elements

In general, the Executive Office manages Embassy Sections by direction and delegation. Section Chiefs bring jurisdictional and other operational problems to the Executive Office for resolution. They, in turn, are expected to manage their sections. This style of operation has been effective in most areas, but it presents some problems of compartmentalization and lateral communications that need attention. Also, of course, managerial problems vary from Section to Section and some Heads of Section are better managers than are others. The Political and Political/Military Sections are doing well; however, political officers

might do more in-country travel and expanding work requirements of the Political/Military Section may soon call for an additional officer position. The Economic/Commercial Section is also performing well; however, it could be better integrated, and it could work more efficiently if space permitted consolidating offices and some functions. The Administrative Section has good leadership and is using effective management methods to get good results. Some major problems (e.g., housing) are on the way to solution. The Embassy has avoided the impact of position ceilings by the use of contract personnel, and the resulting situation needs to be regularized. The management of the Consular Section needs to be improved, but improvement in some areas will depend on obtaining suitable office and reception space.

F. Constituent Posts

Overall, the Embassy gives the three Consulates adequate administrative support. Certain security measures remain to be taken, however. The Consulates should have adequate emergency radio communications facilities linking them to the Embassy. Policy guidance and general supervision is provided by the Embassy's Consular Coordinator, currently the Deputy Head of the Political Section. At some point this responsibility should be transferred to the Counselor for Consular Affairs, whose position should then be upgraded to Consul General. The Consulates would benefit from closer supervision and coordination of their consular and their commercial work. Consulate Tabriz is a marginal post and should be closed. Consulate Isfahan, also marginal at present, should be retained to serve a growing American community. Consulate Isfahan's offices and consular residence are both insecure and should be relocated.

G. Relations with Washington

The Mission and its senior officers have generally satisfactory relations with Washington at several levels. The Country Directorate is ably staffed and is the focal point for back-stopping the Embassy and for the

execution of policy in Washington. The Directorate has close and effective contacts with the Department of Defense and with the large number of Washington agencies interested in Iran. On certain matters (e.g., long-term energy policy, future exports of nuclear technology and other matters which are under consideration at high levels within the Department and the Administration) the Country Directorate obtains little current information or guidance to pass along to the Mission. When the latter does get guidance on such matters or reports on them the correspondence often is given highly restricted distribution, both in Washington and at the Mission. Other agency representatives believe that they are not receiving in timely fashion all the information that would be of use to them.

A major problem of Mission-Washington relations is that of handling arms sales effectively. The Government of Iran has complained of difficulty in obtaining from the Mission (ARMISH/MAAG) firm and accurate data on the costs of weapons systems. This problem is recognized, the Inspectors understand, and steps to cope with it are being taken. In their view, the Mission should be in a position not only to provide valid acquisition cost data but also good estimates of follow-on costs (training, operational, maintenance, etc.) of installing weapons systems. Also it should have the capability to provide to the Government of Iran useful micro- and macro-economic estimates of effects on the Iranian economy of the Government of Iran's present and projected armaments program. It would serve the interests of both Governments to have such information available. Ill-informed Iranian decisions to purchase costly U.S. weapons systems are likely to backfire on both parties and to sour the relations between them. The Inspectors recommend that the Mission take the initiative in launching a study of the costs, direct and indirect, of Iran's military purchase program and that the Department (NEA/IRN) coordinate inter-agency back-stopping of the study.

H. Recommendations

1. The Department (FBO) should include in its next budget submission funds to enlarge the Chancery of Embassy Tehran and should rigorously defend this position.

2. The Department (M) should close Consulate Tabriz.

3. U.S. Mission Tehran should, with support from the Department (NEA/IRN), analyze the impact of the Government of Iran's arms purchase program on the Iranian economy so that, if appropriate, the Government of Iran may be given not only U.S. estimates of the direct financial costs of its program but also of its impact on the Iranian economy.

THE CONDUCT OF RELATIONS
WITH IRAN

III. PRECIS OF PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Department (FBO) should include in its next budget submission funds to enlarge the Chancery of Embassy Tehran and should rigorously defend this position. (Recommendation No. 1.)

2. Embassy Tehran should locate and lease adequate facilities to house in one location the major elements at the Post that serve the public. (Recommendation No. 7.1g-1.)

3. Embassy Tehran should, if it is not possible to implement Recommendation No. 7.1g-1, use existing facilities and/or vacant land near the perimeter of the compound to rehouse the entire consular operations. (Recommendation No. 7.1g-2.)

4. Embassy Tehran should give high priority to remodeling and refurbishing the Consular Section. (Recommendation No. 5-1.)

5. The Department (M) should close Consulate Tabriz. (Recommendation No. 2.)

6. U.S. Mission Tehran should analyze the impact of the Government of Iran's arms purchase program on the Iranian economy so that, if appropriate, the Government of Iran may be given not only U.S. estimates of the direct financial costs of its program but also its impact on the Iranian economy. (Recommendation No. 1.)

7. Embassy Tehran should, in consultation with NEA/EX, (a) determine how many of the 40 contract laborer positions represent a valid, high priority requirement; (b) reprogram the positions recommended by the Inspection team for abolishment; (c) review each remaining local position to determine whether additional positions can be reprogrammed; (d) request additional positions not covered by reprogramming; and (e) discontinue the unauthorized contract for laborers. (Recommendation No. 7.1e-11.)

Table 1 - List of All Resource Recommendations

Post	Delete	Add	Relocate or Otherwise Adjust
Dept.		Request funds (estimated at $3 million) for enlarging Chancery	
Tehran	Abolish two of three Budget and Fiscal Officers--Position Nos. 53-2115-438, 53-2115-353, or 530.1(p).	Authorize and provide funds for an on-line computer terminal for visa clearances.	Give high priority to remodeling and refurbishing the Consular Section.
	Discontinue paying transportation costs of servants.	Consider use of a word-processing machine and more use of form letters in Consular Section.	Assure that most Consular Officers assigned to Iran speak Farsi.
	Abolish two C&R American positions. (Nos. 55-2412-104, 55-2412-168, 55-2412-232, 55-2412-280 or 55-2410-311). Terminate contract for 40 laborers.	Provide more recreational facilities within the Embassy compound. Local position for C&R unclassified processing unit.	Regrade to FO-04 the lead position in American Services Branch and reclassify one of the junior officer positions from 3010 to 3045 and the remaining one to 3025.
	Cease improper use of personal service contracts.	Request additional local positions not covered by reprogramming to replace contract laborers.	Provide on a high priority basis improvements to the Student Visa Annex.
	Cease housing the cook and driver in the transient apartments.	Locate and lease facilities to house in one location the major elements at the Post that serve the public.	Reassess adequacy of Embassy resources to monitor Iranian plans and programs to acquire military military equipment.

Post	Delete	Add	Relocate or Otherwise Adjust
ehran		Install adequate wireless communications facilities between the Embassy and the constituent posts. Install facilities in parking lot adjacent to Consular Annex. One local secretary for Director, Trade Center. One local fiscal assistant and secretary to the Deputy Director, Trade Center	Redesignate, at the appropriate time, the Counselor for Consular Affairs as the Coordinator of the Consulates and redesignate the position as FSO-02, Consul General. Make necessary repairs to the Marine house. Institute a full-scale Junior Officer Rotational Program. Undertake a systematic desk-audit of all State local positions. Abolish and reprogram five of the ten local positions assigned to the Voucher Examination Unit-Position Nos. 531.1(p), 531.6a(p), 531.6b(p), 531.5(p), 531.7b(p), 531.12(p), 531.9b(p), 534.0(p), 533.2(c), or 531.15. Abolish and reprogram the Chief Cashier position (No. 532.2(p)) and one of two remaining cashiers (Position Nos. 532.2(p) or 531.7a)

Post	Delete	Add	Relocate or Otherwise Adjust
Tehran		Improve the telephone system. Rehouse the entire consular operations on the compound if lease facilities cannot be found. Convert transient apartments to permanent housing for single personnel. Modernize and improve the four prefab houses located on the compound. Expedite construction of staff apartment building and consider increasing the number of units.	Abolish and reprogram one of seven positions in Funds Control Unit (Position Nos. 530.6(p) 531.2(p), 531.11(p), 532.3, 531.13, 531.14 (p), or 530.3). Determine optimum size of DEA staff, in MODE context. Abolish and reprogram four telephone operator positions (Position Nos. 551.4(p), 551.10(p), 551.3(p), 551.9, 551.13(p), 551.7(p), or 551.8(p). Discontinue work on the garden or charge all costs to representational expenses. Request additional driver positions if they affect overtime costs.
Isfahan		Install working counter in reception area. Implement security survey recommendations. One PIT position for six month period.	Continue efforts to find more secure offices and residential quarters.
Shiraz		Install door with cipher lock to bar entrance to back offices.	

Post	Delete	Add	Relocate or Otherwise Adjust
Shiraz		Update commercial reference library. Install automatic telephone answering device. Install working counter in reception area. Implement recommendations of latest security survey.	
Tabriz	Cancel contract for cleaning services. Sell additional sections of the compound.	Convert wing of office building now used by school to residence for Vice Consul.	Abolish and reprogram to Embassy Tehran two gardener and one guard positions (Nos. T-S-6(p), T-S-7(p), and T-S-10(p)).

Table 2. Summary of Recommended Position Changes

	Delete			Add			Net		
	FSO/R	FSS	FSL	FSO/R	FSS	FSL	FSO/R	FSS	FSL
Tehran	3	0	13	0	0	19	-3	0	+6
Tabriz	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	-3
Isfahan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shiraz	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
						Grand Total	-3	0	+3

Table 3. U.S. Government Resources, Iran[1/]

	Current Auth. Complement		Appropriated $ Funds (Nearest Thousands)		
	AMER	LOCAL	FY-76	FY-77	FY-78[2/]
STATE					
Program	48	30	1,497	1,832	2,125
Shared	34	142	3,585	4,020	4,663
Representation	--	--	33	49	57
FBO	--	--	76	160	162
FSI	--	--	12	14	17
TOTAL STATE	82	172	5,203	6,075	7,024
MARINE GUARDS	13		22	22	23
USIS					
General Operations	14	80	1,279	1,535	1,781
IBS		1	11	12	13
Fulbright (25) Grants	--	--	219	266	431
TOTAL USIS	14	81	1,509	1,813	2,225

	AMER	LOCAL	FY-76	FY-77	FY-78
COMMERCE					
Trade Center	1	4	237	260	301
Fairs	--	--	288	160	186
Other	--	--	31	10	12
TOTAL COMMERCE	1	4	556	430	499
AGRICULTURE					
Attache	2	1	102	171	204
TOTAL AGRICULTURE	2	1	102	171	204
PEACE CORPS	2	5	514	*	___
TOTAL PEACE CORPS	2	5	514		
*P. C. Phases Out FY-76					
DOD					
DAO	7	5	102	127	146
Other DOD Personnel, including MAAG, TAFT, etc	1637[1/]	634[1/]	see[3/]	___	___
TOTAL	1758	902	8008	8638	10121

1/ Source: U.S. Embassy, Tehran. Figures on US DOD Personnel, however, are from DOD figures.

2/ FY-78 budget is based on 16% average increase factor over FY-77 in State and most agency calculations.

3/ The GOI will pay for all but 8 MAAG positions under the FY-77 security assistance/ TAFT contract. That contract totals $75.9 million and covers 100% of the TAFT cost and 70-80% of support unit costs.

Tehran, Iran
March 8, 1979

His Excellency
Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi
Deputy Prime Minister
Tehran, Iran

Excellency:

The U. S. Embassy would appreciate being able to regain access to the MAC Terminal at Mehrabad Airport in order to recover various items of cargo, household goods, mail and personal vehicles which are located in the cargo yard. Additionally, we respectfully request your approval to enter the MAC Terminal Commander's Office and the Operations Office in order to recover contractual records to insure proper payment of obligations to Iran Air and to recover various personal effects.

We would welcome being accompanied by members of the Iran Air committee. We desire to enter the MAC Terminal area on Sunday, March 11, for removal of items listed in paragraph one.

Sincerely,

William H. Sullivan
Ambassador

DAO:ColSchaefer

NNNN

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DE RUQMHR #3165 0810845
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 220837Z MAR 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACI IMMEDIATE 0486
INFO RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 3165

E.O. 12065: GDS 3/22/85 (SULLIVAN, WILLIAM H.) OR-M
TAGS: MILI, IR
SUBJECT: IRANIAN FMS PROGRAMS

REF: STATE 069188

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DURING PRIME MINISTER'S NOW RUZ RECEPTION, I SPOKE TO ENTEZAM AND YAZDI SEPARATELY ABOUT PGOI MISSION SCHEDULED MEET WITH USG IN WASHINGTON MARCH 26. NEITHER ONE KNEW ANYTHING ABOUT IT.

3. ENTEZAM SAID HE FELT SUCH DISCUSSIONS WERE PREMATURE SINCE PGOI HAD NOT YET STUDIED PROBLEM. HE SUGGESTED MEETING BE POSTPONED. I SAID INITIATIVE CAME FROM IRANIANS AND ACTION TO POSTPONE WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM THIS END.

SULLIVAN

BT
#3163

NNNN

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DE RUQMHR #3395 0881315
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 001
BT
S E C R E T TEHRAN 3395

LIMDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR EAGLEBURGER FROM SULLIVAN

E.O. 12065: GDS 3/28/85 (SULLIVAN, WILLIAM M.) OR-M
TAGS: OGEN
SUBJ: IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO YUGOSLAVIA, SALEHI

REF: BELGRADE 2308

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ME TO GIVE YOU COGENT JUDGMENT CONCERNING FATE WHICH MAY POSSIBLY AWAIT YOUR FRIEND SALEHI IF HE SHOULD RETURN TO TEHRAN. MUCH DEPENDS UPON HIS PERSONAL BACKGROUND AND ALSO UPON POLITICAL CLIMATE WHICH MAY EVENTUALLY EMERGE IN IRAN.

3. IF SALEHI HAD CLOSE PERSONAL TIES WITH SHAH, IMPERIAL COURT, OR SAVAK, HE COULD BE IN SERIOUS TROUBLE IF HE RETURNS. IF, AS YOUR MESSAGE SUGGESTS, HE IS NON-CONTROVERSIAL PROFESSIONAL, HE MAY BE ALL RIGHT. THERE IS LITTLE PRECEDENT ON WHICH TO DRAW AND A GREAT DEAL OF VAGARY IN THE ARBITRARY WAY IN WHICH THE WHEELS OF JUSTICE GRIND.

4. THE A-POLITICAL FORMER UNDER SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS WAS PERMITTED TO REMAIN QUIETLY AT HOME AND CONSIDERED HIMSELF AT LIBERTY. HOWEVER, WHEN HE WENT TO THE AIRPORT TO SEE OFF HIS FRENCH-BORN WIFE ON A TRIP TO PARIS, HE WAS ARRESTED AND HAS NOT BEEN SEEN SINCE. ON THE OTHER HAND, A LT. GENERAL WHO WAS RETIRED BY THE REVOLUTION DROPPED IN TO HAVE TEA WITH ME RECENTLY AND SEEMS AT EASE.

5. I KNOW OF NO RPT NO RECALLED AMBASSADORS WHO COULD

SERVE AS USEFUL GUIDE. SOME PREVIOUSLY RETIRED ARE STILL DRAWING PENSIONS. WHETHER NEWLY RETIRED WILL HAVE SAME PRIVILEGE DEPENDS ON CAPRICE OF "COMMITTEE" AT FOREIGN MINISTRY. FOREIGN MINISTER TOLD ME HE WISHED RETAIN PROFESSIONALS, BUT HE MAY SOON LOSE HIS OWN JOB BECAUSE OF INTERMECING SQUABBLES.

6. ONE THING SALEHI SHOULD RECOGNIZE IS THAT HIS NAME WILL PROBABLY BE ON LIST OF SENIOR OFFICALS FROM PAHLAVI REGIME WHO WILL NOT RPT NOT BE PERMITTED TO LEAVE IRAN ONCE HE RETURNS. THEREFORE, IF HE HAS NOT MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD AVAILABLE IN IRAN, HE MAY NOT RPT NOT BE ABLE TO SEEK ONE ELSEWHERE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. SULLIVAN

BT

#3395

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 03632

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 061332Z APR 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0735
BT
C O N F I D E N T I L L TEHRAN 03632

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STATE
APPRV: CHG:CWNAAS
DRFTD: CHG:CWNAAS
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: CHG
POL

E.O. 12065: GDS 4/6/85 (NAAS, C.W.) OR-M

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, PINS, IR.
SUBJ: MEETING WITH FORMIN UNDERSECRETARY SALAMATIAN

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN, ACCOMPANIED BY DCM NAAS, MADE CALL APRIL 5 ON FONMIN UNDERSECRETARY SALAMATIAN WHO WAS RECENTLY CONFIRMED AS THE SECOND RANKING MAN IN THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY. THE AMB NOTED THAT HE WAS RETURNING TO THE UNITED STATES ON CONSULTATIONS AND WANTED TO KNOW WHAT MESSAGE THE PROVISIONAL ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF IRAN WISHED PASSED TO U.S. OFFICIALS. SALAMATIAN SAID THE AMB SHOULD IMPRESS UPON THOSE WITH WHOM HE CONSULTED THE SUCCESS OF THE REVOLUTIONS AND THE DESIRE OF CLOSE FREINDSHIP WITH THE U.S. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS MATTER PRIOR TO THE MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER SO THAT HIS STATEMENT OF FRIENDSHIP WAS SHARED BY THE HIGHEST OFFICIALS IN THE GOVERNMENT. THE AMB REPLIED THAT HE HAD ALREADY TOLD THE U.S. GOVERNMENT THAT HE BELIEVES FREINDSHIP WITH IRAN WILL ENDURE AND THAT BASIC INTEREST WILL BE PRESERVED BUT IT WILL BE A DIFFERENT KIND OF RELATIONSHIP THAN WE HAD WITH THE SHAH'S GOVERNMENT. FOR MANY REASONS, THE UNITED STATES WISHES IRAN TO BE STRONG, FREE,. INDEPENDENT AND TO MAINTAIN ITS NATIONAL INTEGRITY. WE LOOK FORWARD, HE SAID, TO A NORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN.

3. SALAMATIAN, WHO SPEAKS SOFTLY BUT WITH SOME OVERTONES OF PASSION, SAID THAT AMERICANS SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION HAS HAD MANY OF THE SAME CHARACTERISTICS AS OUR OWN REVOLUTION IN 1776. THE GREAT AMERICAN PRESIDENTS--WASHINGTON, JEFERSON, LINCOLN--

ARE GREATLY RESPECTED HERE. MANY ASPECTS OF THE IRANIAN CONSTITUTION WERE INSPIRED BY THE U.S. CONSTITUTION. HE QUOTED LINCOLN: " YOU CAN DECIVE SOME OF THE PEOPLE SOME OF THE TIME..., AND ADDED THAT A BASIC ERROR OF THE SHAH WAS HIS BELIEF THAT YOU COULD DECEIVE ALL OF THE PEOPLE ALL OF THE TIME. HE WAS PLEASED, HE SAID, THAT THE UNITED STATES WANTS AN INDEPENDENT IRAN WHICH MAINTAINS ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION WAS, HE EMPHASIZED, PURELY IRANIAN AND DID NOT HAVE FOREIGN INSPIRATION.

4. THE AMB RESPONDED THAT THE USG UNDERSTANDS THAT THE REVOLUTION WAS PURELY INTERNAL BUT ONE OF THE REALITIES WE BOTH MUST FACE IS THE CONSTANT STREAM OF PROPAGANDA FROM THE SOVIET UNION TRYING TO DECEIVE IRANIANS RE THE U.S. ROLE HERE. WE ARE DISTURBED BY THE HEAVY FLOW OF LIES FORM MOSCOW AND THEN THE REPETITION OF THESE LIES HERE BY IRANIAN FRIENDS OF THE SOVIETS . HE NOTED THAT KAYHAN WAS GUILTY IN PARTICULAR OF CARRYING SOVIET PROPAGANDA AND HE HOPED THAT SENIOR GOI OFFICIALS WOULD RECOGNIZE THE LIES. HE ADDED THAT, ON THE BASIS OF CONVERSATIONS, PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN RECOGNIZED THE DANGER OF THIS PROPAGANDA. IN RESPONSE SALAMATIAN SAID ONCE AGAIN THAT HE WAS PLEASED BY THE U.S. CONCERN OVER THE UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF HIS COUNTRY. TURNING TO THE IRANIAN PRESS, SALAMATIAN SAID THAT IT WAS NATURAL AFTER 25 YEARS OF SUPPRESSION THAT THE PRESS WOULD ON OCCASION GIVE VENT TO ITS EMOTIONS; THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS VERY IMPORTANT TO THE REVOLUTIONAIRES.

5. THE AMB REFFERED TO A RECENT KAYHAN STORY THAT THE U.S. HAD CONSPIRED WITH SAVAK TO BLOW UP THE HOUSES OF A NUMBER OF PROMINENT IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARIES SUCH AS AYATOLLAH TALAGHANI. THE ARTICLE IS PURE FABRICATION BUT, THE AMB SAID, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT SUCH MATERIAL INCITES OTHERS AND THAT THIS CAH RESULT IN THE HARASSMENT OF PEOPLE ASSOCIATED WITH THE EMBASSY OR U.S. FIRMS. THE AMB THEN MENTIONED THE CASES OF REZA AMINI OF ICA, MR. SHEBANI OF AIU AND DOWLATSHAHI OF MOTOROLA (SEPTELS).
NAAS
BT
#3632

Chd
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OP 091453Z APR 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 1574—
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 088400

AGREMENT CHANNEL
FOR CHARGE

E.O. 12065:ADS DECONTROL UPON WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

TAGS: APER (CUTLER, WALTER L., FSO-1)

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR AGREMENT

1. PRESIDENT DESIRES APPOINT WALTER L. CUTLER (FSO-1) AS AMBASSADOR TO IRAN. PLEASE REQUEST WRITTEN AGREMENT AND INFORM DEPARTMENT SOONEST WHEN AGREMENT RECEIVED. REQUEST GOI OFFICIALS KEEP PROPOSED APPOINTMENT IN COMPLETE CONFIDENCE PENDING WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT NOMINATION. BIO DATA IN BIOGRAPHIC REGISTER.

2. PLEASE SEEK PERMISSION TO MAKE ANNOUNCEMENT BASIS ORAL AGREMENT PENDING RECEIPT WRITTEN AGREMENT AND KEEEP DEPARTMENT INFORMED POSSIBLE TIMING. CHRISTOPHER
BT
#8400

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
STATE
CHG:CWNAAS
CHG:CWNAAS
NONE
NONE

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC, PRIORITY

AGREMENT CHANNEL

E.O. 12065: ADS DECONTROL UPON WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT
TAGS: APER (CUTLER, WALTER L., FSO-1)
SUBJ: REQUEST FOR AGREMENT

REF: STATE 88400

I DELIVERED NOTE TO FOREIGN OFFICE MORNING OF APRIL 11. GOUDARZNIA, HEAD OF FOURTH DEPARTMENT, THOUGHT THAT IRANIAN REPLY WOULD TAKE ABOUT A WEEK. HE ALSO SAID HE WOULD SEEK AGREEMENT TO HAVE ANNOUNCEMENT MADE ON THE BASIS OF ORAL AGREMENT. NAAS##

CONFIDENTIAL
STATE
CHG:CWNAAS
POL:JDSTEMPEL
NONE

CWN
JDS

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BAHRAIN
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY MANAMA

E.O. 12065: GDS 04/12/85(STEMPEL, J.D.)OR-P
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PINT
SUBJ: MEETING WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER YAZDI

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT THIS IS A REPORTING MESSAGE.)

2. SUMMARY: CHARGE OUTLINED U.S. DESIRE TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS AND SPEAK FRANKLY ABOUT PROBLEMS. YAZDI, NOTING U.S. INVOLVEMENT WITH PAST REGIME, EMPHASIZED LETTING PAST GO, COOPERATING IN CERTAIN AREAS, AND HAVING NEW AMBASSADOR WHO UNDERSTOOD IRAN AND IRANIAN REVOLUTION. END SUMMARY.

3. CHARGE ACCOMPANIED BY ACTING POL CHIEF STEMPEL CALLED ON DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER YAZDI AT HIS OFFICE APRIL 12. THIS CABLE COVERS GENERAL PRESENTATION; SEPTELS (NOTAL) WILL DEAL WITH OTHER SPECIFIC MATTERS.

4. CHARGE OPENED BY NOTING HE HAD JUST RETURNED FROM CONSULTATIONS AND WOULD BE IN CHARGE UNTIL NEW AMBASSADOR ARRIVED. HE EXPRESSED USG DESIRE TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS AS CONDITIONS PERMIT AND NOTED THERE WERE SEVERAL SHARED INTERESTS WHICH OFFERED OPPORTUNITY FOR U.S. AND IRAN TO WORK TOGETHER. U.S. GOALS WERE SIMPLE: WE WANT TO SEE IRAN MAINTAIN ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, REMAIN INDEPENDENT OF FOREIGN POLITICAL DOMINATION AND DEVELOP ECONOMICALLY. TOUCHING ON PROBLEM OF PAST TIES TO OLD REGIME, CHARGE SAID U.S. HAS NO ULTERIOR MOTIVES AND DOES NOT WISH TO EMBARASS NEW GOVERNMENT BY PRESSING RECONCILIATION. USG WOULD BE RESPONSIBE TO IRANIAN WISHES. HE SOLICITED ANY

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CONFIDENTIAL

SUGGESTIONS YAZDI MIGHT HAVE ON STEPS THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN IN THIS DIRECTION, AND URGED DEPUTY PM TO BRING TO HIS ATTENTION ANY PROBLEMS OR CHARGES AGAINST U.S. CHARGE EMPHASIZED IT IS BETTER TO DISCUSS FRANKLY THAN TO LET PROBLEMS FESTER.

5. YAZDI RESPONDED THAT ONE GREAT OBSTACLE TO NORMALIZING IRANO-US TIES WAS INDEED QUOTE YOUR DEEP INVOLVEMENT WITH PREVIOUS REGIME UNQUOTE. HE MOVED SWIFTLY TO MORE POSITIVE TACK, NOTING THAT GOVERNMENT IS READY TO NORMALIZE WHEN U.S. QUOTE DEGREE OF RESPONSIVENESS TO CORRECT PROBLEMS OF PAST UNQUOTE (UNSPECIFIED) WAS CLEAR. PAST IS PAST, HE SAID, AND IRANIANS ARE PRAGMATIC. THERE ARE MANY AREAS FOR COOPERATION. IRAN WILL IN DUE COURSE NEED U.S. TECHNOLOGY AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. NORMAL RELATIONS WOULD BE BASED ON MUTUAL RESPECT. IN THIS CONNECTION, YAZDI SAID APPOINTMENT OF NEW AMBASSADOR WAS A VERY POSITIVE STEP, ESPECIALLY IF HE IS QUOTE SOMEONE WHO UNDERSTANDS THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION.UNQUOTE CHARGE ASSURED HIM NEW APPOINTEE WOULD BE THAT KIND OF PERSON. (COMMENT: IF YAZDI HAS BEEN INFORMED OF APRIL 11 REQUEST FOR AGREMENT, HE GAVE NO HINT OF IT.) YAZDI THEN ADDED THAT NEW APPOINTEE SHOULD HAVE HAD QUOTE MINIMUM ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY INVOLVEMENT IN OTHER COUNTRIES. UNQUOTE CABINET AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS, INCLUDING KHOMEINI, ARE READY FOR NORMALIZATION AS BASIC STEPS ARE TAKEN.

6. DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO QUESTION OF REVOLUTIONARY COURTS AND OTHER SPECIFIC ITEMS (BEING REPORTED SEPTELS). NAAS##

CONFIDENTIAL

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 121353Z APR 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0850
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 03877

CLASS: SECRET
CHRGE: STATE
APPRV: CHG:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL ECON ICA

E.O. 12065: RGDS 4/12/99 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, SHUM, IR
SUBJ: YAZDI MEETING: REVOLUTIONARY TRIALS

REF: A. TEHRAN 3859, B. STATE 90863

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT -- THIS IS A REPORTING MESSAGE)

2. SUMMARY: CHARGE EXPRESSED U.S. CONCERN WITH SUMMARY NATURE OF TRIALS AND EXECUTIONS. YAZDI ACCEPTED CRITICISM, SAID GOVERNMENT WAS TRYING TO IMPROVE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE, BUT PUBLIC ANGER WAS SUCH THAT NEW GOVERNMENT HAD DIFFICULTY KEEPING REVOLUTIONARIES FROM KILLING FORMER OFFICIALS IN STREETS. TO UNDERLINE HIS POINT, HE SHOWED CHARGE SET OF GRUESOME PHOTOS FROM OLD SAVAK FILES OF PERSONS TORTURED TO DEATH AS EVIDENCE OF WHAT PEOPLE WERE MAD ABOUT. THE GOVERNMENT'S PROBLEM WAS IN CONVINCING REVOLUTIONARIES TO MAKE EVIDENCE PUBLIC. YAZDI ALSO NOTED THAT COUNTER REVOLUTIONARIES WERE AT WORK, AND SAID GOVERNMENT HAD ALREADY GOT KHOMEINI ARGEEMENT TO HUMANITARIAN CLEMENCY AND SENTENCING POLICY. IMPLEMENTATION AWAITED RIGHT POLITICAL MOMENT. END SUMMARY.

3. AFTER PRESENTATION OF U.S. VIEWS ON TIES WITH NEW REGIME (REF A), CHARGE TURNED TO DISCUSSION OF REVOLUTIONARY TRIALS IN SPIRIT OF FRANK AND FRIENDLY DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS. DRAWING ON REF B GUIDANCE, CHARGE EXPRESSED CONCERN BEING FELT BY MANY IN U.S., PARTICULARLY THOSE WHO HAD SUPPORTED IRANIAN REVOLUTION, AT ACTION OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COURTS. THIS REACTION COULD SLOW DOWN PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION. JUST AS IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARIES SUSPECT U.S. OF CERTAIN THINGS, AMERICANS AND OTHER WESTERN NATIONS ARE DISHEARTED BY THIS APPARENT WARPING OF REVOLUTION AND THIS GENERATES QUESTIONS ABOUT REAL INTENTIONS OF REVOLUTIONARIES. CHARGE EXPRESSED USG AND PERSONAL HOPE THAT REVOLUTIONARY TRIALS AND EXECUTIONS COULD STOP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. U.S. INTEREST WAS HUMANITARIAN AND DID NOT REFLECT CONCLUSIONS OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE OF SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS. RECALLING THAT DEPUTY PM HAD FLED IRAN BECAUSE OF HIS OPPOSITION TO THE SHAH'S REGIME AND LATER RETURNED TO SERVE HIS COUNTRY, CHARGE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT REVOLUTIONARY EXCESSES WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO ALIENATE ANOTHER GENERATION FROM PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL LIFE. NOW IS THE TIME, HE SAID, FOR NATIONAL HEALING AND MERCY.

4. YAZDI WAS VERY FORTHCOMING. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD PROBLEM, MANY PEOPLE HAD EXPRESSED SAME THOUGHTS TO GOVERNMENT. AT THIS POINT HE WENT TO HIS DESK AND WITH-

DREW A FILE CONTAINING 50 OR 60 SHEETS OF PAPER WITH PICTURES ATTACHED. YAZDI SAID THESE WERE SAVAK FILES WHICH HAD BEEN CAPTURED BY REVOLUTION AND SHOWED BEFORE-AND-AFTER RESULTS OF TORTURE ON MANY INDIVIDUALS. THESE, HE SAID, EXPLAIN WHY GOVERNMENT HAS SUCH DIFFICULTY KEEPING REVOLUTIONARIES FROM KILLING OLD REGIME'S OFFICIALS IN STREETS. (COMMENT: PHOTOS, WHICH SEEMED AUTHENTIC, WERE GRUESOME SET OF EVIDENCE SHOWING MANGLED AND TORTURED BODIES. YAZDI CLEARLY HAS EFFECTIVE TACTIC HERE.) YAZDI SAID REVOLUTIONARY COURTS HAD SEEN SUCH PHOTOS AND IT WAS DIFFICULT TO COUNSEL LENIENCY IN WAKE OF SUCH EVIDENCE OF ATROCITIES BY OLD REGIME. GOVERNMENT WAS TRYING TO GET TRIALS INSTITUTIONALIZED TO PREVENT WORST EXCESSES OF REVENGE IN THE STREETS AND HOMES. YAZDI RECOUNTED ONE INCIDENT WHERE EX-SAVAK OFFICER IN ISFAHAN HAD BEEN TORTURED TO DEATH BY REVOLUTIONARY SOLDIERS. WHEN YAZDI SUMMONED SOLDIER TO HIS PRESENCE FOR EXPLANATION, SOLDIER SHOWED HIM HIS OWN MARRED BODY AND SAID HE HAD JUST DONE TO HIS TORMENTOR WHAT HAD BEEN DONE TO HIM.

5. ON QUESTION OF EVIDENCE, YAZDI SAID THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE LINKING MANY FROM PAST, INCLUDING SOME WHO WERE THOUGHT TO BE "CLEAN" AND ABOVE REPROACH WITH EXCESSES. BAZARGAN, ETEZAM AND YAZDI PERSONALLY OBJECTED TO WAY KHOMEINI COMMITTEE WAS HANDLING MATTER OF SUMMARY JUSTICE. PGOI WAS WORKING TO TRY AND IMPROVE SITUATION. CHARGE EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF PROBLEM, BUT SAID KILLING SOMEONE LIKE KHALATBARI WHO WAS MERELY TECHNICIAN WAS NOT ONLY EXCESSIVE BUT GAVE GOVERNMENT NEEDLESS BAD IMAGE ABROAD. YAZDI READILY ADMITTED EXECUTIONS OF KHALATBARI, MAJLES SPEAKER RIAZI AND SENATOR VAHIDI "WERE PERHAPS EXCESSIVE, BUT ASKED "WHERE DO YOU DRAW THE LINE?" ACTING POL CHIEF SUGGESTED THAT PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE IN PUBLIC TRIAL WAS PARTICULARLY CRITICAL IN CASES SUCH AS THESE. YAZDI SAID THIS WAS CRUX OF GOVERNMENT'S ARGUMENT WITH KHOMEINI HIMSELF.

6. DEPUTY PM THEN WENT ON TO NOTE THAT TRIALS WERE IN PART POLITICAL -- MANY AGENTS AND OFFICIALS OF OLD REGIME WERE STIRRING UP TROUBLE AND ACTIVELY ATTACKING REVOLUTIONARY FORCES. GOVERNMENT WAS CERTAIN SUCH FORCES WERE
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#3877

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BT
S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 TEHRAN 03877

INVOLVED IN KURDISH AND TURKOMAN TROUBLES, AND PRESSURE HAD TO BE KEPT UP ON SUCH FORCES. TRIALS WERE ONE WAY OF DOING THIS.

7. CHARGE SUGGESTED PERHAPS PROGRAM OF CLEMENCY AND SENTENCES OF LESS THAN DEATH MIGHT IMPROVE ATMOSPHERE. YAZDI SAID THIS WAS ON AGENDA AND ALREADY APPROVED BY CABINET AND KHOMEINI. IMPLEMENTATION COULD NOT BE UNDERTAKEN UNTIL MOMENT WAS RIGHT AND SECURITY SITUATION WAS A BIT CALMER. PUBLIC OPINION MUST BE PREPARED FOR IT. AYATOLLAH TALEQANI HAD BEGUN THIS PROCESS TWO DAYS EARLIER IN SPEECH TO POLICE WHERE HE SPOKE OF MERCY AND CLEMENCY. THERE WAS NO CITY, EVEN SMALLER ONES, WHICH HAD NOT SEEN INNOCENT PEOPLE KILLED DURING AND BEFORE REVOLUTION. LIMITS WOULD BE DRAWN, HOWEVER. THOSE ENGAGED IN VIOLENCE HAD TO BE PUNISHED; OTHER WOULD FARE BETTER. DISCUSSION THEN PASSED TO OTHER MATTERS.

8. COMMENT: YAZDI HANDLED DIFFICULT SUBJECT WITH PATIENCE AND EFFECTIVE EXPLANATION OF DYNAMICS OF SITUATION. THRUST OF HIS PITCH WAS THAT GOVERNMENT IS MAKING BEST OF BAD SITUATION WHICH COULD BE MUCH WORSE. HE AND GOVERNMENTAL COLLEAGUES ARE WORKING TO MITIGATE RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES. WITHOUT SPELLING OUT OR ASKING DIRECTLY, HE WAS TRYING TO ELICIT SOME UNDERSTANDING OF SITUATION HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES FACE. HE UNDERSTANDS REASON FOR AND PROBLEM OF FOREIGN CONCERN, HOWEVER, AND IS UNDOUBTEDLY USING THIS IN HIS OWN AND GOVERNMENT'S CAMPAIGN TO IMPROVE SITUATION. NAAS
BT
#3877

NNNN

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977 - 225-925

ROUTING SLIP	CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL DATE: 4/17/79

TO: Name or Title	Organ. Symbol	Room No.	Bldg.	Initials	Date
1. Charles W. Naas, DCM, Amembassy Tehran					
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					

	Approval	X	For Your Information		Note and Return
	As Requested		Initial for Clearance		Per Conversation
	Comment		Investigate		Prepare Reply
	File		Justify		See Me
	For Correction		Necessary Action		Signature

REMARKS OR ADDITIONAL ROUTING

This is what we sent to the White House in the papers seeking agrement on Sadr. You and others may find it of interest.

FROM: (Name and Org. Symbol)	ROOM NO. & BLDG.	PHONE NO.
NEA/IRN:MGreene:sw	5246A State	
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL		

80133-101

OPTIONAL FORM 133 (FORMERLY JF-29)
JANUARY 1975
STATE - AID - USIA

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976-623-240

Reza Sadr is the Minister of Commerce in Iran's present Bazargan Government and has been nominated to be Ambassador to the United States. Sadr has an exceptionally broad educational background, a number of years of business experience in the United States, and close connections with the present Iranian political and religious leaders.

Sadr was born in Kashan, Iran on February 4, 1933, and completed secondary school there. He then entered Tehran University where he eventually received a BA and PhD in philosophy and religion. His interest in those subjects has continued until now.

Sadr, who had received an Iranian Government scholarship, entered the United States as a student in 1958, studying first at Wayne University and then at the University of Miami (Florida). From the latter, he received a BA in chemistry.

In 1963 Sadr applied for an American immigrant visa, for which his sponsor was the Manifold Supply Company of Brooklyn (manufacturer of business machines and supplies). His visa was approved in 1964 and Sadr became a permanent resident of the United States in 1966. In 1967 he sought an immigrant visa for his wife, Malook Mohadjane Naraghi, who apparently joined him in New York. Sadr in 1971 filed a Declaration of Intentions to become an American citizen,

but there is no record of his having pursued that request.

During his years in New York, Sadr received an MA in management studies from New York University. After 1968 he changed his place of employment and apparently remained in New York until 1978 or early 1979. Sadr travelled extensively around this country.

A thorough search of United States Government sources reveals no ground for objection to Sadr's nomination as Iranian Ambassador to the United States.

Sources for this report are Tehran's cable 3910 of April 15, 1979, as well as the files of INR, INS, and FBI.

Drafted:NEA/IRN:MGreene:sw Clearance:NEA/IRN:HPrecht

1158

CONFIDENTIAL
STATE
CHG:CWNAAS
POL:JDSTEMPEL
POL: MMETRINKO, NGARRETT, ECON: CTAYLOR, RBASH

P.L 1

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 04/21/89 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PGOV, IR
SUBJ: SITTING ON THE CLEFT STICK: THE U.S. IN IRAN

REF: A) TEHRAN 4128 B) TEHRAN 4069 C) TEHRAN 3859

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: IRANIANS' VIEWS OF U.S. HAVE TAKEN A DISTINCT NEGATIVE TURN. MANY OF OUR FRIENDS ARE DISILLUSIONED, MANY ARE AFRAID TO HAVE OPEN CONTACT WITH US. OUR ENEMIES ARE JUBILANT AND AGGRESSIVELY ANTI-AMERICAN. EVEN THOUGH APPOINTMENT OF NEW U.S. AMBASSADOR OFFERS A CHANCE TO PUT MUCH BEHIND US, U.S. - IRAN TIES ARE NOT LIKELY TO APPROACH THE INTIMACY OF THE PAST. WE SHOULD BEGIN OUR ADJUSTMENT TO THIS NOW TO MINIMIZE POLICY DISLOCATION AND MAXIMIZE WHAT WE MAY BE ABLE TO DO UNDER NEW, MORE LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES. END SUMMARY.

3. EMBASSY IS EXTREMELY GRATEFUL FOR CONCERN EXPRESSED BY SECRETARIES VANCE AND NEWSOM AND ASST. SEC. SAUNDERS OVER CURRENT CONDITIONS IN IRAN. AT SAME TIME, HIGH LEVEL SURPRISE OVER ATTITUDES WHICH HAVE BEEN EVOLVING OVER SOME TIME HAVE MADE US ACUTELY AWARE HOW DIFFICULT IT IS TO COMMUNICATE ACCURATELY TO THOSE OUTSIDE THIS RATHER UNUSUAL AND SOMEWHAT ANARCHIC ENVIRONMENT WHAT IS EVOLVING HERE. WE OURSELVES HAVE HAD PROBLEMS ANALYZING AND FULLY COMPREHENDING CHANGES NOW UNDERWAY HERE. THOSE OF US WHO HAVE RECENTLY RETURNED FROM U.S. VISITATION LEAVE PROBABLY FEEL THIS MOST ACUTELY.

4. IN THE SPIRIT OF TAKING ANOTHER STEP FORWARD TOWARD UNDERSTANDING CHANGE AND DRAWING APPROPRIATE CONCLUSIONS FROM IT, THE FOLLOWING IS OFFERED AS A SHORT QUOTE SNAPSHOT UNQUOTE OF WHERE WE ARE. THIS VIEW IS SHARED BY ALL OUR REPORTING OFFICERS WHO HAVE CONTACT WITH IRANIANS (GOING BACK 3 TO 4 YEARS IN SOME CASES.

5. AS A RESULT OF EVENTS OF THE PAST EIGHT MONTHS, MANY OF OUR FRIENDS ARE VERY DISILLUSIONED BY RECENT EVENTS AND MANY ARE FRIGHTENED TO HAVE CONTACT WITH US. LONGSTANDING PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS ARE STILL FRIENDLY, BUT ALMOST ALL IRANIANS SUBSCRIBE TO ONE OF THE WILDER CONSPIRACY THEORIES (OUR CLEVERNESS AT FOMENTING THE KHOMEINI REVOLUTION FOR ANTI-COMMUNIST PURPOSES). OUR ENEMIES AND THOSE HOSTILE TO US (A SOLID MAJORITY OF THE COUNTRY) ARE JUBILANT. EGGED ON BY THOSE WHO TRULY HATE US ON BOTH RIGHT AND LEFT, THEY ARE CREATING A CLIMATE WHERE ASSOCIATION WITH ANYTHING AMERICAN IS TRAITOROUS, ANTI-ISLAMIC, AND EVIL. ISLAMIC ATTEMPTS TO QUOTE PURIFY UNQUOTE IRAN FROM WESTERN CULTURAL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL INFULENCE ARE TURNING INTO A WITCH HUNT WHEREIN GUILT BY ASSOCIATION WITH AMERICANS IS ENOUGH TO CAST UNDER SUSPICION OR TO CONDEMN. WE ARE GENERALLY VIEWED, EVEN BY OUR FRIENDS, AS WEAK AND INEFFECTIVE. IT IS HEARTENING THAT THERE REMAIN PEOPLE WHO, DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL HOSTILE PRESSURE, WILL TAKE SIGNIFICANT PERSONAL RISKS TO TALK TO LONG-TIME AMERICAN FRIENDS. THEY DO NOT WISH TO RECEIVE AMERICANS IN THEIR OFFICES, OR HAVE EMBASSY CARS PARKED OUTSIDE THEIR HOMES; SOME WILL TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO MEET AT RESTAURANTS OR ON NEUTRAL GROUNDS. IN MANY CASES SUCH PEOPLE ARE BEING EASED OUT OF INFLUENTIAL POSITIONS, AND INFORMATION WHICH WAS AVAILABLE TO US THROUGH A TELEPHONE CALL IS BECOMING UNAVAILABLE TO US BY ANY MEANS SHORT OF COVERT ACTION. OUR FEW REMAINING PRIVATE SECTOR COLLEAGUES HAVE EXPERIENCED MUCH THE SAME THING TO A DEGREE WHICH SUGGESTS THE PHENOMENON IS NEARLY UNIVERSAL AND SYSTEMATIC.

6. HISTORY IS LIKELY TO TREAT US MORE KINDLY THAN CONTEMPORARY OPINION, BUT THE REVOLUTIONARY TRAUMA, DISCRETELY AND ABLY ABETTED BY HOSTILE PROPAGANDA HAS EFFECTIVELY AND SUBSTANTIALLY DIMINISHED OUR HISTORIC INFLUENCE HERE FOR SOME TIME TO COME. WE WILL NEVER GET CREDIT FOR REMAINING UNINVOLVED IN DOMESTIC POLITICS. NO PERSIAN TRULY BELIEVES WE HAVE NOT BEEN, AND IF THEY SAY THEY DO, THEY THEN SAY THEY ARE APPALLED BY WHAT THEY VIEW AS OUR CAVALIER DISREGARD OF OUR (AND THEIR) VITAL INTERESTS. THERE IS ENOUGH CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE (HUYSER VISIT, TRIAL TESTIMONY BY THOSE SEEKING TO SAVE THEIR OWN SKINS, ETC.) TO SUPPORT ALMOST ANY PROPOSITION. EVEN THOSE WHO KNOW OF OUR FOREBEARANCE HAVE NO INTEREST IN CLARIFYING THE RECORD. THE SUCCESSFUL REVOLUTIONARIES -- YAZDI, ENTEZAM, BAZARGAN -- CERTAINLY DO NOT, AND THE KHOMEINI ENTOURAGE WOULD BE FANATICALLY OPPOSED TO IT. WE BELIEVE ONE OF THE MAIN REASONS FOR KHOMEINI'S VENGEFUL HOSTILITY IS THAT HE HAS, OVER THE PAST THREE MONTHS IN IRAN, DISCOVERED JUST

HOW DEEP U.S. TIES WITH IRAN REALLY EXTEND -- HIS CARS ARE AMERICAN, HIS CLOSEST ASSOCIATES' CHILDREN ARE SCHOOLING IN THE U.S.; HE HAS PROBABLY EVEN BEEN APPROACHED BY CLOSE FRIENDS ASKING HIM TO INTERCEDE WITH THE U.S. EMBASSY FOR VISAS! ALL THIS MUST BE PARTICULARLY GALLING.

7. WHAT WE MUST DO IS ROLL WITH THE PUNCH FOR A WHILE. . YAZDI AND ENTEZAM HAVE BOTH SPOKEN TO CHARGE ABOUT THE QUOTE NEW BEGINNING UNQUOTE WHICH THE AMBASSADOR"S ARRIVAL WILL OFFER. OTHER CONTACTS IN THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY HAVE SIMILARLY HINTED TO OTHER EMBOFFS OF THE OPPORTUNITY THIS WILL PROVIDE. ALL HAVE URGED THAT IT OCCUR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IT WILL BE SEEN IN IRAN AS A WATERSHED FROM OLD TO NEW -- NEVER MIND THAT IT WILL BE PART COSMETIC; THAT IS EXACTLY WHAT IS REQUIRED TO BEGIN THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS.

8. WE WILL BE COMMENTING IN THE COMING WEEK ON FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS THIS REGIME OR ANY REGIME IN IRAN FACES. IT IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT IRAN-U.S. RELATIONS HAVE CHANGED FROM INTIMATE TO CORRECT (IF THAT). THIS WILL ENTAIL CONCEPTUAL RETOOLING, AS WELL AS BUREAUCRATIC READJUSTMENT, TO MINIMIZE ADVERSE EFFECTS ON OUR POLICY HERE AND IN THE REGION AND TO MAXIMIZE WHAT WE MAY BE ABLE TO DO IN NEW, MORE (FOR RIGHT NOW, MUCH MORE) LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES.
NAAS##

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 4260

O 240605Z APR 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHTA/USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1049
BT

CHRGE: ICA: 4/23/79
APPRV: PAO:JSHELLENBERGE
DRFTD: ICA:BROSEN:MS
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: ICA-3 CHARGE POL
CRU

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 04260

FOR: NEA

E.O. 12065:N/A

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH DEPUTY MINISTER OF INFORMATION, MEHDI MOMKEN

REFERENCE: TEHRAN 3600, TEHRAN 3968, TEHRAN 4093

SUMMARY: IN COURTESY CALL ON DEPUTY MININFO MOMKEN PRESS ATTACHE DISCUSSED NEW PRESS REGULATIONS AND FOUND HIM AND OTHERS ASSEMBLED AT MEET HOLDING STRONG ANTIPATHY FOR RECENT U.S. POLICY IN IRAN. MOMKEN ACCOMODATING RE HIS MINISTRY'S ROLE AS CLEARING HOUSE FOR COMPLAINTS ABOUT PERSIAN PRESS COVERAGE OF U.S.-IRAN RELATIONSHIP. ALTHOUGH U.S. POLICY VIS A VIS IRAN UNFATHOMABLE TO MOMKEN ET AL BILATERAL IMPERATIVES MAY PROVE TO BE BRIDGE TO FUTURE RELATIONSHIP. END

1. ON MONDAY APRIL 23, PRESS ATTACHE ROSEN PAID COURTESY CALL ON DR. MEHDI MOMKEN, DEPUTY MININFO, LATER JOINED BY ABOLGHASSEM SADEGH, FORMER REGIME HOLDOVER IN CHARGE OF DOMESTIC NEWS DEPARTMENT, MUHAMMAD REZA SHARIF, ACTING MANAGING DIRECTOR OF PARS, AND MR. ALI MAHANI, CONSULTANT TO MINISTRY WHO HAS LIVED IN THE U.S. FOR MANY YEARS. THE MEETING COULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS FRIENDLY BUT CORRECT AND BUSINESSLIKE WITH THE IRANIANS VERY DEFINITELY PUSHING AN ASSERTIVE AND VINDICTIVE LINE VIS A VIS U.S. PRESS AND CARTER ADMINISTRATION POLICY IN IRAN.

2. THE MEETING BEGAN WITH DR. MOMKEN DESCRIBING THE MINISTRY'S INTENTIONS TO PROVIDE SOME ORDER IN THE BURGEONING PRESS INDUSTRY IN IRAN. HE MADE IT QUITE

SYSTEM FALTERS THE GOVERNMENT WILL TURN TO THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE AND THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS. AT THIS JUNCTURE MOMKEN DOES NOT INTEND TO BAR ANY NEWSPAPERS FROM PUBLISHING BUT WITH THE ADVENT OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION HE DOES FORESEE SOME LIMITATION OF GOVERNMENT PERMITS.

3. MOMKEN WAS QUITE CANDID RE THE VIRULENTLY ANTI-AMERICAN COMPAIGN IN THE PERSIAN PRESS AND ASSURED THE PRESS ATTACHE THAT TIME, PATIENCE AND EDUCATION ARE INTEGRAL TO DEVELOPING AN "IMPARTIAL" (BITARAF) PRESS. WITH THAT GAMBIT PRESS ATTACHE BROUGHT UP THE UNSOURCED AND UNBYLINED ARTICLES APPEARING KAYHAN DURING THE FIRST HALF OF APRIL WHICH ACCUSED THE U.S. OF CONTRIVING EXTENSIVE PLOTS TO DESTROY THE IRANIAN POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP. AS SUGGESTED BY MR. SADEGH DR. MOMKEN SAID THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND HE PERSONALLY CAN SERVE AS A CLEARING HOUSE FOR ANY LEGITIMATE COMPLAINTS RE PERSIAN PRESS COVERAGE AND ASKED ROSEN TO SEND A CARBON COPY OF ANY CORRESPONDENCE TO THE MFA.

4. DISCUSSING HIS OWN CAREER MOMKEN ADMITTED SPENDING SOME TIME IN JAIL AS A POLITICAL PRISONER. ALTHOUGH IT WAS THE PAHLAVI DYNASTY WHICH ACTUALLY IMPRISONED HIM HE BLAMES THE U.S. FOR THE RESERVOIR OF DISTRUST BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. HE CANNOT, HE SAID, AS AN INDIVIDUAL OR A MEMBER OF THE IRANIAN NATION UNDERSTAND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF A SUPERPOWER WHICH SUPPORTED THE SHAH, BAKHTIAR AND KHOMEINI ALL WITHIN A TWO MONTH PERIOD. MAHANI CHIMED IN ACCUSING THE U.S. PRESS OF WORKING IN TANDEM WITH THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, WITNESS THEIR DUPLICITY RE HUMAN RIGHTS. SADEGH FELT THAT THE U.S. WOULD HAVE TO EXPECT AN ANTAGONISTIC STANCE FROM THE IRANIANS FOR A WHILE BUT FELT THAT "BOTH THE U.S. AND IRAN NEED EACH OTHER" AND THIS IMPERATIVE MIGHT PROVIDE THE BRIDGE FOR A NEW AND BETTER RELATIONSHIP. SHELLENBERGER

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CLEAR THAT THE PGOI WAS IN NO POSITION TO ACT OR DID IT WANT TO CONTROL THE PRINT MEDIA. HOWEVER, HE ADDED WITH THE END OF AN ERA IN WHICH THE PRESS WAS UNDER THE HAMMER (ZIR-E CHUMAQ) WE ARE NOW LIVING THROUGH AN INTERREGNUM WHEREIN NEWSPAPERS AND REPORTERS ARE, IN SOME INSTANCES, GOING BEYOND WHAT IS CONSIDERED GOOD JUDGEMENT, WITNESS THE RECENT SPATE OF SCANDAL TABLOIDS ILLUSTRATING PAHLAVI EXCESSES.

THE DEPUTY MININFO SAID HE HAS PREPARED A BILL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER WHEREIN THE PRESS WILL BE ENCOURAGED TO FORM A PRESS ASSOCIATION(KANUN-E MATBUAT) MADE UP OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INDUSTRY ACTING AS A REGULATING BODY. IN THE EVENT THIS SELF-REGULATING

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 4301/01

O 241323Z APR 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1061
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 04301

E.O. 12065; GDS 4/14/85 (TAYLOR, C.D.) OR-E
TAGS: PFOR, BGEN, BDIS, IR
SUBJ: CALL ON MINISTER OF COMMERCE DR. RAZA SADR

CHRGE: STATE
4/24/79
APPRV: E/OOCDTAYLOR
DRFTD: :CDTAYLOR
CLEAD: NONE
DISTR: ECON-2
CHG POL ICA
CRU RF

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: THE CHARGE, IN HIS CALL ON MINISTER OF COMMERCE DR. RAZA SADR, EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT OUR COUNTRIES MUTUAL INTERESTS TRANSCEND SPECIFIC GOVERNMENTS AND GAVE ASSURANCES, ON BEHALF OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THAT WE ARE NOT AND DO NOT INTEND TO BE INVOLVED IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF IRAN, HE SAID THE U.S. DESIRES TO WORK WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF IRAN AND AT THE PACE IT SETS IN ESTABLISHING OUR NEW RELATIONSHIPS. LIKEWISE, U.S. FIRMS STILL CONSIDER IRAN AND IMPORTANT MARKET AND CAN ADAPT TO NEW CONDITIONS. THE MINISTER SAID IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT AMERICANS ARE THE MOST PRACTICAL IN THE WORLD AND CAN ADAPT TO ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. GIVEN THE UNCONDITIONAL USG SUPPORT OF THE SHAH , IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THE U.S. TO MAKE GESTURES AND EXERCISE PATIENCE IN ORDER TO OVERCOME UNDERSTANDABLE HOSTILITIES TOWARD THE U.S. HE SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE ENVIRONMENT FOR NEGOTIATING OF OUTSTANDING COMMERCIAL PROBLEMS IS IMPROVING AND THAT HE, LIKE WE, DESIRES TO AVOID LEGAL ACTIONS. SEPTEL DISCUSSES IRANIAN COMMERCIAL REPRESENTATION IN THE U.S. END OF SUMMARY.

UNDERSTANDABLE hostilities toward

3. THE CHARGE, ACCOMPANIED BY ACTING ECONOMIC COUNSELOR CALLED ON MINISTER OF COMMERCE DR. RAZA SADR ON APRIL 23. DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR NORTH AMERICAN AND AFRICAN AFFAIRS, GOLSHAN-BOZORG, WAS ALSO PRESENT. THE 45-MINUTE MEETING WAS FRIENDLY AND FRANK AND WE BELIEVE THAT A GOOD BASE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR OUR FUTURE DEALINGS WITH THE MINISTER AND HIS SUBORDINATES. AS IN THE CASE OF OTHER

COUNSELOR

CALLS ON MINISTERS, WE WERE URGED TO COUNSEL AND PRACTICE PATIENCE IN THE RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING DISPUTES AS WELL AS IN OBTAINING CLARIFICATION OF PGOI POLICIES.

4. THE CHARGE CONVEYED TO THE MINISTER THE USG'S BELIEF THAT OUR COUNTRIES' PERSPECTIVE INTERESTS TRANSCEND SPECIFIC GOVERNMENTS. HE SAID THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP CAN CONTINUE TO BE HELPFUL TO IRAN AND THAT OUR RELATIONSHIPS CAN BE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL. HE PLEDGED ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE THAT THE US WILL NOT INTERFERE AND IS NOT INTERFERING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF IRAN. HE SAID THAT WE ARE WILLING TO WORK WITH IRAN AND AT THE PACE THAT IT DESIRES. HE ADMITTED THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP WILL BE DIFFERENT AND THAT WE CAN ACCEPT THAT. U.S. FIRMS, HE SAID, WILL STILL CONSIDER IRAN AN IMPORTANT MARKET. THEY HAVE BROUGHT IMPORTANT TECHNOLOGY TO IRAN AND THEY TOO CAN ADAPT TO THE NEW ENVIRONMENT IN ORDER TO CONTINUE THEIR RELATIONSHIPS HERE. THE CHARGE SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT SUCH TRADE DISPUTES THAT EXIST CAN BE RESOLVED WITHOUT LEGAL RECOURSE.

5. MINISTER SADR REPLIED BY SAYING THAT AFTER 20 YEARS OF STUDYING, WORKING AND LIVING IN THE UNITED STATES, HE IS CONVINCED THAT THE AMERICAN IS THE MOST PRACTICAL PERSON IN THE WORLD; HE CAN ADAPT AND ADJUST TO NEW SITUATIONS, AS HE WILL BE ABLE TO DO IN IRAN. HE SAID THAT THE U.S.'S UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORT TO THE SHAH LEFT WOUNDS, BUT THAT HAVING BEEN IN THE U.S. DURING THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD, HE WAS WELL AWARE OF THE PROBLEM WITHIN THE DEPT OF STATE CONCERNING IRAN. HE APPRECIATED OUR POLITICAL NEEDS, OUR LIMITATIONS AND OUR PRESSURE GROUPS AND REALIZED THAT THOSE FACTORS WOULD CONTINUE. HE BELIEVES THAT THE REVOLUTION WILL BENEFIT THE UNITED STATES AS MUCH AS ANY OTHER COUNTRIES. HE THEN MENTIONED TWO APPREHENSIONS THAT INFLUENCE OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS: 1) THE SINGULAR PLACEMENT OF THE U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE "PAHLAVI" AND 2) THE BELIEF OF THE U.S. THAT THE FALL OF THE SHAH WOULD LEAD TO COMMUNISM IN IRAN. HE SAID THAT HE BELIEVES THAT THESE TWO PERCEPTIONS ARE BEING ERRODED BUT THAT SOME GOOD GESTURE BY THE U.S. TO ELIMINATE THE SCAR OF THE PAST WOULD BE HELPFUL. LASTLY, HE SAID THAT THE DATA AND PRIORITIES OF THE PAST WERE INACCURATE AND MUST BE IMPROVED. IRAN'S

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S.--EDUCATIONAL, TECHNOLOGICAL, AND FAMILY TIES ARE SUCH AS TO SUPPORT IRAN'S WISH TO SUSTAIN RELATIONSHIPS.

6. THE CHARGE ASKED THE MINISTER IF HE HAD ANY SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING HIS DESIRED GESTURE BY THE U.S. THE MINISTER SAID THAT SUCH ACTIONS CANNOT BE DONE OVERNIGHT. HE ADDED THAT THE MOST OBJECTIONABLE ASPECT OF THE SINGULAR PLACEMENT OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SHAH WAS THE DIRECT INTERVENTION IN IRAN AS SEEN PARTICULARLY IN THE SHAH'S DEPENDING UPON THE U.S. TO DECIDE WHETHER HE WOULD STAY OR LEAVE. HE THEN DID ADD THAT THE U.S. COULD USE ITS BEST EFFORT TO IMPROVE WITH THE PRESS AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING OF IRAN AND ITS REVOLUTION. THE CHARGE NOTED , IN GOOD HUMOR, THE COINCIDENCE OF THE MINISTER'S CONCERNS WITH THOSE EXPRESSED BY THE SHAH ON HIS LAST AUDIENCE. THE SHAH, INTER ALIA, COMPLAINED ABOUT THE MISPERCEPTIONS OF IRAN BY THE U.S. PRESS AND WAS SUSPICIOUS THAT THE U.S. WAS MEDDLING IN IRAN'S DESTINY BY CONTRIVING WITH THE SOVIETS TO DIVIDE IRAN. THE CHARGE ADMITTED THAT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WAS LITTLE INFORMED CONCERNING ISLAM BUT THAT THERE WAS LITTLE THE USG COULD DO IN THAT REGARD. THE MINISTER REFERRED WITH PLEASURE TO HIS MEETING WITH AMB. YOUNG AND SAID THAT HIS ATTITUED TOWARD IRAN SHOULD BE INSTRUCTIVE AND HE HOPES IT WILL INDICATE A CHANGE.

7. ACTING E/C COUNSELOR BROUGHT TO THE MINISTER'S ATTENTION THE ACTIVITIES OF MOHAMMED SOURI AND MR. HASHEMI IN THE UNITED STATES AND POINTED OUT THAT THEIR ACTIONS, LACKING APPROPRIATE CREDENTIALS, TENDED TO CONFUSE ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING BUSINESS PROBLEMS AND NORMALIZE COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS. HE ALSO REFERRED TO CONTINENTAL GRAIN'S DEMURRAGE CLAIM AND THOSE WHICH ARE BUT PARTIALLY SETTLED. (SEPTELS FOLLOW ON THSE ISSUES.) HE SAID THAT WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE REESTABLISHMENT OF IRANIAN ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL REPRESENTATION IN THEIR WASHINGTON EMBASSY, A FUNCTION SORELY NEEDED WHEN U.S. FIRMS ARE FRUSTRATED IN ATTEMPTS TO COMMUNICATE WITH IRANIAN BUSINESS CONTACTS.

8. THE MINISTER SAID, ON THE BASIS OF HIS 12 YEARS AS A BUSINESSMAN IN THE UNITED STATES, THAT HE APPRECIATES THE

NEED FOR NEGOTIATION OF OUTSTANDING BUSINESS ISSUES. HE SAID THAT HE BELIEVES THAT THE ATMOSPHERE FOR NEGOTIATION WILL IMPROVE. HE SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD NOT YET PRESS ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES AND, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE DEMURRAGE CLAIMS, SAID THAT THESE HAD BEEN SITTING AROUND IN THE MINISTRY FOR YEARS AND HAD DAMAGED THE INTEGRITY OF IRAN. HE SAID HE HAS GIVEN ATTENTION TO THESE PROBLEMS BUT THAT IT WILL TAKE TIME AND THAT UNFORTUNATELY IT REQUIRES PATIENCE BY ALL INVOLVED.

9. BIOGRAPHIC: SADR IS CONFIDENT AND ARTICULATE. HIS ENGLISH NOT SURPRISING AFTER 20 YEARS IN THE U.S., IS A 4.75 BY FSI STANDARDS AND HAS A DECIDED NEW YORK IDENTIFICATION. HE POSSESSES THE POLITICIAN'S ABILITY OF FEIGNING A SMILE WHILE DELIVERING GOD'S LAST WORD. HIS REVOLUTIONARY RHETORIC WAS EXPECTED, SINCE HE BY ADMISSION WAS A MEMBER OF KHOMEINI'S KOMITAY IN THE U.S. , BUT IT WAS PROPERLY BUDGETTED FOR THE OCCASION. SHORT, BY IRANIAN STATURES, IS BALDING, HAS A PARTIAL BEARD AND PROBABLY SUFFERS FROM POOR EYESIGHT SINCE DESPITE THICK GLASSES HE SQUINTS FREQUENTLY. NAAS

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FM SECSTATE WA HDC
TO RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 1882
INFO RUTAVC/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 3908
ST
C O N F I D E N T I A L

~~CIVILIAN OFFICIAL~~ USE STATE 102759

AGREMENT CHANNEL

~~E.O. 12065: ADS DECONTROL UPON WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT~~

TAGS: APER (CUTLER, WALTER L.)

SUBJECT: ANNOUNCEMENT OF NOMINATION

WHITE HOUSE PLANS TO ANNOUNCE PRESIDENT'S INTENTION TO NOMINATE WALTER L. CUTLER AS AMBASSADOR TO IRAN AT PRESS BRIEFING, TUESDAY, APRIL 24. WILL CONFIRM BY IMMEDIATE TELEGRAM WHEN ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE. VANCE
ET
#2759

NNNNZVULC

P 011232Z MAY 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1187
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 04530

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STATE
APPRV: CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: CHG POL (2)
ECON MAAG DAO
RF

JD
Mark
File Yazdi

E.O. 12065: XDS-1 5/1/09 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, IR
SUBJ: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT) THIS IS A REPORTING CABLE.

2. SUMMARY: CHARGE RAISED SEVERAL POINTS ON U.S. PRESENCE IN IRAN. YAZDI PROMISED TO LOOK INTO MATTERS. END SUMMARY.

3. ON MAY 1, CHARGE AND ACTING POL CHIEF PAID FIRST CALL ON YAZDI SINCE HE BECAME FOREIGN MINISTER. THIS CABLE COVERS MAIN POINTS U.S. RAISED AND REPLIES. SEPTELS WILL TREAT MORE SPECIALIZED ITEMS.

4. CHARGE RAISED QUESTIONS OF U.S. ACCESS TO GULF DISTRICT AND ARMY HOSPITAL, AND PERMISSION TO WITHDRAW U.S. DOCUMENTS FROM LAVISAN MILITARY COMPOUND, DOSHEN TAPPEH AIR BASE AND NAVY HEADQUARTERS. YAZDI APPEARED SURPRIZED THAT HIS EARLIER EFFORTS TO ALLOW U.S. OFFICIALS TO GAIN ENTRY HAD NOT BORNE FRUIT AND SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO MATTERS AND BE BACK TO US.

5. CHARGE RAISED MATTER OF PERMISSION TO SELL EXCESS COMMISSARY LIQUOR TO RELIGIOUS MINORITY BUYER WHO HAD KHOMEINI COMMITTEE PERMISSION TO PURCHASE LIQUOR FOR MINORITY USE. AFTER SHORT LECTURE ON HOW MINORITIES COULD HAVE LIQUOR, BUT NOT SELL IT, AND UPON LEARNING BUYER HAD COMMITTEE PERMISSION, PROVIDED HE PAID CUSTOMS DUTY, YAZDI SAID THIS WAS ALL RIGHT. POLOFF ASKED QUESTION AGAIN AND GOT A DEFINITE AFFIRMATIVE REPLY TO DIRECT QUESTION ON WHETHER SALE WAS ALLOWED. EMBOFFS CONFIRMED TO YAZDI THAT THIS WAS A ONE-TIME DEAL. YAZDI THEN MENTIONED THAT THERE WERE REPORTS THAT SOME DIPLOMATS HAVE BEEN SELLING LIQUOR ON THE BLACK MARKET. CHARGE STATED THAT IF ANY OFFICIAL AMERICAN IS CAUGHT SELLING LIQUOR IN CONTRAVENTION OF IRANIAN LAW, CHARGE WOULD SEE VIOLATOR ON PLANE OUT OF TOWN WITHIN TWENTY FOUR HOURS. CHARGE URGED FONMIN TO BRING TO OUR ATTENTION ANY U.S. VIOLATION. YAZDI WAS APPRECIATIVE OF THIS ASSURANCE.
NAAS
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chron

SECRET
STATE
CHG:CWNAAS
POL:JDSTEMPEL
NONE
POL

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC/-NIACT IMMEDIATE

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: XDS-4 5/1/09 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PGOV, EFIN, IR, PINT
SUBJ: MEETING WITH YAZDI: IRANIAN CONCERNS

REF: TEHRAN 4530

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT; ACTION REQUIRED)

2. SUMMARY: YAZDI RAISED QUESTION OF PRESENCE OF AMCITS IN OR NEAR NAGHADEH AT TIME OF RECENT DISTURBANCES. FONMIN ASKED WHAT PROSPECTS WERE FOR GETTING JURISDICTION OVER CRIMINALS FROM OLD REGIME WHO HAD FLED TO U.S. UNDER ASSUMED NAMES, AND FOR BLOCKING ACTIVITIES OF PAHLAVI FOUNDATION IN U.S. CHARGE SAID WE WOULD LOOK INTO PROBLEMS AND AGAIN URGED GOI TO HIRE A GOOD LAWYER. END SUMMARY.

3. AT END OF DISCUSSION OF U.S. PRESENCE PROBLEMS (SEE REFTEL), YAZDI ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY PENNSYLVANIANS IN NORTHWESTERN IRAN. HE SAID PGOI HAD REPORTS OF "TWO OR THREE AMERICANS FROM PENNSYLVANIA" BEING PRESENT THERE JUST BEFORE TROUBLES. EFFORTS HAD BEEN MADE TO TRACE THEM LATER, BUT TO NO AVAIL. ALLEGED AMERICANS SPOKE GOOD KURDISH AND TOLD PEOPLE THEY WERE ORIENTALISTS ON A MISSION TO STUDY THE LANGUAGE AND CULTURE OF KURDISH PEOPLE. CHARGE AND ACTING POL CHIEF SAID WE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF AMCITS AND EXPRESSED DOUBT U.S. SCHOLARS WOULD BE WANDERING ABOUT IRAN AT THIS TIME. CHARGE REQUESTED WHATEVER FURTHER INFO PGOI COULD PROVIDE AND SUGGESTED THAT STORY COULD BE RESULT OF DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN, BUT PROMISED TO CHECK. (SUBSEQUENTLY, POLOFF LEARNED FROM LOCAL U.S. ACADEMIC THAT THERE HAD BEEN UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA ARCHAEOLOGISTS AT HASSANLOO--A SHORT WALK FROM NAGHADEH--UP UNTIL TWO YEARS AGO, BUT NONE WERE THERE NOW. CHECK OF OUR BADLY TRUNCATED

CONSULAR RECORDS SHOWS NO AMCITS IN REGION, EITHER, BUT THIS DOES NOT RULE OUT POSSIBILITY OF VISITORS. ABOVE BEING PASSED TO YAZDI IN SPIRIT OF HELPING DEFUSE ISSUE.) ACTION REQUESTED: PLEASE CHECK ASAP WITH UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA AND LEARNED SOCIETIES TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THERE ARE SCHOLARS IN AREA. TWO DAYS AGO AMIR ENTEZAM TOLD PRESS THAT HE WOULD PROVIDE INFO TO PRESS ON SPY RING THURSDAY, MAY 3. WE HAD HOPED THIS WAS REFERENCE TO A SOVIET CAPER GONE SOUR (REPORTED ELSEWHERE) BUT YAZDI'S QUESTION RAISES POSSIBILITY WE WILL BE TARGET OF ATTACK OR THAT "FOR BALANCE" BOTH MATTERS WILL BE RELEASED AT SAME TIME.

4. FONMIN THEN RAISED QUESTION OF HOW IRAN COULD GO ABOUT TRYING TO GET CUSTODY OF "SEVERAL CRIMINALS" FROM OLD REGIME. YAZDI SAID GOI HAS TRACED SEVERAL WANTED EX-SAVAK MEN TO U.S., INCLUDING ALLEGED PERPETRATOR OF ABIDAN REX CINEMA FIRE WHICH KILLED OVER 400 PEOPLE IN AUGUST 1978. CHARGE REPLIED THAT SINCE THERE WAS NO IRAN-U.S. EXTRADITION TREATY, PROBLEM WAS GOING TO BE DIFFICULT AND THAT HE WOULD SEEK ADVICE. CHARGE CONFIRMED THIS WAS QUESTION OF SMALL NUMBER OF PEOPLE WANTED ON SPECIFIC CHARGES. YAZDI SAID ALL HAD NEW PASSPORTS IN ASSUMED NAMES ISSUED BEFORE BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT FELL. HE DID NOT PURSUE QUESTION OF HOW GROUP GOT VISAS TO U.S. (AS MAJOR BENEFICIARY OF PAST LACK OF EXTRADICTION TREATY BETWEEN U.S. AND IRAN, YAZDI IS CERTAINLY MORE BLOODTHIRSTY ON THIS POINT THAN ONE MIGHT EXPECT.) COMMENT: PLEASE ADVISE ME WHETHER ANY ACTION CAN BE TAKEN IN U.S. COURTS BY PGOI FOR CRIMES COMMITTED ABROAD.

5. YAZDI THEN RAISED QUESTION OF HOW PGOI COULD STOP PAHLAVI FOUNDATION IN NEW YORK FROM SELLING OFF ITS ASSETS--BUILDING, ETC. IRAN'S CENTRAL BANK HAD LOANED FOUNDATION DOLS 39 MILLION, AND PGOI WANTED TO STOP WHAT WAS APPARENT ATTEMPT BY OLD REGIME LEADERS TO MILK OUT LOAN THROUGH SALE OF BUILDINGS. TWICE ALLUDING TO FACT THAT EX-SECSTATE WILLIAM ROGERS WAS CHAIRMAN OF PAHLAVI BOARD, YAZDI SAID IRANIAN PEOPLE HAD TROUBLE UNDERSTANDING NUANCES OF LAW, BUT UNDERSTOOD THEY HAD BEEN ROBBED. HE CONCLUDED THAT USG HAD OBLIGATION TO HELP PGOI STOP THIS. PGOI IS PREPARED TO SHOW PAHLAVI FOUNDATION ASSETS WERE IRANIAN TREASURY FUNDS ILLEGALLY CHANNELED TO FOUNDATION. EMBOFFS SAID CENTRAL BANK COULD PROBABLY

USE U.S. COURTS IF THERE WERE VIOLATIONS OF LAW WITHIN US JURISDICTION. AS EMBOFFS WERE NOT LEGAL SPECIALISTS, HOWEVER, CHARGE WOULD HAVE TO ASK DEPARTMENT FOR ITS VIEWS ON SUBJECT. YAZDI MADE CLEAR THAT HIS QUERY WAS NOT LIMITED TO CBI LOAN BUT COVERED ALL PAHLAVI FOUNDATION ASSETS. CHARGE URGED YAZDI (AS HE HAS URGED OTHERS) TO CONVINCE HIS COLLEAGUES TO HIRE A GOOD LAW FIRM TO FIGHT THE NUMBER OF CASES WHICH ARE COMING TO COURT. HE CITED INSTANCES WHERE GOI MIGHT HAVE WON ITS POINT WITH SOVEIGN IMMUNITY ARGUMENT IF IT HAD BEEN REPRESENTED IN COURT. HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED U.S. TRADE UNION SUIT AGAINST OPEC COUNTRIES, NOTING MATERIAL WOULD BE TURNED OVER TO PGOI SHORTLY. YAZDI NOTED THAT USG COULD SAY PRIVATELY IT WISHED TO IMPROVE ITS TIES WITH ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, BUT IF IT REALLY WANTED TO DO SO, IT MUST DO SOMETHING TO HELP.

6. COMMENT: WE HAVE BEEN WONDERING WHEN PGOI WOULD GET AROUND TO RAISING QUESTIONS SUCH AS THE ABOVE. YAZDI WAS VAGUE ENOUGH ON DETAILS OF EXTRADITION PROBLEM AND PAHLAVI FOUNDATION SITUATION THAT WE ARE UNABLE TO POSE SPECIFIC LEGAL QUESTIONS, BUT POLITICAL THRUST OF HIS APPROACH IS CLEAR: U.S. MUST AT LEAST TRY TO HELP. AS DEPT KNOWS, CORRUPTION WAS BIGGEST POLITICAL ISSUE IN REVOLUTION WHICH DREW SUPPORT FROM ALL REPEAT ALL CLASSES OF IRANIAN SOCIETY. I WOULD LIKE A STATEMENT FROM L ON STEPS PGOI COULD TAKE IN COURTS IF IT WISHED, TO RECOVER PAHLAVI FOUNDATION ASSETS. NAAS##

P 021240Z MAY 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1217
BT
S E C R E T TEHRAN 04578

CHRGE: STATE
APPRV: CHG:CWNAAS
DRFTD: CHG:CWNAAS/BJH
CLEAR: PAO:JSHELLENBERGE
POL:JDSTEMPEL
DISTR: PAO

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUNDERS FROM CHARGE

E.O. 12065: GDS 5/2/85 (NAAS, C.W.) OR-M
TAGS: PFOR, IR
SUBJ: VOA INTERVIEW

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT; REPORTING MESSAGE)

2. IN ALL MY RECENT CALLS, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE HIT ME HARD WITH COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE CRITICAL MANNER IN WHICH THE WESTERN MEDIA, PARTICULARLY THE U.S. , IS TREATING THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT. THE FOLKS CURRENTLY IN THE SADDLE, NO LESS THAN THEIR PREDECESSOR, ARE PRETTY THIN SKINNED AND PRONE TO SEE A CONSPIRACY --USG, ZIONIST, OR OTHERWISE. ALSO, I HAVE BEEN REMINDED OF OUR DAILY STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR BAKHTIAR IN JANUARY AND OUR OFFICIAL SILENCE (WHICH I HAVE STRONGLY SUPPORTED) ON THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT IN THE LAST MANY WEEKS. THERE IS NO CURE, OF COURSE, FOR PERSIAN PARANOIA, BUT I BELIEVE WE SHOULD CONSIDER SOME EFFORT TO PRESENT A MORE POSITIVE U.S. VIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT.

3. OUR PAO TOLS ME THAT, WHEN HE WAS IN WASHINGTON IN LATE MARCH, VOA WAS TO APPROACH YOU RE AN INTERVIEW ON IRAN. THIS SEEMS TO ME TO BE AN EXCELLENT FORUM AND I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE ON THE TASK SOON. YOU ARE AN OLD HAND AT THIS AND CAN PLAY THE THEMES OF NORMALIZATION, HISTORICAL TIES, PARALLEL INTERESTS, THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE, ETC. WITHOUT TOO CLOSE AN EMBRACE OF THE GOVERNMENT, EITHER TO ITS DISADVANTAGE OR OUR OWN.
NAAS
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OO RUQMHR
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 2151
BT
C.O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 113756

E.O. 12065 GDS 5/4/85 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PINT, IR

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH CHARGE AGAH AND ROUHANI

1. IN A MEETING WITH AGAH AND ROUHANI MAY 4 ON OTHER SUBJECTS, ROUHANI STRESSED IRANIAN INTEREST IN RESUMPTION OF VISA WORK BY EMBASSY TEHRAN. DEPOFF REPLIED THAT INCREASE IN VISA SERVICES WOULD DEPEND PRIMARILY ON TWO FACTORS: (1) EQUIPMENT OF A NEW BUILDING FOR CONSULAR SERVICES, WORK WAS ABOUT TO BEGIN AND THE NEW PREMISES SHOULD BE READY IN A FEW MONTHS. (2) PROVISION OF ADEQUATE SECURITY FOR EMBASSY PERSONNEL. DEPOFF REVIEWED PRESENT SECURITY CONDITIONS AND INDICATED THIS WAS THE OVERRIDING CONCERN WHICH PREVENTED OUR RESUMING NORMAL CONSULAR ACTIVITIES. ROUHANI TOOK NOTE AND INDICATED HE WOULD MAKE A SPECIAL EFFORT TO ASSIST EMBASSY WITH ITS SECURITY PROBLEMS.

2. ROUHANI SAID THE ACTIVITIES OF HIS COMMITTEE WERE TERMINATED EFFECTIVE MAY 4. HE PLANS TO RETURN TO TEHRAN IN ABOUT 10 DAY'S TIME AND TO REMAIN FOR AT LEAST THROUGH THE SUMMER. VANCE
BT
#3756

Tehran, May 8, 1979.

Excellency:

At our meeting on May 1, 1979, you requested me to look into the questions of the assets of the Pahlavi Foundation and the possible extradition from the United States of Iranian nationals charged with having committed specific crimes in Iran.

As you undoubtedly have been informed, your Embassy in Washington formally raised the question of the assets of the Pahlavi Foundation in a diplomatic note on April 16, 1979. The Department of State replied in a diplomatic note on May 1, 1979. For your convenience the texts of both notes are given below:

Iranian Embassy Note of April 16:

"The Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honor to advise that it has received a report of the possibility of an imminent transfer of ownership of an office building in New York City, at 650 5th Avenue, New York, New York 10019, heretofore held by the Pahlavi Foundation as owners, to other interests.

"In the event that the Department is approached with respect to any of the details of such a transaction, it would be appreciated if the Department of State would advise any potential purchaser of the fact that the ownership of the Pahlavi Foundation and of its several and individual assets,

His Excellency
Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Tehran.

is under investigation by the Government of Iran, and would discourage any transfers until the investigation has been completed, and this Embassy has advised the Department of the results.

"It would also be appreciated if the Department will inform this Embassy of the names and addresses of any potential purchasers which come to the Department's attention, so that the Embassy may convey the same message to them.

"The Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran further avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of State the assurances of its highest consideration."

Department of State Note of May 1:

"The Department of State acknowledges receipt of Note No. 226 of April 16, 1979, from the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

"In the event that the Department is approached by a potential purchaser of Pahlavi Foundation assets or by other interested parties, the Department will bring to the attention of such purchaser or parties the fact that the Embassy has informed the Department that ownership of the Foundation and its several and individual assets are under investigation by the Government of Iran.

"The Department has advised interested agencies in the United States Government of the contents of the referenced note. The Embassy may wish to consider other means of making its views on the Pahlavi Foundation known to American commercial enterprises. The Department assumes that any action taken by the Government of Iran with respect to the transfer of ownership of Pahlavi Foundation assets located within the jurisdiction of the United States will be taken in accordance with applicable federal, state, and other laws, regulations, and procedures which may govern such transfers."

With respect to the extradition issue I have repeated below the information provided me by the Office of the Legal Adviser in the Department of State:

Under international law there is no obligation to extradite a fugitive in the absence of an agreement. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933). Under United States law there can be no extraditions apart from treaty (18 U.S.C. 3181). There is no executive discretion to surrender a

fugitive to a foreign government, unless that discretion is granted by an Act of Congress or by the terms of a treaty. Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neideder, 299 U.S. 5, 8 (1936). Currently, there is no extradition treaty with Iran.

While the U.S. courts would not have jurisdiction over crimes of the kind described by Foreign Minister Yazdi committed abroad, individuals with a grievance against former Iranian officials may sue them for damages in U.S. civil courts for injuries and losses caused abroad. The Islamic Republic of Iran itself could assist aggrieved individuals in bringing legal actions here. If those sued claim immunity the Islamic Republic of Iran could waive immunity in a declaration to the court. The outcome of any specific case would be based on facts at hand and the judge's interpretation of such legal issues as immunity, sufficiency of evidence and so forth. It would be preferable for the Islamic Republic of Iran to explore these possibilities itself with a qualified lawyer in the U.S.

I hope that this information is of value to you and I am prepared to discuss these issues further at your convenience.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Naas
Charge d'Affaires, a.i.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
ICA 5/9/79
PAO:JHSHELLENBERGER
PAO:JHSHELLENBERGER:MN
1. CHARGE:CNAAS, 2. POL:JSTEMPEL
ICA-2 CHARGE POL, ADMN CRU

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
USICA WASHDC, PRIORITY

USICA

FOR: NEA CURRAN

SPECDIS E.O. 12065: N/A
SUBJECT: BILATERAL COMMUNICATION RELATIONSHIP

1. ALTHOUGH CP INSTRUCTIONS WERE LOST DURING ICA BUILDING BREAKIN, I HAVE HAD A CRACK AT DOING ANOTHER ESTIMATE OF THE BILATERAL COMMUNICATION RELATIONSHIP IN LIGHT OF WHAT HAS OCCURRED DURING THE PAST SIX MONTHS. IT MAY OR MAY NOT CONFORM WITH THE AGENCY'S GUIDELINES, BUT IS OFFERED BOTH AS A REPLACEMENT FOR THE FY'79 ESSAY AND THE FY'80 - '81 REQUIREMENT. ESSAY HAS BEEN REVIEWED BY CHARGE AND ACTING POLCOUNS. YOUR COMMENTS AND CRITIQUE WELCOMED.

A. THE BILATERAL COMMUNICATION RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES, AT THIS WRITING (MAY '79) CAN BE CHARACTERIZED AS SCHIZOID ON THE IRANIAN SIDE. THERE IS WIDESPREAD PUBLIC DUSTRUST OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, A PREVAILING SUSPICION THAT IT IS ATTEMPTING TO FU** FRUSTRATE THE GOALS OF THE REVOLUTION THROUGH ALL MANNER OF ACTIVITIES RANGING FROM EMPLOYING FORMER SAVAK AGENTS AS ASSASSINS AND EXPLOITERS OF DISCONTENT AND INSURRECTION AMONG MINORITIES TO THROTTLING IRAN'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE U.S. REMAINS THE PREFERRED LOCALE FOR STUDY, TRAINING, TOURISM, INVESTMENT AND COMMERCIAL EXCHANGE. THE AMERICAN LIFESTYLE, DESPITE DENUNCIATIONS BY THE CLERGY, CONTINUES TO BE EMULATED BY YOUTH AND THE MIDDLE CLASS. AMERICA, HAVING SPAWNED MANY OF THE LEADERS OF THE REVOLUTION, AND NOW HOME FOR AS MANY AS A HUNDRED THOUSAND IRANIAN STUDENTS, IS CONSIDERED BOTH HOSPITABLE AND HUMANE AS CONTRASTED WITH OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES. AMERICA AND THINGS AMERICAN ARE INTERESTING TO IRANIANS WHO BELIEVE BOTH THEIR RECENT PAST AND THEIR DESTINY ARE INEXTRICABLE** INEXTRICABLY LINKED TO THE U.S. THE

FRUSTRATIONS OF THESE DAYS ARE EASILY ATTRIBUTED TO IMPERIALISM, USUALLY OF THE U.S. VARIETY (ALTHOUGH THE USSR AND ISRAEL ARE ALSO INVEIGHED). COMMUNICATION ON A ONE TO ONE BASIS IS USUALLY SPONTANEOUS, CANDID AND CORDIAL. BUT THE PUBLIC RHETORIC AS CONVEYED BY A VENGEFUL MEDIA IS UNRELENTINGLY HOSTILE AND HARSH. U.S. MISSION GOALS IN IRAN AT PRESENT ARE TO MAINTAIN AN OPEN, COOPERATIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THOSE AREAS IN WHICH OUR SERVICES AND PRODUCTS MEET IRAN'S REQUIREMENTS. ACHIEVING THIS GOAL IN A PSYCHOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERE WHEREIN THE USG IS AT THE ROOT OF ALL OF IRAN'S *** TROUBLES IN CONJECTURAL AT BEST*** WHEREIN THE USG IS**(IN LEAGUE WITH U.S. MEDIA) IS AT THE ROOT OF ALL OF IRAN'S TROUBLES IS CONJECTURAL AT BEST, AND FURTHER COMPLICATED BY THE NEW IMAGE IRAN PROJECTS INTERNATIONALLY. US** U.S. MEDIA'S ABSORPTION WITH THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION HAS TENDED TO FOCUS ON ALL THAT IS WRONG HERE. CLOSELY MONITERING SUCH COVERAGE LEADS RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES HERE TO CONCLUDE THAT AMERICA DOES NOT WISH US WELL, AND TENDS TO CONFIRM IN AMERICAN MINDS THAT IRAN IS A DISASTER IN EVERY SPHERE. FURTHER CONTRIBUTING TO THE TENSION IN OUR COMMUNICATION RELATIONSHIP IS THE PRESENCE IN THE U.S. OF LEADING PERSONALITIES OF THE FORMER REGIME. SHOULD THE SHAH TAKE REFUGE IN THE U.S. AS SOME PROMINENT AMERICANS HAVE URGED,POTENTIAL IS THERE FOR A TOTAL BREAK IN OFFICIAL COMMUNICATION. BEYOND PERSONALITIES, THERE ARE AN IMMENSE NUMBER OF CLAIMS FROM BOTH SIDES RESPEC** RESPECTING FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS, DELIVERY OF MATERIALS, CONTRACTUAL DISPUTESOBSTRUCT RESUMPTION OF THE ACTIVE US-IRAN COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP. WHEREAS ONE YEAR AGO, IRAN'S ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS HAD SCORES OF AMERICANS TEACHING, CONSULTING, ADVISING, RESEARCHING, NO MORE THAN A HANDFUL ARE LEFT AND UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES IN THE AGGREGATE ARE FOR THE MOMENT ESCHEWING IMPORTED LECTURERS. OUTSIDE OF TEHRAN, LIMITED BUT POTENTIALLY ACTIVE COMMUNICATION WAS POSSIBLE THROUGH IRAN AMERICA SOCIETIES IN FIVE MAJOR CITIES. OF THESE ONLY ISFAHAN REMAINS INTACT. FOR ICA, TASK IS TO DETERMINE WHAT SYMBOLICALLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY CAN BE CONVEYED (AND HOW) TO BOTH THE SOPHISTICATED AND NON-SOPHISTICATED WHICH WILL ALLAY FEARS AND RESENTMENTS FOSTERED BY THOSE WHO INSTINCTIVELY DESPISE US AND THOSE WHOSE STRATEGY IS TO OBLITERATE OR AT LEAST THOROUGHLY DISCREDIT THE US-IRAN CONNECTION.

B. MAJOR ISSUES AND CONCERNS

1. COUNTER THE FALSE BELIEF THAT THE USG IS OPPOSED TO THE REVOLUTION AND SEEKS A RETURN TO FORMER TIMES WHEN IRAN WAS A U.S. "DEPENDENCY".

2. ENCOURAGE THE RENEWAL OF DIALOGUE AND INTERACTION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND IRAN IN NON SECURITY-RELATED FIELDS.

3. EASE THE ADJUSTMENT PROBLEMS FOR IRANIAN UNIVERSITY SUT** STUDENTS SEEKING STUDY IN THE U.S. THROUGH ENGLISH TEACHING AND ORIENTATION PROGRAMS.

4. FOSTER A RESUMPTION OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN AMERICANS WHO ARE PERSIAN STUDIES SPECIALISTS AND THEIR IRANIAN COUNTERPARTS SO AS TO REVEAL A SIDE OF AMERICA WHICH REVERES PERSIAN TRADITIONS.

5. SUSTAIN THE NOTION THAT FOR ALL OF ITS ILLS, THE US IS AN INTERESTING, DYNAMIC, CREATIVE PLACE WITH MUCH TO CONTRIBUTE TO WORLD PEACE AND HUMAN BETTERMENT.

6. PROVIDE GREATER UNFILTERED ACCESS TO INTERNATIONAL EVENTS, U.S. OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL ATTITUDES AND AMERICAN LIFE THROUGH THE VOA'S PERSIAN SERVICE.
SHELLENBERGER##

"

O 141058Z MAY 79

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 2367

INFO

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 120586

FOR CHARGE

E.O. 12065 GDS 5/14/85 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: IR

SUBJECT: YOUR MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WHEN YOU SEE YAZDI, PLEASE MENTION TO HIM THAT AMBASSADOR CUTLER WILL HAVE HIS CONFIRMATION HEARINGS AT 10 A.M. WASHINGTON TIME MAY 15. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY WORD YAZDI MIGHT GIVE US ON THE FOLLOWING TWO SUBJECTS. YOU MAY SAY THAT WE ANTICIPATE STRONG CONGRESSIONAL INTERESTS IN THESE TWO SUBJECTS AND WOULD BE GLAD TO REPEAT ANY WORD OF EXPLANATION OR STATEMENT OF PGOI POLICY THAT YAZDI MIGHT LIKE TO PROVIDE.

(A) STATUS OF JEWS AND OTHER MINORITY GROUPS. THERE IS CONCERN HERE THAT EXECUTION OF ELGHANIAN MAY LEAD TO PRESSURE AGAINST JEWISH COMMUNITY BECAUSE OF TIES WITH ISRAEL AND -ZIONISM.- THERE ARE MANY STORIES THAT NUMBERS OF PROMINENT JEWS HAVE RECENTLY BEEN ARRESTED. WE WOULD APPRECIATE CLARIFICATION AS TO FACTS AND POLICY.

(B) LEGAL STATUS OF ARMISH-MAAG PERSONNEL. IN CURRENT IRANIAN CONDITIONS OF REVOLUTIONARY COURTS IN OPERATION, SOME AMERICANS FEAR THAT DEPRIVING AMERICAN MILITARY ADVISERS OF THEIR IMMUNITY MAY PLACE THEM IN JEOPARDY. PLEASE NOTE THAT U.S. -IRANIAN BILATERAL AGREEMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT REMAIN IN EFFECT. IF IRAN IS TO SEEK U.S. MILITARY ADVISORY EFFORT IN THE FUTURE, WE WILL NATURALLY HAVE TO MAKE ADEQUATE ARRANGEMENTS TO PROVIDE FORPROTECTION OF PERSONNEL. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY CLARIFICATION YAZDI CAN PROVIDE ON THIS SUBJECT. VANCE

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CONFIDENTIAL
STATE
CHG:CWNAAS
CHG:CWNAAS/BJH
NONE
A/M CHG

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
INFO USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE, IMMEDIATE

E.O. 12065: GDS 5/15/85 (NAAS, C.W.) OR-M
TAGS: PFOR, IR, US
SUBJ: MEETING WITH FONMIN YAZDI: 1964 LEGISLATION ON ARMISH-MAAG IMMUNITIES

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT: THIS IS A REPORTING MESSAGE)

2. DURING MEETING WITH FONMIN YAZDI MAY 15, I ASKED HIM FOR EXPLANATION OF PGOI'S ACTION ABROGATING 1964 LEGISLATION AFFORDING DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITIES TO U.S. MILITARY. YAZDI REPLIED THAT I SHOULD NOT INTERPRET THIS STEP AS ANTI-AMERICAN OR INDICATING ANY CHANGE IN PGOI'S DESIRE TO NORMALIZE OUR RELATIONS. IT WAS A MATTER OF "CLEANING UP" SOME OF THE PAST AND THEN, WITH A GRIN, HE NOTED THAT THE DEMONSTRATION IN TEHRAN FOLLOWING THE PASSAGE OF THIS "CAPITULATION" HAD LED TO THE EXILE TO TURKEY OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. NAAS##

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AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
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FOR WHITE HOUSE AND D
E.O. 12065: GDS 5/15/85 (NAAS, C.W.) OR-M
TAGS: SHUM, IR
SUBJ: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER: STATUS OF JEWISH COMMUNITY

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT; THIS IS A REPORTING CABLE)

2. DURING MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI ON MAY 15, I NOTED THAT THE EXECUTION OF MR ELGHANIAN AND THE RUMORS OF WIDESPREAD ARRESTS OF JEWS IN TEHRAN HAD CREATED A SHOCK WAVE IN THE UNITED STATES AND PARTS OF WESTERN EUROPE. THERE WAS A FEAR, I SAID, OF PERSECUTIONS OF THE JEWISH MINORITY. YAZDI REPLIED THAT ELGHANIAN WAS NOT EXECUTED BECAUSE HE WAS A JEW; CATEGORICALLY DENIED THAT THERE WAS ANY RELATIONSHIP IN THE EXECUTION AND ELGHANIAN'S FAITH. NO JEWS ARE BEING PERSECUTED BECAUSE OF THEIR RELIGION, HE CONTINUED, AND THERE WILL BE NO PERSECUTION AGAINST ANY INDIVIDUAL BECAUSE HE IS A MEMBER OF A MINORITY GROUP. HOWEVER, SOME JEWS, LIKE MANY MOSLIMS, COMMITTED CRIMES DURING THE PREVIOUS REGIME AND THEY, LIKE THE MOSLIMS, CHRISTIANS AND OTHERS, WILL BE PROSECUTED IF THE EVIDENCE WARRANTS. HE ADDED THAT THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO GOVERNMENT PRESSURE ON THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN IRAN. REPRESENTATIVES OF REPUTABLE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE WELCOME TO COME AND SEE FOR THEMSELVES.

3. DURING THIS PART OF OUR CONVERSATION, DR. YAZDI WAS SLIGHTLY PRICKLY AND WONDERED WHERE THE BORDER LINE WAS WITH RESPECT TO INTERFERENCE IN IRAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. I REPLIED THAT THIS IS A QUESTION THAT COULD BE ENDLESSLY DEBATED BUT THAT CLEARLY CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBLE PERSECUTION OF MINORITIES WAS OF MORE THAN NATIONAL INTEREST.

CONFIDENTIAL

I ALSO SAID THAT WE HAD PREVIOUSLY AGREED TO BE FRANK WITH EACH OTHER AND NOT TO LET DOUBTS FESTER AND THAT MY QUERY SHOULD ALSO BE SEEN IN THAT CONTEXT. I CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT IT IS IMPORTANT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR NEW RELATIONSHIP THAT WE OPERATE ON THE BASIS OF FACTS AND THE POLICIES OF OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS AND NOT ON RUMORS AND ALLEGATIONS. NAAS##

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R 170944Z MAY 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1498
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 05140

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STATE
APPRV: CHG:CWNAAS
DRFTD: CHG:CWNAAS/BJH
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: CHG POL OR
ECON ICA RF

E.O. 12065: GDS 5/17/85 (NAAS, C.W.) OR-M
TAGS: US, IR
SUBJ: US-IRAN RELATIONS: FONMIN YAZDI'S VIEWS

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT; REPORTING CABLE)

2. AT THE CONCLUSION OF MY MEETING ON MAY 15 WITH FONMIN YAZDI, I DREW ATTENTION TO AN AFP NEWS REPORT QUOTING HIM AS SAYING, "THE IRANINAN GOVERNMENT HAS COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT AMERICANS HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN ALMOST ALL ATTEMPTED SUICIDES, TORTURES, AND CORRUPTION OF THE PAHLAVI REGIME. OF COURSE, THEY HAVE NO BAD INTENTIONS TOWARD AMERICA AND AMERICANS; HOWEVER , IT IS DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO FORGET THESE PAST INVOLVEMENTS". YAZDI IMMEDIATELY DENIED THAT THE QUOTE WAS FULLY ACCURATE AND SAID THAT THE AFP REPORT HAD BEEN INCORRECTLY DRAWN FROM HIS INTERVIEW WITH THE NEW YORK TIMES. HE THEN STATED THAT HE HAD SAID THAT "IRANIANS" WERE CONVINCED OF U.S. DEEP INVOLVEMENT IN SUCH MATTERS, BUT THAT HE HAD VERY CAREFULLY NOT ATTRIBUTED THESE VIEWS TO THE IRANIAN GOVENMENT. "AFTER ALL, I HAVE LEARNED ENOUGH ALREADY OF WHAT I CAN SAY AS AN IRANIAN OFFICIAL, WHATEVER MY PERSONAL VIEWS ARE."

3. IN A VERY FRIENDLY MANEER, HE THEN BRIEFLY LECTURED ME ON THE NEED OF THE U.S. TO TAKE THE INITIATIVES TO DISABUSE IRANIANS OF THEIR CURRENT SUSPICIONS AND TO WIPE OUT THE MEMORIES OF THE PAST. HE WENT THROUGH THE FAMILIAR CATECHISM OF OUR INVOLVEMENT IN THE MOSSADEGH OVERTHROW, THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAVAK AND CIA, THE ENORMOUS U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE SHAH'S INTERNATIONAL OBJECTIVES, THE SALE OF MANY ITEMS WHICH IRAN DID NOT NEED, ETC. HE THEN STATED THAT, ACCORDING TO HIS IN-

SALE

FORMATION, PRESIDENT CARTER HAD PERSONALLY TELEPHONED THE SHAH ON SEPTEMBER 8, THE VERY EVENING OF THE JALEH SQUARE MASSACRE IN WHICH "THOUSANDS WERE KILLED." HE SAID THAT EVERY IRANIAN BELIEVED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD CALLED TO GIVE THE SHAH HIS FULL SUPPORT FOR THE MILITARY ACTIONS OF THE DAY AND IT WOULD BE HARD FOR IRANIANS TO FORGET THIS. THE BROAD WEB OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS AT THE TOP WITH THE SHAH AND HIS PROTEGES ESTABLISHED OVER THE YEARS WOULD ALSO HINDER U.S. -IRAN RELATIONS IN THE FUTURE; FOR EXAMPLE, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE ROGERS WAS ON THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE PAHLAVI FOUNDATION, AND OTHER PEOPLE PROMINENT IN U.S. IRANIAN RELATIONS HAVE LONG TERM RELATIONSHIPS WHICH ARE AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT.

4. YAZDI THEN SAID THAT , OF COURSE, THE PURPOSE OF SUCH MEETINGS AS THE ONE WE WERE HAVING WAS TO PUT THE PAST BEHIND US AND TO LOOK AHEAD. HOWEVER, THE ONUS IS ON THE U.S. TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE AND SPECIFIC ACTIONS TO SHOW THE IRANIAN PEOPLE THAT THE PAST WAS INDEED PAST AND THAT THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION HAD TRULY BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

5. I REPORT THE ABOVE SIMPLY TO SHOW THE MIND-SET OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND MANY OF THOSE IN THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT. YAZDI APPEARS TO BE BASICALLY FRIENDLY TO US AND DESIROUS OF A NORMAL RELATAIONSHIP. BUT HIS OWN PAST OPPOSITION TO THE SHAH AND THE COMPLEX INTERTWINING TIES OF THE U.S. WITH THE PAHLAVI REGIME CONTINUE TO WEIGH HEAVILY ON HIM. NAAS

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 5140

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 5211

O 201239Z MAY 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1545
INFO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0027
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 05211

CHRGE: STATE
APPRV: CHG:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:VTOMSETH
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL CHG RF
CRU

E.O. 12065: GDS 5/20/85 (TOMSETH,, V.C) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, SHUM, IR
SUBJ: IRANIAN JEWS AND OTHER MINORITIES

DURING CALL OF FON MIN YAZDI MAY 20 (REPORTED SEPTEL) YAZDI STRONGLY REITERATED PGOI'S POSITION THAT JEWS AND OTHER MINORITY GROUPS ARE NOT NOW AND WILL NOT BE SUBJECTED TO DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT IN REVOLUTIONARY IRAN. THE U.S. SENATE, WHICH HE CLAIMED EVERYONE KNOWS IS DOMINATED BY THE ZIONIST LOBBY , IS MISTAKEN TO PERCEIVE OTHERWISE.TO SUPPORT HIS CONTENTION THAT IRANIAN MINORITIES ENJOY THE SAME FREEDOMS AS IRANIAN MUSLIMS, YAZDI CITED THE RECENT VISIT OF A JEWISH DELEGATION TO QOM WHERE KHOMEINI REASUURED THEM ON THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY GROUPS. YAZDI SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAS FIRM EVIDENCE THAT ISRAEL HAD SENT AGENTS TO IRAN WHERE THEY WERE GIVEN IRANIAN PASSPORTS AT THE SPECIFIC DIRECTION OF THE SHAH. HE SAID THAT IRAN HAS EVERY RIGHT TO ARREST THESE ZIONIST SPIES, BUT THAT SUCH ARRESTS SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED AS A POGROM AGAINST THE JEWISH COMMUNITY. INTERPRETED

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CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 5211

POL-1 US-14

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

DATE: May 22, 1979

REPLY TO ATTN OF: E/C - Clyde D. Taylor

SUBJECT: Perceived Effects of the Javits Resolution

TO: Charge

We have already noted in this Section several instances of nervousness or boycott of contacts with us which are most understandable in the context of the Javits resolution. Richard Bash had two appointments at the General Manager level of the NIOC cancelled on May 21; both of these officials are long time contacts who he has seen since the revolution. One even called after his secretary had cancelled the appointment to apologize but offered no explanation. Barbara Schell had an appointment with the head of a major PGOI-owned company cancelled with no explanation. On May 20 a senior official of the CBI, who was merely to have rescheduled his appointment, told me he would be busy for the foreseeable future.

We have had a number of calls or expressions by visitors expressing the concern that our days here were numbered. In one instance, the vice president of a large American company was advised by his firm's Iranians to advance his departure time from three weeks hence to as soon as possible.

cc: POL

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 (REV. 7-76) GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6 9010-112

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 5316

DE RUQMHR #5316 142**
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221259Z MAY 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1598
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 05316

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STATE
APPRV: CHG:CWNAAS
DRFTD: CHG:CWNAAS DRFT
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: CHG POL CRU

E.O. 12065: GDS 5/22/85 (NAAS, C.W./TOMSETH, V.L.)
TAGS: PEPR, IR, US
SUBJ: U.S. -IRANIAN RELATIONS: MAY 17 SENATE RESOLUTION
1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT; THIS IS A REPORTING MESSAGE)

2. I APPRECIATE THE WAY IN WHICH THE DEPARTMENT'S SPOKESMAN HANDLED THE FLOOD OF QUESTIONS MAY 21 ON THE IRANIAN REACTION TO THE SENATE RESOLUTION. NO EASY TASK. AS WE ARE REPORTING SEPARATELY, THE DECIBEL LEVEL AND SHRILLNESS OF PRESS AND RADIO COVERAGE HERE MARKEDLY DECREASED TODAY AND WE HOPE THAT ON OUR SIDE WE CAN AVOID RESTIMULATING IT.

3. ONE OF THE QUESTIONS DIRECTED TO THE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN AT THE MAY 21 PRESS BRIEFING INDICATED THAT A SUBSTANTIAL MISUNDERSTANDING MAY EXIST AS TO THE NATURE OF THE PGOI'S PROTEST OF THE MAY 17 SENATE RESOLUTION SPONSORED BY SENATOR JAVIS AND ITS POSTION TOWARD THE SENATOR HIMSELF. THE SPOKESMAN'S RESPONSE, WE BELIEVE, MAY NOT HAVE ENTIRELY SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT IN THIS REGARD. FOR THE RECORD, THEN, THE PGOI'S PROTEST IS WITH THE RESOLUTION WHICH IT REGARDS AS UNWARRANTED INTERFERENCE IN IRAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON SENATOR JAVITS HAVE BEEN LIMITED TO ALLEGATIONS THAT HE HAS ZIONIST CONNECTIONS. HIW WIFE'S FORMER RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN AIR HAS ALSO BEEN THE SUBJECT OF OFFICIAL CRITICISM. NO THREAT AGAINST SENATOR JAVITS HAS BEEN MADE BY THE PGOI, HOWEVER, NOR, TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, HAS ANY KIND THREAT BEEN MADE AGAINST HIM BY ANY INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP WHICH MIGHT EVEN BE REMOTELY CONSTRUED AS AN AGENT OF THE PGOI.

4. I HAVE SENT TO YAZDI THE TEXT OF THE PREPARED STATEMENT BY THE SPOKESMAN AND A COPY OF THE SECRETARY'S MAY 1 ADDRESS. I DREW YAZDI'S ATTENTION IN PARTICULAR TO THE SECRETARY'S COMMENTS ON THE U.S. APPROACH TO INTERNAL CHANGE.

5. WE HAVE BEEN REFLECTING OVERNIGHT ABOUT THE VEHEMENCE OF THE PGOI REACTION TO THE SENATE RESOLUTION. THE PGOI'S RESPONSE SURELY RELATES IN PART TO ITS CONTINUING INSECURITY. HIGHLY SENSITIVE TO ITS VULNERABILITIES, IT IS INCLINED TO REGARD EVEN THE SLIGHTEST SUGGESTION OF PRESSURE FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES AS UNWARRANTED INTERFERENCE IN IRANIAN AFFAIRS. HOWEVER, WE SPECULATE THAT THERE MAY BE ANOTHER MOTIVATION FOR THE PGOI'S DECISION TO ASK US THAT AMBASSADOR CUTLER'S ARRIVAL IN IRAN BE DELAYED A MOTIVATION THAT GIVES US CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM REGARDING OUR PROSPECTS FOR WEATHERING THE CURRENT STORM WITHOUT MAJOR, LASTING DAMAGE. THE PGOI HAS BEEN VICTIMIZED ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS BY THE SYSTEM OF DUAL GOVERNMENTS (I.E., THE PGOI ON THE ONE HAND AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE STRUCTURE SUBJECT TO KHOMEINI'S DIRECTION ON THE OTHER), NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH WAS THE BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH EGYPT FORCED BY KHOMEINI'S VIEWS ON THE ISSUE. SEVERAL FACTORS LEAD US TENTATIVELY TO CONCLUDE THAT THE PGOI MAY HAVE TAKEN THE ACTION IT DID TO FORESTALL MORE PRECIPITOUS UNILATERAL ACTION ON THE PART OF THE IMAM. AMONG THESE ARE THE OTHERWISE SURPRISINGLY LOW KEY MANNER IN WHICH THE I WAS RECEIVED BY FOUR DIFFERENT CABINET MINISTERS ON MAY 20 AND 21--MEETINGS WHICH OCCURRED AFTER THE DECISION TO REQUEST AMBASSADOR CUTLER TO DELAY HIS ARRIVAL HAD BEEN MADE-- AND THE PUBLIC TREATMENT TO THE MOVE BOTH IN THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED MEDIA AND BY FONMIN YAZDI. FOLLOWING THE VITRIOLIC ATTACKS OF MAY 20 IN NIRT'S RADIO AND TELEVISION PROGRAMMING, THE ISSUE WAS DECIDEDLY DOWNPLAYED IN PROGRAMMING ON MAY 21. YAZDI IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE MAY 21 AND AN INTERVIEW AIRED THE SAME DAY BY NIRT WAS MODERATE IN TONE, CAREFUL TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCHES OF THE USG, AND HOPEFUL THAT GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND THE U.S. WOULD NOT BE IMPEDED BY THE SENATE RESOLUTION.

6. ALL OF THIS SUGGESTS THAT OUR BEST HOPE OF REACHING A SATISFACTORY ACCOMMODATION WITH THE NEW IRAN LIES IN QUIET DIPLOMACY. DESPITE KHOMEINI'S INTRANSIGENCE TOWARD THE U.S. , THERE ARE MANY HERE WHO SINCERELY WANT TO HAVE CORDIAL, COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WITH US, WHO ARE RECEPTIVE TO OUR VIEWS AND WHO ARE SENSITIVE TO INTERNATIONAL OPINION ON MATTERS SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS. UNFORTUNATELY, KHOMEINI REMAINS FOR THE MOMENT THE MOST POWERFUL POLITICAL FIGURE IN IRAN AND AN INDIVIDUAL WHOM PERHAPS MORE PROGRESSIVE IRANIANS DARE NOT CHALLENGE FRONTALLY. WE SHOULD NOT OVER-ESTIMATE OUR ABILITY TO AFFECT EVENTS HERE, BUT WE CAN HOPE TO HAVE AN IMPORTANT IMPACT AT THE MARGINS BY PLUGGING AWAY WITH THOSE IRANIAN WHO ARE INCLINED TO APPRECIATE THE IMPORTANCE OF FRIENDSHIP WITH THE U.S. THE ASSUMPTION, OF COURSE, IS THAT THESE SAME INDIVIDUALS WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE AUTHORITY AND INFLUENCE IN THIS CURIOUS MIX OF ZEALOTS AND DEMOCRATIC REFORMERS..

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CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 5316

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 5824

DE RUQMHR #5824 156**
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 050751Z JUN 79 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1840
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 05824

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STATE 5/6/79
APPRV: CHARGE' CWNAAS
DRFTD: CHARGE' CWNAAS
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: CHARGE' POL ICA
RF CHRON

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/5/85 (NAAS, C.W.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, SOPN, IR, US
SUBJ: NOON BRIEFING RE AMBASSADOR CUTLER JUNE 4

1. I WOULD APPRECIATE CLARIFICATION AND ELUCIDATION ON SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENTS ON AMBASSADOR CUTLER JUNE 4. STATEMENTS THAT " THE UNITED STATES AT THIS TIME HAS NO PLANS EITHER TO WITHDRAW HIS NAME OR TO REASSIGN HIM TO ANOTHER POST" CERTAUNLY RAISES THE QUESTION WHY THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF IRANIAN REQUEST TO WITHDRAW THE AMBASSADOR'S APPOINTMENT WAS MADE AT THIS TIME. THE MANNER IN WHICH THIS DELICATE MATTER HAS BEEN HANDLED, THEREFORE, CAN ONLY BE VIEWED HERE AS A GRATUITOUS SLAP AT PGOI, A DESIRE TO PLAY TIT FOR TAT. I CAN APPRECIATE EMOTIONS AND IRRITATIONS AROUSED IN WASHINGTON BY PGOI ACTIONS. THOSE OF US HERE WHO BEAR THE DAILY BRUNT OF THE EFFECTS OF THESE ACTIONS SHARE THEM.

2. HOWEVER, I HAD THOUGHT THAT WE WERE GOING TO TRY THROUGH QUIET DIPLOMACY TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO MODERATE CURRENT PASSIONS. THAT APPEARED TO BE THE CRUX OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR MY MEETING WITH YAZDI WHICH IRONICALLY TOOK PLACE A FEW HOURS BEFORE THE NOON BRIEFING. IF HE IS SOME WHAT CONFUSED TODAY, I CAN WELL UNDERSTAD. I AM SURE YOU WILL AGREE THAT THERE IS A CERTAIN INCONSISTENCY IN OUR APPROACH.

3. FINALLY, SINCE DEPARTMENT KNEW THAT I WAS ABOUT TO CARRY OUT MY INSTRUCTIONS WITH YAZDI, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN NICE TO LET ME KNOW ANNOUNCEMENT WAS TO BE MADE SO THAT I COULD HAVE INFORMED PGOI, I FIRST LEARNED OF OUR ACTION FROM TEHRAN RADIO BROADCAST THIS MORNING AS THOUSANDS OF DEMONSTRATORS WERE MOVING BY THE EMBASSY.

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RR RUQMHR 7 JUN 79 09 05Z
DE RUEHRO #4953 1580815
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R 070801Z JUN 79
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7629
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 993
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 14953

E.O.12065: RDS-1 (6/6/99), HOLMES, H.A., OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MASS, IR, IT
SUBJ: (C) IRANIAN INTEREST IN SPARE PARTS

1. C-ENTIRE TEXT

2. MFA OFFICIAL TOLD US JUNE 5 THAT AT RECENT MEETING BETWEEN IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI AND ITALIAN AMBASSADOR TO IRAN TAMAGNINI, YAZDI EXPRESSED INTEREST IN PURCHASING SPARE PARTS PRODUCED IN ITALY UNDER U.S. LICENSE FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT NOW IN IRAN, SUCH AS BELL HELICOPTERS. OFFICIAL SAID THAT ITALIANS, WHO ARE NOW CONSIDERING THEIR RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSAL, BELIEVE THAT YAZDI REQUEST IS EFFORT TO IMPROVE CONTACTS WITH THE U.S. THROUGH THIRD COUNTRY AS IT IS NOT POLITICALLY POSSIBLE AT THE MOMENT TO APPROACH U.S. DIRECTLY.

3. COMMENT: WHILE WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO JUDGE VALIDITY OF THIS INTERPRETATION OF YAZDI REQUEST, WE NOTE THAT ITALIANS WOULD PROBABLY BE EAGER TO SELL SPARE PARTS TO IRAN IN ANY CASE. WE CAN PROBABLY EXPECT TO HEAR MORE ABOUT THIS MATTER SHOULD IRANIANS PRESENT SPECIFIC LIST OF DESIRED SPARE PARTS.

GARDNER

BT
#4953

S E C R E T/NODIS TEHRAN 5952

DE RUQMHR #5952 159**
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 080826Z JUN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1900
BT
S E C R E T TEHRAN 05952

CLASS: SECRET
CHRGE: STATE 6/8/79
APPRV: CHARG:CWNAAS
DRFTD: CHARGE:CWNAAS:MA
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: CHG

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM CHARGE

E.O. 12065: XDS-3 6/8/99 (NAAS, C.W.) OR-M
TAGS: IR, US
SUBJECT: U.S. POSTURE IN FORTHCOMING MONTHS

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE, I HAVE SENT YOU A FAIRLY GLOOMY OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION HERE. FOLLOWING ARE MY THOUGHTS ON HOW WE SHOULD POSTURE OURSELVES IN THE SUMMER MONTHS AHEAD. ONE CANNOT PRACTICALLY LOOK FURTHER THAN THAT.

3. GENERAL APPROACH TO PGOI:

--I HAVE TAKEN A FAIRLY ACTIVIST APPROACH SINCE MY RETURN TO POST, E.G., CALLING ON MANY MINISTERS AND SPELLING OUT OUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE REVOLUTION, ETC. I HAVE BEEN GENERALLY WELL RECEIVED, BUT THE CENTRALITY OF KHOMEINI AND THE TUMULTUOUS IRANIAN REACTION TO THE SENATE RESOLUTION HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY NEGATED ANY GOOD DONE.

--I BELIEVE THE NEW CHARGE SHOULD RETURN TO A LOW PROFILE. LET THE IRANINAS TAKE THE INITIATIVES WHEN THEY REALIZE THAT THERE ARE ADVANTAGES TO GOOD RELATIONS WITH US. IT IS LIKELY THAT THOSE CLOSE TO KHOMEINI, CERTAINLY THE MANY IRANIAN OPPOSED TO HIM, SEE US AS EAGER TO PROPITIATE HIM AND, THEREFORE, WILLING TO ENDURE MUCH ABUSE.

--DISTANCE IS ALSO CALLED FOR IN VIEW OF MY ASSESSMENT (SEPTEL) THAT WE CAN CURRENTLY HAVE LITTLE POSITIVE LONG

TERM IMPACT ON THE SITUATION HERE. WE SHOULD NOT BECOME IDENTIFIED WITH THE KIND OF STATE AND POLICIES KHOMEINI IS CREATING AND WHICH ARE UNLIKELY TO ENDURE OVER THE LONG TERM.

--I DO NOT FAVOR THE DESPATCH OF AN EMISSARY TO KHOMEINI UNLESS PGOI TAKES THE INITIATIVE. AN EMISSARY WOULD HAVE LITTLE OR NO OPPORTUNITY NOR CHANCE OF AFFECTING HIS MIND-SET AND IT WOULD BE SEEN AS A FURTHER KNUCKLING DOWN TO HIS BRAND OF EXTREMISM.

--EMBASSY STAFF, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, SHOULD MAINTAIN ITS FORMERLY FAIRLY WIDESPREAD CONTACTS.

--THE DIALOGUE SHOULD CONTINUE WITH THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP AS A SIGN OF GOOD WILL AND, IF SPARE PARTS ORDERS ARE SUB-MITTED,WE SHOULD BE REASONABLY FORTHCOMING (TO THE EXTENT CONGRESSIONAL OPINION WILL PERMIT).

--THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD AVOID PUBLIC COMMENT ON IRAN INSOFAR AS POSSIBLE AND, WHEN IT IS NECESSARY TO COMMENT, TAKE A BLAND "WE LOOK FORWARD TO IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS" LINE.

--WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO ADHERE TO A STRICT POLICY OF NON-INTERFERNCE FOR THE TIME BEING . THE BODY POLITIC IS SIMPLY TOO FRACTURED TO DO ANYTHING ELSE.

4. STAFFING--THE DECISION TO DENAY APPOINTMENT OF A NEW AMBASSADOR IS JUST RIGHT. A LATE SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER ARRIVAL WOULD BE A GOOD TARGET DATE.

--EMBASSY STAFF SHOULD NOT BE INCREASED AND POSSIBLE SHOULD BE DECREASED; ONLY REPLACEMENTS OF CURRENT STAFF SHOULD COME HERE THIS SUMMER. OTHERS ASSIGNED TO EMBASSY SHOULD BE HELD IN WAITING PATTERN TO SEE HOW SITUATION ENVOLVES.

--WIVES AND CHILDREN SHOULD NOT BE PREMITTED TO TRAVEL HERE UNTIL A NEW AMBASSADOR CAN MAKE HIS OWN ASSESSMENT.

--CONSTRUCTION OF THE NEW COSULAR QUARTERS SHOULD BE COM-PLETED BUT FULL CONSULAR SERVICES SHOULD NOT BE RESUMED UNTIL THE NEW AMBASSDOR ARRIVES. VISA SERVICES ARE ONE THING WE HAVE THE IRANIANS WANT. CONTINUATION OF OUR PRESENT LIMITED SERVICES IS A SMALL SIGNAL OF OUR DIS-PLEASURE. NAAS

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S E C R E T TEHRAN 5951/1

DE RUQMIR #5951/01 159**
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 080814Z JUN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1898
BT
S E C R E T TEHRAN 05951

CLASS: SECRET
CHRGE: STATE 6/8/79
APPRV: CHARGE:CWNAAS
DRFTD: CHARGE:CWNAAS:MAM
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: CHG

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM CHARGE

E.O. 12065: XDS-3 6/8/99 (NAAS, C.W.) OR-M
TAGS: IR, US
SUBJECT: THE IRANIAN SCENE; IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. AS I PREPARE TO RELINQUISH CHARGE OF THIS MISSION, I WISH TO SHARE A FEW OBSERVATIONS AND THOUGHTS WITH YOU. IN FAIRNESS.I SHOULD ALERT YOU THAT THE EXPERIENCES OF THE LAST YEAR PERHAPS ACCENTUATE THE DOURNESS OF MY VIEWS. HOWEVER, ALMOST ALL MY DIPLIMATIC COLLEAGUES (EXCEPT THE JAPANESE) AND EMBASSY CO-WORKERS WOULD SHARE MOST OF MY THOUGHTS.

3. THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE--THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION HAS NOT RUN ITS COURSE. THE ODDS ARE BETTER THAN 50-50 THAT FURTHER SERIOUS VIOLENCE WILL OCCUR. THE SITUATION IS HIGHLY VOLATILE.

-- THE BODY POLITIC IS SPLINTERED INTO AN ALMOST HOPELESS PROFUSION OF POLITICAL GROUPS AND THERE SEEMS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF MEANINGFUL COOPERATION (NEVER AN IRANIAN CHARACTERISTIC) AMONG THEM.

--KHOMEINI IS UNDER ATTACK FROM DIVERSE GROUPS ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION AND NATURE OF THE STATE. VIOLENCE MAY OCCUR. BUT, I BELIEVE HE WILL REMAIN FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE THE SINGLE STRONGEST POLITICAL FORCE. THERE IS NO VISIBLE REPLACEMENT TO HIM WHO COULD COMMAND SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY

TO CONTROL THE NATION. COERCIVE AUTHORITY RESTS WITH HIM AND HIS REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS AND THE ARMED MOBS. THE POLICE AND MILITARY UNITS HAVE RECOVERED ONLY SLIGHTLY. --ANTI-AMERCIANISM IS A FACT OF LIFE HERE AND COULD GROW WORSE AS THE POLITICAL POT BOILS. WE ARE THE OBVIOUS TARGET BECAUSE OF OUR TIES WITH THE SHAH. IN THE BEST OF TIMES THE PERSIANS MUST BLAME SOMEONE ELSE FOR THEIR WOES.

— THE "GOVERNMENT" IS COMPOSED OF ESSENTIALLY DECENT MEN, BUT THEY HAVE LITTLE OR NO POWER; THEY ARE BEHOLDEN TO KHOMEINI, WHO DICTATES THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE SYSTEM. THUS, THE DUALITY OF AUTHORITY HERE WHICH AFFECTS ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENTAL, BUSINESS AND PRIVATE ACTIVITIES AND DRIVES THE MINISTERS TO DISTRACTION.

—THE ECONOMY IS A MESS. MUCH OF THE FORMER FOREIGN AND IRANIAN MANAGEMENT LEVEL HAS FLED; OTHERS ARE IN JAIL, DEMORALIZED OR UNABLE TO PERFORM THEIR WORK BECAUSE OF WORKER OR REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE INTRUSION AND SHORTAGES OF IMPORTED MATERIALS. THE BANKING SYSTEM HAS RECOVERED SUBSTANTIALLY. UNEMPLOYMENT IS VAST. BUT, THE HEAVY DOLLAR EARNINGS FROM OIL ARE BEING PLOWED BACK INTO ECONOMIC RECOVERY LOANS TO SUPPORT WAGES FOR UNPRODUCTIVE WORK AND CAN FINANCE RELIEF OF FOOD AND NON-EDIBLE SHORTAGES THAT ARE BEGINNING TO EMERGE.

—THE FISSIPAROUS STRAINS OF THIS POLYGLOT AND ETHNICALLY DIVERSE COUNTRY HAVE ALREADY BEEN SEEN IN TURKESTAN, KURDISTAN AND KHUZESTAN. THEY ARE LIKELY TO GET WORSE AND AZERBAIJAN COULD BE NEXT.

4. A FUTURE WITH KHOMEINI:

— KHOMEINI IS 79, TIRED AND NOT IN THE BEST OF HEALTH. HOWEVER, OUR POLICY FOR THE NEAR TERM MUST REALISTICALLY BE BASED ON THE EXPECTATION THAT HE WILL BE AROUND FOR AWHILE. IN FACT, HIS DEATH NOW COULD THROW THIS COUNTRY INTO EVEN GREATER TURMOIL; HIS CHARISMA IS ONE OF THE FEW ELEMENTS KEEPING THE SOCIETY FROM COMPLETE ANARCHY.

--HE IS A MAN DRIVEN BY HIS VISION OF CREATING A PURE MUSLIM STATE GOVERNED BY THE KORAN AND THE ASCENDANCY OF

ISLAM IN THE WORLD. AT TIMES HE SOUNDS AS IF HE BELIEVES HE IS ALLAH'S CHOSEN MESSENGER.

--HE IS CONVINCED THAT HE AND "THE MASSES" ALONE BROUGHT ABOUT THE REVOLUTION AND THAT THEY ALONE ARE COMMITTED TO AN ISLAMIC STATE. THUS, HIS CONTEMPT FOR THE MODERNIZERS AND DEMOCRACY AND HIS UNWILLINGNESS TO SHARE POWER WITH THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION.

MASSES

--HE IS SURROUNDED BY EXTREMISTS (ISLAMIC, LEFTIST, PLO, ETC.) AND EVEN THE CABINET HAS GREAT DIFFICULTY IN GETTING HIS UNDIVIDED ATTENTION. DIRECTLY INFLUENCING HIM, IN SUM, IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE.

--KHOMEINI IS UNTUTORED IN WORLD AFFAIRS AND THE NEEDS OF

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A MODERN STATE, EMOTIONAL, ZEALOUS AND PRONE TO OFF-THE-CUFF PRONOUNCEMENTS WHICH CREATE SERIOUS DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL DISCORD. HE DOES NOT APPEAR TO CARE WHAT TURBULENCE HE CAUSES.

--HIS DISLIKE (HATRED?) FOR THE U.S. IS REAL. HE UNDOUBTEDLY BELIEVES THAT WE ARE INTERFERING AND ATTEMPTING TO UNDO THE REVOLUTION.

5. THE NEAR TERM FUTURE:

IF I AM RIGHT THAT KHOMEINI WILL REMAIN THE PREDOMINANT FIGURE IN THE MONTHS AHEAD, IRAN PRESENTS A BLEAK LANDSCAPE FOR US:

--IT WILL BE A VIRTUAL DICTATORSHIP BY THE MOST CONSERVATIVE RELIGIOUS LEADERS WHO WILL USE THREATS FORCE AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COURTS TO ATTEMPT TO COW THE OPPOSITION. ALL OF THIS WILL BE MITIGATED BY ADMINISTRATIVE INEFFICIENCY, PERSIAN INDIVIDULAISM, CORRUPTION, AND CONTINUED OPPOSITION OF OTHER POLITICAL FORCES, INCLUDING THE LEFT, THAT HAVE BECOME USED TO POLITICAL ACTIVITY. THIS WILL ALSO INCLUDE THE INCREASING RESORT TO TERRORISM BY DISAFFECTED GROUPS.

--OUR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE WHIMS OF KHOMEINI AND COULD BE SEVERED AT ANY TIME. ANTI-AMERICANISM WILL REMAIN A FAVORED THEME AND OUR PERSONNEL COULD BE ENDANGERED ON OCCASION. OUR ACCESS TO USEFUL SOURCES WILL BE DIFFICULT.

--THE ECONOMY WILL RECOVER VERY SLOWLY. OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. BUSINESS, EXCEPT FO THE EXPORT OF CRITICAL ITEMS SUCH AS FOOD GRAINS, WILL BE EXCEEDINGLY LIMITED. BUSINESSMEN SEEKING TO COLLECT AGAINST OLD CONTRACTS, REGULARIZE THEIR STILL VALID ONES AND JOINT VENTURES WILL CONTINUE TO FACE A LABYRINTH OF CONFLICTING AUTHORITIES AND EXPERIENCE PERSONAL AS WELL AS CORPORATE RISK.

--INTERNATIONALLY, WE WILL FIND IRAN GENERALLY NON-CONFORMIST LENDING SUPPORT TO RADICAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS, AND A SOURCE OF REGIONAL INSTABILITY.

—IN THIS ENVIRONMENT OF ACUTE ISTABILITY, THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT IRANIAN OIL PRODUCTION WILL BE DISRUPTED IN SPITE OF THE INTERNAL ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO PREVENT THIS.

6. I WILL COMMENT IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE ON OUR POSTURE OVER THE COMING MONTHS. MAY I ALSO RECOMMEND THAT YOU FIND A FEW MINUTES TO READ POLITICAL COUNSELOR TOMSETH'S ANALYSIS "WAITING FOR GODOT—IRANIAN STYLE" (TEHRAN 5932). IT TAKES A LONGER TERM VIEW THAN THIS MESSAGE. NAAS

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#5951

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S E C R E T/NODIS TEHRAN 05951/2

Tehran, Iran

June 13, 1979

Excellency:

I request your assistance in a matter concerning the Iran-American Society in Isfahan and the Isfahan Office of Education.

As you know, the Iran-America Society (IAS) is a private cultural association which attempts to maintain and improve relations between the people of Iran and the people of the U.S. through a program of cultural events and exchanges, library and meeting services, and classes in English for Iranians and Farsi for Americans. The IAS offices in Tehran and other cities have had their charters approved through the Minister of Cultural Affairs. In Isfahan, however, although the charter approval has been pending for some time, it was not completed prior to the Revolution, and is still pending.

Today, June 13, the Director of the Isfahan IAS, Mr. Dennis Wilson, received a letter from Mr. Hassan Nilfroushand, Director-General of the Office of Education in Isfahan. In that letter, Mr. Nilfroushand, apparently considering the IAS a foreign language school rather than a cultural association, has ordered the IAS to immediately suspend operations until it receives its school license, and to follow all regulations for schools.

While the IAS is not a U.S. Government organization, the Embassy does incourage and support the IAS and believes these associations contribute to better understanding

His Excellency,
Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Tehran.

between our countries. If the Isfahan IAS is forced to close now, just as its new season is beginning and it is accepting applications for membership and language classes, there is a good possibility that it would never reopen, since its current costs far exceed its income. This would be regrettable for both those residents of Isfahan who use its services, and for a better understanding between our peoples. The order is apparently in error, as the IAS has never come under the Ministry of Education but rather the Ministry of Cultural Affairs. I hope that you can intervene to set aside this order and to advise the Office of Culture in Isfahan that it has the proper jurisdiction over the IAS.

With high esteem and thanking you for your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Naas
Charge d'Affaires, a.i.

DE RUQMHR #6263 167**
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 160900Z JUN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2058
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 06263

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STATE 4/16
APPRV: CHG:CWNAAS
DRFTD: CHG:CWNAAS
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: CHG POL RF

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/16/85 (NAAS, C,W.)OR-M
TAGS: IR, US
SUBJ: RESOLUTION ON IRAN

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT; ACTION CABLE)

2. ETTESAM (DIR GEN EUROPE AND AMERCIAS) REQUESTED ME TO CALL ON HIM ON "URGENT" MATTER THIS MORNING. WHEN I ARRIVED HE TOLD ME THAT FONMIN YAZDI HAD RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT "TWO SENATORS" BARNES AND HOLLENBECK WERE SPONSORING A RESOLUTION ON IRAN ALONG THE LINES OF THE PREVIOUS SENATE RESOLUTION (I CANNOT PUT MY HANDS ON CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY BUT NEA/IRN OFFICER HAS INFORMED THAT A REPRESENTATIVE HOLLENBECK HAS BEEN WORKING ON SUCH A RESOLUTION). ETTESAM SAID THAT PGOI IS VERY CONCERNED THAT THE PASSAGE OF SUCH A RESOLUTION WILL CREATE A VERY STRONG RESURGENCE OF ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING IN THE COUNTRY. GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT PASSING OF SHCH A RESOLUTION, IN FACT, WOULD CREATE EVEN STRONGER REACTION THEN EARLIER SENATE RESOLUTION. HE ASKED THAT WE DO WHATEVER COULD BE DONE TO PREVENT THIS HAPPENING.

3. AT THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER, ETTESAM REFERRED FAVORABLY TO THE SENTIMENTS OF SECRETARY VANCE'S LETTER TO THE FONMIN AND SAID THAT THE PGOI RECIPROCATES THESE REELINGS AND WISHES TO SEE A GRADUAL IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS. HOWEVER, ANOTHER CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION WOULD MAKE THIS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT.

4. I WOULD APPRECIATE A CURRENT READING ON THIS MATTER SO THAT I MAY INFORM THE FOREIGN MINISTER. I REALIZE THAT THIS IS SATURDAY BUT IF YOU COULD HAVE EVEN A PRELIMINARY REPORT SENT TO ME TODAY, I COULD PASS THE INFORMATION TO FONMIN YAZDI TOMORROW MORNING AT OUR 10:30 MEETING.
THANKS. NAAS
BT
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DE RUEHC #6044 1671819
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O 162007Z JUN 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 3026
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 156044

E.O. 12065GDS 6/16/79 (PRECHT, H.)

TAGS: IR, US

SUBJECT:RESOLUTION ON IRAN
REFERENCE: TEHRAN 6263
1. CONGRESSMAN HOLLENBECK, CONGRESSMEN SOLARZ AND POSSIBLY OTHERS INTRODUCED RESOLUTIONS SEVERAL WEEKS AGO ON SITUATION IN IRAN WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO JEWISH COMMUNITY. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THESE RESOLUTIONS HAVE BEEN REFERRED TO HIRC.

2. CONGRESSMAN BARNES HAS INVITED DEPT OFFS ON JUNE 18 TO MEET WITH INTERESTED CITIZENS FROM HIS DISTRICT FOR DISCUSSION OF SITUATION IN IRAN. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT SOME 30 PERSONS WILL ATTEND AND THAT MEETING-WILL BE PRIVATE.

3. CONGRESSMAN HOLLENBECK HAD PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED A CLOSED HEARING ON JUNE 19 TO REVIEW STATUS OF IRANIAN JEWISH COMMUNITY. HE HAD PLANNED TO INVITE DEPT OFFS, CIA AND AMERICAN JEWISH LEADERS. THIS HEARING HAS BEEN CANCELLED AND, INSTEAD, DEPT OFFS WILL MEET WITH HIM AND POSSIBLY OTHER CONGRESSMEN PRIVATELY. CIA REP MAY ALSO BE INVITED.

4. IRANIAN EMBASSY CHARGE AGAH WAS AWARE OF PLANNED MEETINGS AND RESOLUTIONS AND ASKED US ABOUT THEM ON JUNE 15. WE REPLIED ALONG FOREGOING LINES. CHRISTOPHER
BT
#6044

PAGE NUMBER #6279/01 168 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 171103Z JUN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2069
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L 06279

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STATE 6/17
APPRV: CHG:CW.NAAS
DRFTD: POL:VLIONSETH/BJL
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL RF CHG
ECON

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/17/85 (NAAS, C.W.) OR-M
AGS: PEPR, MASS, EFIN, IR
SUBJ: U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS

REF: STATE: 156044

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT: REPORTING CABLE)

2. SUMMARY: DURING FAREWELL CALL ON FONMIN YAZDI JUNE 17 HE REITERATED TO ME PGOI'S (AND KHOMEINI'S) DESIRE FOR CONTINUED RELATIONS WITH U.S. YAZDI APPEALED FOR COOPERATION PREVENTING INCIDENTS SUCH AS MAY 17 SENATE RESOLUTION FROM FRUSTRATING THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION. HE ALSO EMPHATICALLY STATED THAT U.S. PARTNERS IN RECENTLY NATIONALIZED IRANIAN BANKS SHOULD NOT BE CONCERNED ABOUT RECOVERY OF THEIR EQUITY. END SUMMARY.

3. YAZDI RECEIVED ME AND POLCOUNS JUNE 16 FOR FAREWELL CALL. I ASKED HIM WHAT MESSAGE I COULD CARRY BACK TO WASHINGTON. HE REPLIED THAT HE WOULD APPRECIATE MY EXTENDING HIS REGARDS TO SECRETARY VANCE. IN THIS REGARD, HE SAID, HE WANTED TO REITERATE THAT IT CONTINUES TO BE THE POSITION OF THE PGOI AND OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI NOT TO "SEVER" RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. RATHER, IRAN WANTS TO IMPROVE THESE RELATIONS AND TO PUT THE PAST BEHIND. "WE KNOW THIS WILL NOT BE EASY," HE SAID. HE ADDED THAT IT WAS VERY UNFORTUNATE THAT THE MAY 17 SENATE RESOLUTION HAD STARTED "A WAVE" OF MUTUAL RECRIMINATION. HE SAID THAT THE PGOI HAD BEEN DISTURBED TO HEAR RECENTLY THAT CONGRESSMAN BARNES HAD PROPOSED A SIMILAR RESOLUTION TO THE ONE PASSED BY THE SENATE.

4. USING INFO CONTAINED IN REFTEL I OUTLINED FOR YAZDI THE EFFORTS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE AND WERE CONTINUING TO BE MADE TO PREVENT THE KIND OF ACTIONS THAT SO CONCERNED HIM AND THE PGOI. HE REPLIED THAT HE WAS GLAD WE UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM. "THIS IS WHAT I WANTED TO TELL YOU," HE SAID, "AND THAT I WOULD LIKE YOU TO CONVEY IT TO WASHINGTON. THESE KINDS OF RESOLUTIONS DO NOT HELP. THEY ARE CONTRARY TO THE EXPRESSIONS OF GOODWILL FROM THE ADMINISTRATION." YAZDI THEN WENT OVER THE NOW FAMILIAR REFRAIN OF HIS UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONGRESS BUT THE IRANIAN MAN-IN-THE-STREET'S LACK OF DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE T&O.

5. YAZDI WENT ON TO THE QUESTION OF MILITARY SALES. HE SAID THAT HE HAD RECENTLY BEEN INFORMED BY AIR FORCE COMMANDER EMANIAN THAT WE ARE HOLDING UP THE DELIVERY OF CERTAIN SPARES THAT IRAN HAD ALREADY PAID FOR. HE ASKED

THAT WE "PAVE THE WAY" FOR DELIVERY OF THESE ITEMS. I ASKED HIM TO PROVIDE US WITH MORE PRECISE DETAILS AND PROMISED THAT WE WOULD DO WHAT WE COULD. YAZDI SAID THE MANNER IN WHICH MOST OF THE MILITARY CONTRACTS BETWEEN THE PREVIOUS REGIME AND THE U.S. HAD BEEN WRITTEN IS "UNACCEPTABLE" TO THE PGOI. "THESE CONTRACTS ARE LIKE A BLANK CHECK TO YOUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE GROUP. IF WE CANCEL, WE STAND TO LOSE MILLIONS OF DOLLARS. WE PREFER TO CANCEL THESE CONTRACTS IN A WAY THAT WILL NOT HURT US FINANCIALLY. IT COULD COST US ALMOST A BILLION DOLLARS. IF YOU HELP US WITH THIS, IT WOULD BE SOMETHING I COULD GO TO THE PEOPLE WITH AND TELL THEM WHAT YOU HAVE DONE FOR US."

6. I EXPLAINED RECENT ACTIONS WITH REGARD TO THE DOD SUPPLEMENTAL. YAZDI WENT ON TO REQUEST HELP WITH NON-DEFENSE CONTRACTUAL MATTERS AS WELL. HE NOTED THAT A CONTRACT FOR 600 MILLION IOLS HAD BEEN GIVEN TO GTE AND THAT ABOUT 450 MILLION HAD BEEN PAID OUT TO DATE BUT THAT GTE HAD NOT COMPLETED ALL OF THE WORK REQUIRED. HE SAID, "I KNOW THIS HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE USG, BUT THE PEOPLE SEE GTE AS AN AMERICAN COMPANY. WE NEED YOUR HELP IN GETTING THEM TO COMPLETE THE WORK." I POINTED OUT THE EFFORTS WE HAVE MADE TO GET BUSINESSMEN TO RETURN TO SETTLE THEIR AFFAIRS AND NOTED THAT GTE ITSELF HAD SENT A DELEGATION TO IRAN ABOUT SIX WEEKS EARLIER TO DISCUSS ITS CONTRACT WITH THE RELEVANT IRANIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICES. I THEN APPEALED TO HIM TO LET US KNOW IN EACH INSTANCE WHEN IRANIAN ENTITIES ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC CONTRACTS AND PROMISED THAT WE WOULD DO EVERYTHING WE COULD TO SEE THAT THE U.S. COMPANIES SEND SOMEONE OUT.

7. AS HIS FINAL MESSAGE YAZDI SAID THAT HE WANTED IT TO BE PERFECTLY CLEAR WHAT THE PGOI'S POLICY IS WITH REGARD TO THE NATIONALIZATION OF BANKS IN IRAN. HE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD TAKEN CONTROL OF THE BANKS FOR MANAGEMENT PURPOSES. AMERICAN BANKS WHICH HAVE SHARES IN ANY OF THESE IRANIAN BANKS SHOULD NOT FEAR THE LOSS OF THEIR EQUITY. "WE WILL MAKE IT GOOD TO

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THE LAST PENNY," HE SAID. "WE ARE GOING THROUGH THE ACCOUNTS RIGHT NOW, AND WE WILL PAY WHATEVER IS DUE TO THE SHAREHOLDERS, FOREIGN AS WELL AS IRANIAN. WE DO NOT INTEND TO CONFISCATE ANYONE'S EQUITY. IT WAS A DECISION OF THE CABINET TO PAY WHATEVER IS FAIRLY DUE, AND AMERICAN PARTNERS IN IRANIAN BANKS SHOULD NOT BE CONCERNED OR FEARFUL." NAAS

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CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 6279/2

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 6477

[illegible]

FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2199
INFO

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 06477

FOR PRCNT (NEA/IRN) FROM LAINGEN

E.O. 11652: GDS 6/21/85 (LAINGEN, L. P.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, IR, US
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE VOA INTERVIEW WITH SAUNDERS

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SINCE GETTING HERE, I HAVE HAD OPPORTUNITY TO TALK WITH ASSISTANT OTHERS ABOUT WISDOM OF AN EARLY VOA INTERVIEW FOR ASSISTANT SAUNDERS TO PUT SOME VIEWS ON OUR RELATIONS WITH IRAN ON THE RECORD IN A POSITIVE SPIRIT. I HOPE [illegible] CAN BE AHEAD WITH THIS IDEA FAIRLY PROMPTLY TO TALK PRIVATELY OF WHAT MAY BE SOME UNWANTED INTEREST HERE IN PUTTING A LITTLE BETTER GLOSS ON OUR RELATIONSHIP.

3. SOMETHING ALONG THE LINES OF THE DRAFT D'S AND S'S TEXT FOR PARA #2 WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. [illegible] SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS ON THAT POINT. FIRST, THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR IRAN APPEARS IN NON-DISMAL OVERALL IN SOME AREAS BUT WORSE IN OTHERS. SECOND, ALONG THE LINES THAT THIS IS A MATTER THAT WE AND CONFIDENT CAN BE WORKED OUT AMICABLY IN TIME IN THE CONTEXT OF A NO DOUBT TO BUILD A BETTER RELATIONSHIP. FINALLY, THE [illegible] CONCERNING U.S. INTERESTS IN IRAN [illegible] COMPLETELY IRRELEVANT REFERENCE TO OUR COMMERCIAL INTERESTS, IMPORTS FROM IRAN, EXPORTS, AS WELL AS TO THE MORE BROAD INTERESTS AND INVOLVEMENT OF AMERICANS IN PERSIAN STUDIES. LAINGEN

6477

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 6477

DE RUQMHR #6560 175**
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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2223
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 06560

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STATE 6/24/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LAINGEN
DRFTD: E/C:RMBASH:GO
CLEAR: 1.E/C:CDTAYLOR
2.POL:VLTOMSETH
ICA RF CRU
DIST: ECON2 DCM POL.
ICA RF CRU MAAG

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/24/85 (BASH, RICHARD M.) OR-E
TAGS: BEXP, BDIS, IR
SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR NORMALIZATION OF U.S.-IRANIAN COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT

2. THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN (A) THE GENERALLY REASONABLE POSITIONS OF MANY SENIOR PGOI OFFICIALS WHO RECOGNIZE THE NEED TO RE-ESTABLISH A MORE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC AND COMMERCIAL INTERCHANGE WITH THE U.S., AND (B) THE ANTI-AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY RETHORIC OF THE PRESS, THE KHOMEINI CLERICAL CAMP, AND MANY XENOPHOBIC IRANIANS AT THE SECOND AND LOWER LEVELS OF THE PGOI CONTINUES TO FRUSTRATE EFFORTS FOR NORMALIZATION.

3. ON JUNE 21, BOTH FORMIN YAZDI AND PGOI SPOKESMAN AMIR-ENTEZAM PUBLICLY SPOKE UP IN DEFENSE OF CONTINUING CONTRACTS AND CONTACTS WITH THE WEST. AMIR-ENTEZAM'S REMARKS TO THE PRESS COVERED A WIDE RANGE OF TOPICS, INCLUDING PGOI PERSONNEL CHANGES, EXCESSIVE INFLUENCE OF THE COMMITTEES , AND VARIOUS ECONOMIC ISSUES. HE TOLD REPORTERS THAT HE HOPED THAT RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. WOULD " SOON TAKE A TURN FOR THE BETTER." ON THE TOPIC OF MILITARY CONTACTS, AMIR-ENTEZAM SAID THAT IT WOULD BE FOLLY TO CANCEL ALL OLD CONTRACTS IN WHICH IRAN HAD ALREADY INVESTED BILLIONS OF DOLLARS, AND HE EVEN INDIRECTLY SUGGESTED A CONTINUING NEED FOR U.S. MILITARY EXPERTS. THE PGOI SPOKESMAN ALSO SAID, NOT VERY CREDIBLY, THAT NEITHER THE IMAM NOR THE PGOI HAD EVER CONTEMPLATED CONFISCATION OF PROPERTY SINCE PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY WAS ALMOST SACRED TO ISLAM.YAZDI'S COMMENTS, AS REPORTED IN THE JUNE 23

TEHRAN TIMES, SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED QUESTION OF IRAN'S INABILITY TO COMPLETELY GO IT ALONE. YAZDI FORTHRIGHTLY ACKNOWLEDGED A CONTINUING DEPENDENCE (SIC) ON THE WEST AND HE STATED THAT PRECIPITOUS CONTRACT CONCELLATIONS BY IRAN WOULD HARM IRAN FAR MORE THAN ITS FOREIGN SUPPLIERS AND REDUCE IT TO AN AGRICULTURAL SOCIETY.

4. WHILE WE WELCOME POSITIVE COMMENTS SUCH AS THOSE MADE LAST THURSDAY BY YAZDI AND AMIR-ENTEZAM, WE ARE STRUCK BY THE CONTEMPORARY AND ALMOST GLEEFUL REPORTING OF (A) THE "CANCELLATION " OF THE ANACONDA CONTRACY WITH THE STATE COPPER COMPANY AND (B) THE INTEMPERATE, SUDDEN, AND UNEXPECTED ATTACKS ON GTE. ANOTHER EXAMPLE WAS THE REPORT BY THE FARSI-LANGUAGE NEWSPAPER BAMDAD OF THE CONTINUING U.S. FOOD SHIPMENTS TO IRAN. BAMDAD USED THE ICA PREPARED RELEASE BUT PREFACED IT WITH THE STATEENT THAT U.S. HAD "LIFTED EMBARGO" AGAINST IRAN.

5. UNLESS AND UNTIL THE PGOI OBTAINS A FAR GREATER DEGREE OF AUTHORITY AND RESPECT, THE VOICES OF MODERATION, SUCH AS YAZDI, AMIR-ENTEZAM, AND EVEN BAZARGAN, ARE UNLIKELY TO HAVE MUCH IMPACT. EVENTS OF THE PAST WEEK CALL INTO SERIOUS QUESTION THE HYPOTHESIS THAT RESUMPTION OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES AND RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND THE U.S. CAN PAVE THE WAY FOR AN IMPROVEMENT IN OUR POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP. GIVEN THE SOURED POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE, IT IS NOT AT ALL CLEAR THAT THE MODERATES IN THE PGOI ARE NUMEROUS ENOUGH OR INFLUENTIAL ENOUGH TO PREVENT THE KINDS OF ATTACKS OR ALTER THE INTRANSIGENT AND ANTI-AMERICAN ATTITUDES WHICH SERVE TO PREVENT AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN FROM RESUMING NORMAL ACTIVITIES IN IRAN.
MOREOVER, IT MAY WELL BE THAT OUR COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WILL PROVE AN ABSOLUTE IMPEDIMENT TO NORMALIZATION OF OUR POLITICAL RELATION IF, AS WE SUSPECT, THE CONTINUED REVIEW, MODIFICATION, AND/OR CANCELLATION OF OLD CONTRACTS WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY VITURERATIVE ATTACKS ON AMERICAN IMPERIALISM AND IMPERIALISTS. AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN CAN HARDLY BE FAULTED FOR NOT MAKING A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO IRAN'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY WHEN THEY ARE VIEWED, BOTH INDIVIDUALLY AND COLLECTIVELY, WITH SUCH SUSPICIONS AND OFTEN HOSTILITY, WHEN THEY ARE JUSTIFIABLY

CONCERNED FOR THEIR PERSONAL SECURITY, WHEN THEIR IRANIAN EMPLOYEES OFTEN DO NOT RECONGNIZE THEIR AUTHORITY, WHEN THEIR LEGITIMATE AND LONG OUTSTANDING FINANCIAL CLAIMS ARE LEFT BURIED IN SOME NAMELESS OFFICIAL'S PENDING BOX, ETC.
LAINGEN
BT
#6560

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CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 6560

NNNNBFOMVV ESA049BRA274
OO RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #3650 1751748
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN-IMMEDIATE 3162
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 163650

FOR CHARGE

E.O. 12065 GDS 6/23/85 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS:PEPR, IR, US

SUBJECT: AMIR-ENTEZAM STATEMENT

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WHEN YOU SEE YAZDI OR AMIR-ENTEZAM, PLEASE CONVEY OUR APPRECIATION FOR THE LATTER'S HELPFUL TV STATEMENT ON U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS. WE HOPE THAT WE CAN CONTINUE TO COOL THE RHETORIC AND BEGIN TO MAKE SOME REAL PROGRESS ON THE THORNY PROBLEMS IN OUR RELATIONSHIP.

3. IF THE ASSIGNEMENT OF AN AMBASSADOR IS RAISED PLEASE DISCOURAGE SPECULATION ON TIMING OF ANY ANNOUNCEMENT. AS YOU KNOW, THERE IS STILL STRONG FEELING HERE OVER IRANIAN-REJECTION OF AMBASSADOR CUTLER AND IT MAY BE SOME TIME BEFORE-SENATE WOULD BE RECEPTIVE TO ANOTHER NOMINATION,
CHRISTOPHER
BT
#3650

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
ICA 6/25
CHG:LBLAINGEN
ICA:JSHELLENBERGER/BJH
POL:VLTOMSETH
ICA POL RF

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
USICA WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

NEA, PGM/RC

DEPARTMENT FOR IR

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: US, IR
SUBJ: YAZDI COMMENT ON CUTLER

REF: A. TEHRAN 6279, B. TEHRAN 6379

1. (U) IN TV INTERVIEW BROADCAST JUNE 23 AND REPORTED SEPARATELY IN LOCAL PRESS JUNE 24, FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI WAS ASKED WHEN THE NEW AMERICAN AMBASSADOR WILL ARRIVE IN IRAN. IN REPLY, HE SAID, "IT IS THE RIGHT OF EVERY INDEPENDENT COUNTRY TO MAKE HER OWN DECISIONS. AS WE DISCOVERED THAT MR. CUTLER WAS COMING TO TEHRAN FROM A COUNTRY WHERE HE HAD BEEN CARRYING OUT IMPERIALISTIC OBJECTIVES, AND HIS PRESENCE HERE WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO A BETTERMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, WE WITHDREW OUR ACCEPTANCE OF HIM...THE U.S.CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ONE DAY CAME TO THE MINISTRY AND SAID THAT OUR REJECTION HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY HIS GOVERNMENT AND ADDED THAT THE NEW AMBASSADOR'S NAME WILL BE MADE KNOWN LATER....PROBABLY IN SEVERAL WEEKS."

2. (LOU) COMMENT: THE SUBJECT OF A NEW AMBASSADOR DID NOT COME UP AT ALL DURING FORMER CHARGE NAAS' MOST RECENT CONVERSATION WITH YAZDI (REF A) ALTHOUGH IT DID IN CONVERSATION WITH AMIR-ENTEZAM A DAY LATER (REF B).
SHELLENBERGER##

SECRET
STATE 7/3/79
CHARGE:LBLAINGEN
CHARGE:LBLAINGEN
NONE
CHARGE CHRON

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
INFO JCS WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

EXDIS--MILIADDEES HANDLE SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/3/85 (LAINGEN, L.B.) OR-M
TAGS: MASS, IR, US
SUBJECT: SUPPLY OF SPARE PARTS

REF: STATE 167423

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. BY SEPTEL I HAVE REPORTED MY CONVERSATION YESTERDAY WITH FONMIN YAZDI CONCERNING THE TRUST FUND STATUS. WE HAVE SOME REASON TO THINK THAT, AS A RESULT OF THIS EXCHANGE AND THE CONTINUING EFFORTS OF GENERAL GAST AND HIS COLLEAGUES WITH MILITARY CONTACTS, WE MAY BE MAKING SOME PROGRESS IN BUILDING BETTER UNDERSTANDING AND RESTRAINT AND PATIENCE ON THE PART OF THE PGOI CONCERNING THAT ISSUE.

3. TO HELP BUY TIME ON THIS SCORE, HOWEVER, I THINK WE SHOULD MOVE PROMPTLY TO ESTABLISH THE $5.5 MILLION SPECIAL FMS CASE FOR EMERGENCY SPARE PARTS AND TECHNICAL ORDERS FOR THE IIAF. IT WAS CLEAR FROM YAZDI'S COMMENTS YESTERDAY THAT HE AND OTHERS IN PGOI ARE ANXIOUS TO PROCEED WITH THIS AND FIND IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND WHY WE ARE DELAYING. THEY ALREADY APPEAR TO SUSPECT THAT WE HAVE POLITICAL MOTIVES IN HOLDING BACK, AND I FEAR THIS MAY INCREASE IF WE DELAY MUCH LONGER.

4. I TOLD YAZDI YESTERDAY ON THE BASIS OF REFTEL THAT WE WERE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING ESTABLISHING THIS CASE AND, WHEN PRESSED, I SAID THAT I HOPED WE WOULD HAVE SOMETHING DEFINITE WITHIN A MATTER OF ONE OR TWO WEEKS. I BELIEVE THAT IF WE CAN MOVE IN THIS WAY, WE CAN STRENGTHEN OUR POSITION GENERALLY AMONG THOSE WHO IN THE PGOI AND THE MILITARY HERE WANT TO KEEP THE U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONSHIP

AFLOAT.

5. ON THE TRUST FUND GENERALLY, I REITERATED OUR OFFER TO RECEIVE AN IRANIAN GROUP IN WASHINGTON FOR A DETAILED BRIEFING, BUT BOTH GENERAL GAST AND I DOUBT VERY MUCH THAT THEY WILL FIND THIS POLITICALLY FEASIBLE. ALL THE MORE REASON FOR US TO PUT TOGETHER A STATUS REPORT AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. WE MIGHT THEN WANT TO CONSIDER HAVING IT BROUGHT HERE BY SOMEONE FROM WASHINGTON, SUCH AS COL. PETTY, WHO CAN GO INTO THE SPECIFICS IN SOME DETAIL WITH IRANIAN MILITARY AUTHORITIES. LAINGEN##

DE RUQMHR #6940/01 184 **
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2439
INFO RUEKJCS/JCS WASH DC
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
BT
S E C R E T TEHRAN 06940/1

EXDIS

CLASS: SECRET
CHRGE: STATE 7/3
APPRV: CHG:LBLAINGEN
DRFTD: POL:VLTOMSETH/B...
CLEAR: A/M:GENGAST
DISTR: CHG

MILITARY ADDRESSEES SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/2/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P
TAGS: MASS, PEPR, IR
SUBJ: IRANIAN TRUST FUND AND OTHER MILITARY MATTERS

REF: STATE 167423

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: DURING JULY 2 MEETING WITH FM YAZDI CHARGE REVIEWED STATUS OF IRANIAN TRUST FUND AND OTHER MILITARY MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. HE STRESSED THE NEED TO WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER LEST MILITARY ISSUES BECOME AN IRRITANT IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND AN IMPEDIMENT TO THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION OF THAT RELATIONSHIP. END SUMMARY.

3. THE CHARGE TOLD YAZDI THAT WE UNDERSTAND IRAN'S CONCERN ABOUT THE QUESTION OF MILITARY SUPPLIES AND EXPRESSED OUR APPRECIATION FOR HIS JUNE 27 STATEMENT REGARDING THE COMPLICATED NATURE OF OUR ENTIRE BILATERAL MILITARY RELATIONSHIP. THIS STATEMENT HAD HELPED PUT A VERY COMPLEX ISSUE INTO BETTER PERSPECTIVE. HE ADDED THAT WE ARE MOTIVATED IN OUR APPROACH TO THIS ISSUE BY A DESIRE TO AVOID THE LEGAL COMPLICATIONS WHICH WOULD ENSUE FROM INSOLVENCY OF THE IRANIAN TRUST FUND, COMPLICATIONS WHICH WOULD INEVITABLY HAVE WIDER CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR OVERALL RELATIONS. HE THEN REVIEWED OUR EFFORTS WITH REGARD TO THE DOD SUPPLEMENTAL, EXPLAINING HOW PASSAGE OF THE APPROPRIATION BILL WOULD KEEP THE TRUST FUND SOLVENT SEVERAL MONTHS LONGER THAN WOULD OTHERWISE BE THE CASE. THIS ADDITIONAL LIFE, HE POINTED OUT, WOULD PROVIDE MORE TIME WHICH COULD BE USED TOWARD SORTING OUT THE MYRIAD COMPLICATED CONTRACTUAL ISSUES.

4. THE CHARGE ALSO MADE NOTE OF THE IRANIAN DESIRE TO PROCEED WITH A SEPARATE FMS CASE FOR APPROXIMATELY 5M DOLS WORTH OF BADLY NEEDED SPARES FOR THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE. HE SAID THAT HE WAS AWARE OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN GEN. GAST AND COL. KAMKAR ON THIS MATTER, AND UNDERSTOOD THAT THE AMOUNT MIGHT HAVE TO BE INCREASED TO 5.5M DOLS TO COVER CERTAIN ADDITIONAL ITEMS. WHILE WE WERE NOT YET READY TO GO AHEAD WITH THIS PROPOSAL THIS WAS IN NO WAY POLITICALLY MOTIVATED OTHER THAN TO THE EXTENT THAT OVERALL PERCEPTIONS WITHIN THE CONGRESS ARE CRITICAL TO

THE ULTIMATE SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF ALL OUTSTANDING MILITARY ISSUES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

5. CHARGE REVIEWED EFFORTS WE HAD MADE TO DATE TO BE HELPFUL IN THE AREA OF MILITARY CONTRACTS, MENTIONING THE M.O.U., COL PETTY'S RECENT TRIP TO IRAN, GEN. GAST'S ONGOING EFFORTS, ETC. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR THE PGOI TO SEND A TEAM QUIETLY TO WASHINGTON TO PURSUE SOME OF THESE MATTERS, OR, IF THAT IS NOT POSSIBLE, WE MIGHT BE ABLE AGAIN TO SEND SOMEONE OUT TO IRAN--ALSO QUIETLY. HE THEN GAVE YAZDI A BACKGROUND PAPER ON THE TRUST FUND PREPARED BY GEN. GAST'S STAFF.

6. YAZDI IMMEDIATELY ASKED IF IT CONTAINED A FULL ACCOUNTING TO WHICH THE CHARGE REPLIED THAT IT DID NOT BUT THAT WE ARE AWARE OF THE PROBLEM OF CERTAIN DISCREPANCIES IN FIGURES RAISED BY COL. KAMKAR. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO RESOLVE THESE DISCREPANCIES BUT THAT NOT ALL OF THE RELEVANT DATA ARE PRESENT IN IRAN. IN THIS REGARD, HE REITERATED THE DESIRABILITY OF THE PGOI SENDING A TEAM TO WASHINGTON. YAZDI ASKED WHEN THE TRUST FUND WOULD GO BROKE. THE CHARGE SAID THAT WE ESTIMATED MONIES MAY BE EXHAUSTED BY THE END OF JULY SHOULD THE SUPPLEMENTAL NOT PASS. IF IT PASSED BUT WITH FUNDS FOR ONLY TWO SHIPS, THEN THERE WOULD BE FUNDS SUFFICIENT TO LAST THROUGH SEPTEMBER. HE ADDED THAT IN THE LATTER EVENT, DOD WOULD PROBABLY ASK FOR FUNDS FOR THE REAMINING TWO SHIPS IN ITS REGULAR FY1980 BUDGET REQUEST.

7. CHARGE TOLD YAZDI THAT GEN. GAST HAD PREPARED A LETTER TO COL. KAMKAR REGARDING THE SIZE OF THE MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP AFTER ITS CURRENT FMS CONTRACT EXPIRES OCTOBER 1. HE NOTED THAT HIS RECOMMENDATION WOULD BE FOR SIX POSITIONS FUNDED BY THE U.S. AND FOUR ADDITIONAL POSITIONS WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE FUNDED BY IRAN. YAZDI INDICATED NO OBJECTION TO THE LETTER GOING FORWARD.

8. YAZDI THEN RETURNED TO THE FMS CASE FOR SPARES FOR THE

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AIR FORCE. HE SAID THAT THE PGOI DOES NOT WANT TO MIX THIS MATTER UP WITH THE STATUS OF THE TRUST FUND. IN THE PGOI'S VIEW, HE SAID, THIS CASE IS RELATED TO THE "FRESH START" (A REFERENCE YAZDI HAS SEVERAL TIMES MENTIONED BEFORE AS NECESSARY IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP). HE ASKED IF THE DELAY WAS POLITICALLY MOTIVIATED. THE CHARGE STRESSED THAT WE ARE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING THE PGOI REQUEST, THAT WE ARE PREPARED IN SUBSTANCE TO ACCEDE TO IT, THAT HE COULD NOT TELL HIM WHEN THAT WOULD OCCUR, BUT HOPEFULLY WITHIN THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS. THE MATTER NEEDED ALSO TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE STILL INCOMPLETE LEGISLATIVE ACTION ON THE APPROPRIATION BILL, NOTING THE SCHEDULED JULY 10 CONFERENCE SESSION. YAZDI SAID HE COULD NOT SEE HOW THE TWO ARE RELATED, TO WHICH THE CHARGE MADE NOTE OF OUR NEED TO BE FULLY APPRECIATIVE OF CONGRESSIONAL SENSITIVITIES AND PERCEPTIONS. HE STRESSED THAT WE HAVE NO DESIRE TO PENALIZE IRAN ON THIS ISSUE OR ANY OTHER ASPECT OF THE MILITARY SUPPLY ISSUE.

9. AT TWO POINTS IN THE DISCUSSION THE CHARGE RAISED THE QUESTION OF ACCESS TO GULF DISTRICT, DISPOSITION OF COMMISSARY STOCKS AND RETURN OF USG COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT WHICH HAS BEEN IN IRANIAN HANDS SINCE FEBRUARY. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE EFFORTS YAZDI HAD MADE TO IATE ON THESE MATTERS, BUT STRESSED OUR DESIRE TO DISPOSE OF THEM IN AN ORDERLY WAY WITHOUT LEAVING A RESIDUE OF MISUNDERSTANDING. HE SAID THAT WE RECOGNIZE THE DIFFICULTIES POSED BY CONFLICTING JURISDICTIONS BUT THAT WE HOPE THAT THE DECISION-MAKING GROUPS INVOLVED CAN COME TO AGREEMENT. YAZDI SAID THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THE PROBLEM OUR PEOPLE HAD ENCOUNTERED THE PREVIOUS WEEK IN GAINING ACCESS TO THE GULF DISTRICT AND ADDED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO AN UNIDENTIFIED "SOMEONE" ABOUT THE MATTER THE NIGHT BEFORE (JULY 1). HE WAS OTHERWISE NON-COMMITTAL BUT APPEARED TO RECOGNIZE THE MUTUAL DESIRABILITY OF DISPOSING OF THESE MATTERS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

10. COMMENT: THE SESSION REPRESENTED SOME PROGRESS IN THE SENSE THAT YAZDI APPEARED TO BE DEVELOPING A BETTER APPRECIATION OF THE COMPLEXITY OF THE U.S.-IRANIAN MILITARY RELATIONSHIP THAN HE HAS EXHIBITED ON EARLIER OCCASIONS. HE IS STILL FOCUSING ON "A NEW BEGINNING," BUT SEEMS TO UNDERSTAND BETTER THAT THE PGOI CANNOT LOOK TO THE U.S. ALONE FOR CONCESSIONS TOWARD THAT END. THE CHARGE TOOK CONSIDERABLE PAINS TO STRESS THE NEED FOR COOPERATION AND FLEXIBILITY ON BOTH SIDES, POINTS YAZDI DID NOT DISPUTE. IN THIS REGARD, WE THINK HE MAY BE GAINING A BETTER GRASP OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS, PARTICULARLY AS ITS AFFECTS MILITARY ASSISTANCE ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. LAINGEN
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031128Z JUL 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2441
INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0156
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0155
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0160
RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 0130
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0132
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0189
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0182
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0197
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0160
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0232
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0131
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0172
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0065
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0197
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
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CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STATE 7/3/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN
DRFTD: POL:VLTOMSETH
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: CHARGE CHRON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 06941

EXDIS - MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/3/85 (LAINGEN, L.B.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IR
SUBJECT: US-IRANIAN RELATIONS

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: DURING MY INITIAL CALL ON FM YAZDI JULY 2 I REITERATED U.S. DESIRE TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH IRAN. I EMPHASIZED THAT THE PROCESS OF REBUILDING OUR RELATIONSHIP MUST BE A MUTUAL ONE. YAZDI RESPONDED BY EXPRESSING HIS AND HIS GOVERNMENT'S APPRECIATION FOR OUR STATEMENTS RECOGNIZING THE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES IN IRAN BUT CAUTIONED THAT RECOGNIZING THE REVOLUTION AND ACCEPTING IT ARE TWO DIFFERENT MATTERS. I GAVE YAZDI THE TEXT OF THE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN'S JUNE 25 BACKGROUND STATEMENT CONCERNING THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN AMBASSADOR, WHICH PROMPTED YAZDI TO ASK JUST WHEN WE WOULD BE SENDING SOMEONE. HE ALSO WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WAS IMPLIED BY GEN. ROGERS' STATEMENT RE "SPECIAL FORCES" IN THE GULF AREA. END SUMMARY.

3. I BEGAN MY REMARKS BY STATING FOR THE RECORD MY GOVERNMENT'S APPRECIATION FOR THE HELP YAZDI AND HIS COLLEAGUES AT THE MFA HAD PROVIDED. I TOLD HIM THAT WE WERE ESPECIALLY APPRECIATIVE FOR HIS PERSONAL INTERVENTION IN TIMES OF DANGER AND STRESS FOR THE PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO OUR MISSION IN IRAN. I SAID THAT I HAD COME TO IRAN AS A FRIEND, BOTH IN PERSONAL TERMS AND AS AN OFFICIAL OF THE USG. I TOLD HIM THAT I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SAY THAT MY GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO WORK IN JOINT EFFORT WITH THE PGOI TO REBUILD A MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP, ONE THAT TAKES INTO FULL AND SYMPATHETIC ACCOUNT THE CHANGED SITUATION IN IRAN. IRAN'S INDEPENDENCE AND

TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, I SAID, ARE OF ABIDING INTEREST TO US. WE WANT A STRONG AND VIGOROUS IRAN. WE STAND READY TO COOPERATE IN ACHIEVING THAT END, INCLUDING A READINESS TO WORK TOGETHER IN SORTING OUT OLD PROBLEMS SUCH AS MILITARY SUPPLY AS WELL AS REACHING UNDERSTANDING ON AREAS OF COOPERATION IN THE FUTURE.

4. I SAID THAT WE WISH IRAN WELL IN ITS EFFORTS TO DRAFT A NEW CONSTITUTION AND TO BUILD NEW INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT ALTHOUGH WE HAD NEITHER THE INTENTION NOR DESIRE TO INVOLVE OURSELVES IN ANY WAY IN THAT PROCESS. I STRESSED THAT THE REBUILDING OF OUR RELATIONSHIP MUST BE A MUTUAL PROCESS IN WHICH RESTRAINT AND UNDERSTANDING ARE REQUIRED ON BOTH SIDES. I TOLD HIM THAT, IN THIS REGARD, I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION FOR RECENT STATEMENTS BY PGOI SPOKESMEN, INCLUDING HIMSELF AND DEPUTY PM AMIR-ENTEZAM REGARDING U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS. I SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED YAZDI'S COMMENTS OF JUNE 27 REGARDING MILITARY-RELATED ISSUES. I CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT MY GOVERNMENT WANTS A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NEW IRAN AND THAT, FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, MY ASSIGNMENT TO IRAN, ALBEIT AN INTERIM ONE, WAS A STEP IN THE REBUILDING PROCESS.

5. YAZDI THANKED ME FOR MY REMARKS AND SAID THAT, AS I KNEW, HIS GOVERNMENT, TOO, HAD OFTEN SAID THAT IT WANTS A MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP. THERE ARE, HE CONTINUED, PROBLEMS IN REACHING THIS GOAL, PROBLEMS WHICH HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH FORMER CHARGE NAAS. HE HAD FOUND HIS RECOGNITION THAT THE HISTORY OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PREVIOUS REGIME CONSTITUTED A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS AN ENCOURAGING SIGN. UNDERSTANDING THE REALITY OF THE NEW IRAN, HE SAID, WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO DEVELOP A MEANINGFUL RELATIONSHIP. "ALL WE WANT IS AMERICANS TO KNOW AND ACCEPT THE NEW REALITY HERE." TO MY RESPONSE THAT, "YOU HAVE IT," YAZDI COUNTERED THAT THERE IS A DISTINCTION BETWEEN RECOGNIZING THE REALITY HERE AND ACCEPTING IT. HIS GOVERNMENT AND THE IRANIAN PEOPLE, HE SAID, ARE STILL UNSURE ABOUT AMERICAN ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR REVOLUTION. "WE NEED ACTIONS ON YOUR PART," HE CONTINUED, "THAT WILL SHOW OUR PEOPLE THAT YOU
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ACCEPT WHAT HAS HAPPENED HERE."

6. THEREAFTER WE TOOK UP A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC ISSUES (SEPTELS), BUT TOWARD THE END OF THE MEETING WE CAME BACK TO THE GENERAL ISSUE OF U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS WHEN I HANDED HIM THE TEXT OF THE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN'S JUNE 25 STATEMENT REGARDING THE STATUS OF EXCHANGES BETWEEN US AND THE PGOI ON ASSIGNMENT OF AN AMBASSADOR TO IRAN. YAZDI BRISTLED A BIT AND SAID THAT WHAT HE HAD SAID ON THE SUBJECT WAS BASED UPON "WHAT WE WERE TOLD WITHIN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF OUR INFORMING YOUR CHARGE THAT WE DID NOT ACCEPT CUTLER." I REPLIED THAT WHAT THE SPOKESMAN SAID REMAINS FOR THE TIME BEING OUR OFFICIAL POSITION, BUT THAT IN ANY EVENT WE DID NOT WANT THE MATTER TO BECOME AN ISSUE IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS SINCE IT IS OUR VIEW THAT A PUBLIC DEBATE IS IN NO ONE'S INTERESTS. THE LESS SAID ON BOTH SIDES, THE BETTER. YAZDI QUICKLY ASKED IF IT IS OUR INTENTION TO NAME A NEW PERSON OR NOT. I REFERRED HIM TO THE RECORD, BUT ADDED OFF THE RECORD THAT WE ARE WORKING ON THE MATTER. I SUGGESTED THAT IN THE INTERIM IT WOULD BE BEST TO "PLAY IT COOL." YAZDI AGAIN REPLIED THAT THE PGOI WAS TRYING TO BE "COOL," THAT IT THOUGHT IT HAD BEEN GIVEN ASSURANCES WE WOULD QUICKLY NOMINATE SOMEONE TO REPLACE CUTLER, THAT IT WANTED US TO DO SO.

7. AS WE WERE WINDING UP THE MEETING YAZDI SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO TALK AT A LATER SESSION ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF GENERAL ROGERS' STATEMENT REGARDING "SPECIAL FORCES" IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA. I REPLIED THAT I WOULD BE AVAILABLE AT ANY TIME, BUT THAT, IN BRIEF, ROGERS' STATEMENT REFLECTED OUR GLOBAL CONCERNS AND OUR PERCEPTION OF A NEED TO DEFEND OUR WORLDWIDE INTERESTS. I STRESSED THAT ROGERS WAS REFERRING ONLY TO CONTINGENCY PLANNING. I THEN NOTED RECENT PRESS REPORTS HERE THAT THE U.S. IS SOMEHOW INVOLVED IN TRYING TO SEPARATE KHUZISTAN FROM THE REST OF IRAN, SAYING THAT SUCH ACCUSATIONS ARE CONTRARY TO ALL LOGIC. OUR OVERRIDING INTEREST IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD, I SAID, RELATED TO THE NEED FOR AN UNINTERRUPTED FLOW OF OIL FROM THE REGION, WE SEE STABILITY AND DETENTE AMONG THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION AS THE BEST ASSURANCE OF THAT, A POINT INCIDENTALLY THAT OUR MISSION IN IRAQ HAD MADE THERE ON THE SUBJECT OF IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS. YAZDI REPLIED THAT THE PRESS REPORTS ABOUT U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN KHUZISTAN MUST BE VIEWED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ROGERS STATEMENT. I REITERATED THAT HE WAS REFERRING TO CONTINGENCY PLANNING, THAT WE ARE NOT SEEKING IN ANY WAY TO DESTABILIZE THE SITUATION HERE. "YES," YAZDI SAID, "BUT HOW CAN SPECIAL FORCES HELP IN THAT REGARD?" (A QUESTION THAT WE HEAR A GOOD DEAL OF, ACCOMPANIED BY INCREDULITY THAT WE WOULD IN ANY EVENT GO PUBLIC WITH SUCH PLANNING.)
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S E C R E T

TEHRAN 7267

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CLASS: SECRET
CHRGE: STATE 7/12/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN
DRFTD: A/M:MGGAST:MAM
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: MAAG CHG POL
DAO RF CHRON

PP RUQMHR #7267 193 **
DE RUQMHR #7267 193 **
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 121202Z JUL 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2603
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S E C R E T TEHRAN 07267

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/12/85 (LAINGEN,L. BRUCE) OR-M
TAGS: MOPS, OCLR, XO
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR U.S. NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, GULF OF OMAN AND PERSIAN GULF

REF: STATE 175611

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. DURING RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH MFA, WE HAVE BEEN QUESTIONED ON USN MOVEMENTS IN THE AREA. SPECIFICALLY HAS THE COMIDEASTFOR (LASALLE GROUP) BEEN AUGMENTED RECENTLY. REFTEL MENTIONS A TOTAL OF FOUR NOW. REQUEST INFO AND GUIDANCE ON HOW TO HANDLE.

3. MFA OBVIOUSLY CONCERNED OVER RUMORS OR SPECULATION AND SPECTRE OF A TASK FORCE TROUBLES THEM. LAINGEN
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S E C R E T TEHRAN 7267

DE RUQMHR #7430/01 198 **
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2669
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASH DC
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
BT

CLASS: SECRET
CHRGE: STATE 7/17
APPRV: CHG:LBLAINGEN
DRFTD: POL:VLTOMSETH
CLEAR: A/M:GENGAST
DISTR: CHG

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 07430

EXDIS - MILITARY ADDRESSEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/17/85 (LAINGEN, L. B.) OR-M
TAGS: MASS, PEPR, IR
SUBJ: MILITARY SALES TO IRAN

REF: STATE 179065 (NOTAL)

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: I MET WITH FM YAZDI AT HIS REQUEST JULY 16 TO DISCUSS, INTER ALIA, SALES OF MILITARY ITEMS TO IRAN. YAZDI RAISED THREE CATEGORIES, I.E., SPARE PARTS THAT IRAN HAD ALREADY PAID FOR, PARTS IT WISHED TO ORDER UNDER A NEW ACCOUNT, AND 747 REPAIRABLES WHICH HAD BEEN SENT TO THE U.S. BUT HAD NOT YET BEEN RETURNED. I POINTED OUT TO YAZDI THE OVERRRIDING NEED TO KEEP THE IRANIAN TRUST FUND SOLVENT AND REVIEWED FOR HIM THE ACTIONS WE HAD TAKEN TO ASSURE THIS. I EXPRESSED MY HOPE THAT PASSAGE OF THE DOD SUPPLEMENTAL WOULD ALLOW US TO GO FORWARD ON SPECIFIC MATTERS OF PGOI INTEREST, BUT CAUTIONED HIM THAT PASSAGE WOULD ONLY PROVIDE BREATHING SPACE IN WHICH TO SORT OUT THE RESOLUTION OF ALL OUTSTANDING CONTRACTS. I ALSO WARNED HIM NOT TO EXPECT THAT ALL SPARE PARTS, EVEN SOME THAT IRAN HAD ALREADY PAID FOR, WOULD NECESSARILY BE COMPLETELY AVAILABLE. END SUMMARY.

3. YAZDI CALLED ME IN ON JULY 16 FOR THE PRIMARY PURPOSE DISCUSSING THE SAME THREE CATEGORIES OF SPARE PARTS AS CHARGE AGAH RAISED WITH PRECHT ON JULY 11 (REFTEL). I TOLD YAZDI THAT I FOUND MYSELF SPENDING MORE TIME ON THIS GENERAL ISSUE THAN ANY OTHER ASPECT OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND NOTED THAT OUR OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE IN THIS REGARD HAD BEEN PREVENTING A SITUATION FROM ARISING IN WHICH FORCE MAJEURE WOULD PRECLUDE OPTIONS BOTH WE AND THE IRANIANS WOULD PREFER TO EXERCISE IN THE PROCESS OF REBUILDING OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH ONE ANOTHER. I EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT WITH THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE SENATE-HOUSE CONFERENCE ON THE DOD SUPPLEMENTAL AND THE IMMINENT PROSPECT OF THE BILL BECOMING LAW IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MOVE FAIRLY EXPEDITIOUSLY ON THOSE SPECIFIC MATTERS OF INTEREST TO IRAN. I ALSO POINTED OUT TO YAZDI THAT IN CERTAIN INSTANCES, SUCH AS THE OUTSTANDING CLAIMS OF THE IIAF'S FREIGHT FORWARDER (BEHRING INTERNATIONAL), THE USG WAS NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE FRUSTRATION OF IRANIAN MATERIEL, BUT THAT WE HAD NONETHELESS TRIED TO BE HELPFUL

BY UTILIZING IIAF AIRCRAFT TO TRANSPORT HHE TO MCGUIRE, WHICH IN TURN FACILITATED IIAF PAYMENTS TO FREIGHT FORWARDERS HOLDING SPARE PARTS CONSIGNMENTS THERE. I TOLD HIM THAT, WHILE WE LACKED PRECISE INFORMATION ON THE QUESTION OF 747 REPAIRABLES, IT WAS OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE PROBLEM WAS A DIPECT ONE BETWEEN THE IIAF AND PANAM OR BOEING OR BOTH. UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES THE USG MIGHT BE ABLE TO PLAY A FACILITATIVE ROLE IN BRINGING THE INTERESTED PARTIES TOGETHER TO RESOLVE THEIR OWN DIFFERENCES, BUT THE PGOI SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THE USG IS CLEARLY ENJOINED BY LAW FROM ACTING AS AN ARBITRATOR. (YAZDI SAID HE COULD AND WOULD PROVIDE THE SPECIFICS REGARDING 747 REPAIRABLES.)

4 A LONG DISCUSSION ENSUED WHICH CENTERED ON TWO FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES--(A) THE PGOI'S VIEW THAT THE TRUST FUND AND PROGRAMS THAT IRAN NO LONGER NEEDS OR WANTS NOT BE MIXED UP WITH IRAN'S ONGOING, LEGITIMATE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, AND (B) THE LINGERING SUSPICION THAT WE ARE SOMEHOW DETERMINED NOT TO SEE THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THESE TWO MATTERS. I WENT TO CONSIDERABLE PAINS TO EXPLAIN THAT WE APPRECIATED THE DISTINCTION IN PURELY TECHNICAL TERMS, AND THAT WE MADE NO OVERT POLITICAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THEM, BUT THAT WE HAD CONCLUDED THAT NEITHER CAN BE DIVORCED FROM THE CONTEXT OF OUR OVERALL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. ACCORDINGLY, I TOLD HIM, WE HAVE TRIED NOT TO LOOSE SIGHT OF OUR FINAL OBJECTIVE, WHICH IS THE NORMALIZATION OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, AND NOT TO LET ANY SINGLE ISSUE JEOPARDIZE ITS REALIZATION THROUGH LACK OF APPRECIATION THAT, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, ALL ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP HAVE BEARING ON ONE ANOTHER. I CLOSED THIS PORTION OF OUR DISCUSSION BY POINTING OUT THAT, WHILE THE PGOI MUST LEAVE TO US THE DETERMINATION OF HOW TO HANDLE MILITARY SALES TO IRAN IN TERMS OF OUR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS, WE HAVE NO DESIRE TO PLACE OBSTACLES IN THE PATH OF SUCH SALES AS THE FINANCIAL SITUATION OF THE TRUST FUND PERMITTED. I ASKED FOR HIS FOREBEARANCE IN THIS REGARD, TO WHICH YAZDI RESPONDED THAT THE PGOI, TOO, HAS ITS DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS TO DEAL WITH. HE ALLOWED, HOWEVER, THAT IF THERE BT
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WAS MOVEMENT WITHIN THE NEXT TEN DAYS ON THE MATTERS HE HAD RAISED HE WOULD BE ABLE TO COPE.

5. BEFORE LEAVING THE SUBJECT, I CALLED TO YAZDI'S ATTENTION THAT PASSAGE OF THE DOD SUPPLEMENTAL WOULD ONLY PROVIDE BREATHING SPACE IN WHICH TO RESOLVE OUTSANDING CONTRACTURAL MATTERS. I CAUTIONED HIM THAT IT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT ALL SPARE PARTS ORIGINALLY DESIGNATED FOR IRAN, QUITE PROBABLY INCLUDING CERTAIN ITEMS IRAN HAD ALREADY PAID FOR, WOULD BE EITHER TOTALLY OR IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE. I NOTED THAT IN THE INTEREST OF KEEPING THE TRUST FUND SOLVENT SOME THINGS EITHER HAD BEEN PURCHASED BY OUR OWN SERVICES OR HAD BEEN SOLD TO THIRD PARTIES. I SAID THAT WE WOULD BE BETTER ABLE TO DISCUSS THE SPECIFICS OF WHAT WAS INVOLVED WHEN WE RECEIVED A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT FROM DOD LATER IN THE MONTH. I ALSO REITERATED THAT IT WOULD HELP IF THE PGOI COULD SEND A TEAM TO WASHINGTON TO SPEAK DIRECTLY WITH THOSE IN OUR GOVERNMENT IN POSSESSION OF ALL THE DETAILS OF WHAT HAS BEEN DONE.

6. YAZDI'S REACTION WAS MORE MUTED THAN I WOULD HAVE EXPECTED, PERHAPS BECAUSE THE INFORMATION THAT WHAT THE IRANIANS HAD BOUGHT AND PAID FOR WAS NOT, AS HE PUT IT, "PACKED AND WAITING TO BE SHIPPED" SEEMED TO COME AS SOMETHING OF A SURPRISE TO HIM. I AGAIN WENT THROUGH THE RATIONALE OF WHY WE HAD DONE WHAT WE HAD DONE, NOTING THAT THE TRUST FUND COULD WELL HAVE BECOME INSOLVENT SOME WEEKS AGO IF WE HAD NOT SO ACTED. YAZDI COMPLAINED A BIT THAT IRAN HAD NOT BEEN GIVEN PROPER DETAILS ON HOW ITS MONEY WAS BEING SPENT SINCE 1966 AND CLAIMED THAT ASSURANCES WERE GIVEN IN JANUARY THAT THE EIGHT HUNDRED-ODD MILLION DOLLAR BALANCE IN THE TRUST FUND AT THAT TIME WAS "PLENTY TO COVER EVERYTHING." BUT CONCLUDED THAT THE WHOLE SITUATION WAS "A MESS, A..." "A CAN OF WORMS," I SUGGESTED.

7. THEREAFTER OUR DISCUSSION TOUCHED ON HOW WE MIGHT WORK TOGETHER TO KEEP EVERYONE WITH A NEED-TO-KNOW AS FULLY INFORMED AS POSSIBLE ON SPECIFIC DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING ALL ASPECTS OF THE TRUST FUND, MILITARY SALES, AND AVAILABILITIES (I SUGGESTED AS A FIRST STEP AN EARLY MEETING OF GEN. GAST, COL. KAMKAR OF THE MOND, AND FOURTH POLITICAL DEPARTMENT CHIEF BAYNADOR OF THE MFA). YAZDI ENDED THIS PORTION OF OUR MEETING BY SAYING THE PGOI MUST ANSWER TO THE IRANIAN PEOPLE ON THE SUBJECT AND EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE "TO DO SOMETHING" FOR HIM IN THIS REGARD.

8. THE PREDOMINANT IMPRESSION THAT I CARRIED AWAY FROM THE MEETING WAS THAT OUR PERFORMANCE IN THIS AREA COULD VERY WELL BECOME THE ACID TEST IN THE OFFICIAL IRANIAN VIEW OF OUR SINCERITY IN WANTING A "NEW BEGINNING" IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN. YAZDI VOLUNTEERED THAT HE HAS BEEN LEARNING TO TEMPER HIS REVOLUTIONARY IDEALISM WITH THE REALISM REQUIRED BY THE EXIGENCIES OF HIS JOB. I THINK HE PROBABLY HAS BEEN, AND I THINK WE CAN JUSTIFIABLY TAKE AT LEAST PARTIAL CREDIT IN BRINGING

HIM ALONG IN THIS REGARD. HOWEVER, I AM CONVINCED THAT WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO MAKE AN EVEN GREATER EFFORT THAN WE HAVE HERETOFORE IN EDUCATING THE NEW IRANIAN LEADERSHIP ON THE INTRACACIES OF THEIR COUNTRY'S FOREIGN MILITARY SALES RELATIONSHIP WITH US. WE MUST BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE THEM WITH AS MUCH DETAIL AS THEY CAN POSSIBLY ABSORB AND THEN SOME, AND WE MUST BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE IT IN A TIMELY FASHION. ACCORDINGLY, I TRUST THERE WILL BE NO DELAY IN THE REPORT WE HAVE BEEN PROMISED FOR JULY. FURTHER, PROMPT ACTION ON THE IIAF 5.5 MILLION DOLLAR FMS CASE AND AN EARLY RESUMPTION OF FLOW OF WHATEVER MAY BE LEFT IN THE PIPELINE WILL PROVIDE THE TANGIBLE PROOF NEEDED THAT WE ARE NOT ATTEMPTING TO CREATE OBSTACLES IN THE PATH TO RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING MILITARY SALES PROBLEMS. LAINGEN
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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 TEHRAN 07430

DE RUQMHR #7557 200**
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R 191251Z JUL 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2719
INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0189
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0194
RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 0163
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0166
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0225
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0220
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0231
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0194
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0275
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0161
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0203
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0091
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUFRBAA/COMIDEASTFOR MANAMA BA
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 07557

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STAT/19
APPRV: CHG
DRFTD: POL
CLEAR: DAO:TESCHAEFER/ A/M:
GENCAST
DISTR: POL2 DAO A/M
RF

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/19/85 TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, MPOL, IR
SUBJ: IRANIAN CONCERNS ABOUT U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND NEARBY WATERS

REF: FBIS LONDON 172306Z JULY 79

1. (C ENTIRE TEXT)

2. U.S. MILITARY CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND ACTIVITIES AS THEY RELATE TO THE PERSIAN GULF AND NEARBY WATERS HAVE EMERGED AS ONE OF TWO MAJOR CONCERNS TO THE PGOI IN ITS BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH US (THE OTHER RELATES TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE MATTERS). IN HIS MEETING WITH THE CHARGE JULY 16 FM YAZDI MADE A FORMAL DEMARCHE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE PROPOSED 110,000-MAN STRIKE FORCE, CITING ALSO INTER ALIA REPORTS THAT THE PGOI HAD RECEIVED

REGARDING PLANS TO AUGMENT THE NUMBER OF VESSELS IN THE COMIDEASTFOR TASK GROUP AND U.S. NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.

3. THE CHARGE NOTED THAT ALL THIS INVOLVED PURELY CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON THE PART OF THE USG, THAT IT MUST BE SEEN IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR CONCERN FOR AND INTEREST IN PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE AREA, BUT THAT SUCH PLANNING WAS NOT NECESSARILY TARGETED ON THE MIDDLE EAST AS SUCH. MOREOVER WE HOPED VERY MUCH THAT EVENTS WOULD NEVER REQUIRE IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH CONTINGENCY PLANNING.

4. ON THE SUBJECT OF NAVAL AUGMENTATIONS, CHARGE WONDERED RHETORICALLY IF THE PGOI MIGHT NOT BE CONFUSING THE RECENT ENTRY OF A TASK FORCE INTO THE INDIAN OCEAN WITH COMIDEASTFOR WHICH IS PERMANENTLY STATIONED IN THE AREA. HE SAID THAT SENDING A TASK FORCE INTO THE INDIAN OCEAN IS SOMETHING THAT WE DO REGULARLY, THAT IN THIS ISTANCE IT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH ANY SPECIFIC RECENT DEVELOPMENT, AND THAT IN TERMS OF TONNAGE IT WAS NOT AS SIGNIFICANT AS SOME EARLY TASK FORCES.

5. YAZDI DID NOT PRESS THE MATTER, BUT SAID HE WANTED TO REGISTER HIS GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN ABOUT U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES THAT DIRECTLY IMPINGED UPON IRAN. ON JULY 17 YAZDI RETURNED TO THE SUBJECT IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE SEMI-OFFICIAL PARS NEWS AGENCY (REFTEL). IN THAT INTERVIEW YAZDI SUGGESTED THAT THE ONLY REAL THREAT TO SECURITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF WOULD COME FROM THE U.S., SPECIFICALLY ITS PLAN FOR A 110,000 -MAN TASK FORCE. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE, HOWEVER, THAT "THIS PLAN IS MORE OF A PUTATIVE (SIC) NATURE THAN A REAL ONE". LAINGEN
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CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 7557

DE RUQMHR #7907/01 208**
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 270655Z JUL 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2892
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 07907

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STATE 7/26/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN
DRFTD: POL:VLTOMSETH:GO
CLEAR: SY:MHOWLAND
CONS:CSRICHARDSON
DISTR: POL2 CHG ADMIN
SY CONS RF

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/26/85 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.)OR-P
TAGS: ASEC, PDPR, CGEN, CVIS, IR
SUBJECT: RESUMPTION OF VISA SERVICES AND COMPOUND SECURITY

REF: STATE 07539

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: AFTER TOUCHING ON THE MATTERS IN A GENERAL WAY WITH FM YAZDI JULY 25, CHARGE DISCUSSED RESUMPTION OF VISA SERVICES AND REQUIREMENT FOR ADEQUATE COMPOUND SECURITY WITH FOURTH POLITICAL DEPARTMENT HEAD BAYANDOR JULY 26. PERSENTATION FOLLOWED CONCERN EXPRESSED SEVERAL DAYS EARLIER TO CHARGE BY BAYANDOR OVER DIFFICULT VISA ACCESS FACING THOUSANDS OF IRANIAN STUDENTS SEEKING TO GO TO OR RETURN TO U.S. BEFORE OPENING OF FALL TERM. PGOI WAS PREPARED, SAID BAYANDOR, TO OFFER SECURE AND AMPLE OFFICE SPACE AWAY FROM EMBASSY COMPOUND TO FACILITATE VISA ISSUANCE IN SHORT TIME REMAINING. CHARGE DECLINED LATTER OFFER, DESCRIBING EFFORTS WE HAVE MADE TO CONTINUE LIMITED VISA SERVICES SINCE FEBRUARY, TO FACILITATE IRANIANS APPLYING FOR VISAS ABROAD DURING THE SAME PERIOD, AND TO RESUME FULL-SCALE CONSULAR OPERATIONS AT THE EARLIEST DATE. HE POINTED OUT THAT RESUMPTION OF VISA SERVICES IS NOT ONLY DEPENDENT UPON ADEQUATE FACILITIES AND STAFF BUT REGULARIZED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. BAYANDOR REACTED STRONGLY, DESCRIBING THE LINK AS A "THREAT" TO WHICH THE CHARGE RESPONDED BY POINTING OUT THAT THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION AKE SUCH A LINK UNAVOIDABLE. END SUMMARY.

3. THE CHARGE BEGAN DISCUSSION OF THE TWO SUBJECTS BY

REVIEWING WHAT WE HAVE DONE SINCE FEBRUARY TO FACILITATE IRANIANS APPLYING FOR VISAS. HE NOTED THAT DESPITE THE HANDICAPS OF LACK OF ADEQUATE STAFF, SPACE TO WORK IN AND SECURITY, WE HAVE BEEN ISSUING 50 STUDENT VISAS A DAY AS WELL AS A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF SO-CALLED "EMERGENCY" CASES. FURTHER, WE WERE NOW PREPARED TO ACCEPT AN ADDITIONAL 100 RETURNING STUDENT APPLICANTS PER DAY AS SOON AS THE MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND HIGHER EDUCATIONS REOPENS ITS PROCESSING CENTER. IN THE CASE OF IRANIANS APPLYING ABROAD, WE HAD GENERALLY WAIVED THE REQUIREMENT FOR RECORDS CHECKS AND SENT TWO FARSI-SPEAKING OFFICERS TO ROME TO DEAL WITH THE LARGE NUMBER OF IRANIAN APPLICANTS AT THAT POST. OTHER EUROPEAN POSTS WERE ALSO ISSUING LARGE NUMBERS OF VISAS TO IRANIANS. AS FOR THE ALLEGATION MADE BY YAZDI JULY 25 THAT IRANIAN, THAT IRANIANS WERE BEING REFUSED WHEN THEY APPLIED ABROAD, THE CHARGE SAID THAT WE MUST ASSUME THAT IT RELATED TO INELIGIBILITY UNDER THE LAW RATHER THAN TO THE FACT THAT THE APPLICANT WAS IRANIAN. POL-COUNS, WHO ALSO ATTENDED MEETING, POINTED OUT THAT TO THE EXTENT WE HAD GOTTEN FEEDBACK FROM POSTS OUTSIDE IRAN IT APPEARED THAT THOSE IRANIANS BEING REFUSED WERE OVERWHELMINGLY APPLICANTS FOR STUDENT VISAS WHOSE DOCUMENTS WERE NOT IN ORDER.

4. CHARGE SAID WE COULD NOT ACCEPT PGOI OFFER OF SEPARATE BUILDING BECAUSE OF NEED TO PRESERVE OVERALL CONSULAR OPERATION IN ONE PLACE. IN ANY EVENT WE SAW NO NEED OF THIS BECAUSE OF EFFORTS ALREADY UNDERWAY. CHARGE WENT ON TO REITERATE WHAT WE ARE DOING TO GET NEW FACILITIES READY (DOUBLE SHIFT) AND TO HAVE SUFFICIENT STAFF IN PLACE WHEN THEY ARE. HE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SAY BY THE DEPARTMENT THAT WE WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO OPEN IN THESE NEW FACILITIES IF WE WERE NOT ASSURED OF ADEQUATE SECURITY, INCLUDING REMOVAL OF PRESENT IRREGULAR FORCE ON COMPOUND.

5. BAYANDOR RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT WHAT THE CHARGE HAD TOLD HIM SOUNDED LIKE A "THRE T. THE CHARGE QUICKLY REJOINED THAT IT WAS NOT AND EXPRESSED HIS REGRET THAT BAYANDOR CHOSE TO USE THAT WORD. HE SAID THAT OUR SAYING THAT WE COULD NOT EXPAND VISA OPERATIONS WITHOUT ENHANCED

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O 270655Z JUL 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2893
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CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STATE 7/26/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN
DRFTD: POL:VLITOMSETH:GO
CLEAR: SY:MHOWLAND
CONS:CSRICHARDSON

DISTR: POL2 CHG ADMIN
SY CONS RF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02-TEHRAN 07907

POSSIBLE WAS BEING DONE TO PROVIDE THE ENHANCED SECURITY REQUIRED, BUT ADDED THAT THE CHARGE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THE PRESSURES THEY WERE UNDER.

6. THE CHARGE SAID THAT HE FULLY APPRECIATED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE VISA FUNCTION IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, AND RECALLED HIS OWN PREVIOUS STATEMENT TO YAZDI THAT IRANIANS WHO STUDY IN THE U.S. FORM PART OF THE BASIC HUMAN RESOURCES BOTH COUNTRIES CAN CALL UPON IN REBUILDING OUR RELATIONS: HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT WE CANNOT IGNORE THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION FOREVER. THE PRESENT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE EMBASSY COMPOUND WERE WELL-KNOWN IN WASHINGTON THROUGH PRESS REPORTING ON THE SUBJECT AND THEY HAVE CAUSED GREAT CONCERN. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS SITUATION WAS DOING MUCH TO DAMAGE IRAN'S IMAGE AND REPUTATION, THAT IT WAS INEVITABLY PRODUCING A REACTION, AND THAT IT COULD NOT CONTINUE INDEFINITELY WITHOUT SOME KIND OF RESPONSE BEING FORCED UPON THE U.S. HE REITERATED THAT WHAT HE WAS SAYING WAS NOT A THREAT BUT A STATEMENT OF REALITY.

7. THEREAFTER BAYANDOR RETREATED, REPEATING THAT HE AND OTHERS WERE DOING ALL THEY COULD TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION OF SECURITY. HE ASKED FOR UNDERSTANDING THAT IRAN HAS NOT YET RETURNED TO NORMAL, ALTHOUGH HE CONCEDED THAT HE WOULD BE AT THE MFA EVERYDAY "PROTESTING" THE SITUATION IF HE WERE IN THE CHARGE'S PLACE AND CONFRONTED WITH THE SAME SECURITY CONDITIONS AS EXISTED ON OUR COMPOUND THE CHARGE SAID THAT HE APPRECIATED THAT IRAN HAS GREAT PROBLEMS BUT REMINDED BAYANDOR THAT IT WAS NOT WE WHO HAD CREATED THEM. LAINGEN

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SECURITY WAS A STATEMENT OF REALITY. IN THAT SENSE
OUR PREPAREDNESS TO RESUME FULL-SCALE VISA OPERATIONS
WAS DIRECTLY LINKED TO THE ABILITY OF THE PGOI TO
PROVIDE NECESSARY SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. BAYANDOR
COMPLAINED THAT THE PGOI HAD BEEN WORKING HARD TO SOLVE
THE PROBLEM OF COMPOUND SECURITY AND, WHILE IT COULD
ACCEPT THE EMBASSY'S EXPRESSION OF CONCERN ON THIS MATTER,
WASHINGTON'S INVOLVEMENT WAS ANOTHER MATTER. HE SAID
THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SAY THAT THE PGOI WOULD
BE FORCED TO INFORM THE IRANIAN PUBLIC THAT IT WAS SOLELY
A U.S. DECISION IF FULL-SCALE VISA SERVICES WERE NOT
RESUMED. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD HOPED THAT HE WOULD NOT
HAVE TO RAISE THIS BUT THE CHARGE'S STATEMET HAD LEFT
HIM NO CHOICE. HE SAID THAT HE AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER
WERE PREPARED TO GIVE THEIR ASSURANCES THAT EVERYTHING
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TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 3806
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 199141

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POL
CHG
ECON
RF
CHRON

E.O. 12065: GDS, 7/31/85 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PEPR, IR, US

SUBJECT: AGAH CALL ON SAUNDERS, CONSTABLE

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ON JULY 31 IRANIAN CHARGE AGAH CALLED ON ASST. SEC. SAUNDERS AND DEP ASST. SEC. CONSTABLE. AGAH'S CALL WAS A FIRST MEETING AND CONVERSATION FOCUSED ON MUTUAL DESIRE FOR STRONGER AND MORE NORMAL RELATIONSHIP. SAUNDERS EMPHASIZED OUR INTEREST IN A STRONG, INDEPENDENT, AND POPULARLY-BASED IRAN WHICH WOULD BE ABLE TO RESIST SOVIET PRESSURES AND IN TIME ENGAGE IN MUTUALLY PRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US. THE US HAD NO INTEREST IN INVOLVING ITSELF IN IRAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS BUT WANTED IRANIAN OFFICIALS TO KNOW THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO COOPERATE IN AREAS OF COMMON CONCERN AND INTEREST.

3. AGAH RECIPROCATED THESE SENTIMENTS DESCRIBING THE GENUINELY FRIENDLY FEELINGS AND ADMIRATION FELT FOR THE US BY THE IRANIAN PEOPLE -- DESPITE THE HISTORY OF US TIES WITH THE SHAH'S REGIME.

4. MUCH OF THE CONVERSATION CENTERED ON THE "NEGATIVE" CHARACTERIZATION OF POST-REVOLUTIONARY EVENTS IN IRAN BY

THE AMERICAN PRESS. WHEN CONSTABLE ASKED WHAT THE US MIGHT DO TO STRENGTHEN RELATIONS, AGAH'S FIRST POINT WAS DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE AMERICAN PRESS. HE QUICKLY ADDED THAT HE KNEW THIS WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR USG OFFICIALS. AGAH'S SECOND POINT WAS TO EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SHAH MIGHT COME TO THE US. SOME PEOPLE IN IRAN FELT THAT THERE WAS AT LEAST "BACK DOOR ENCOURAGEMENT" BY ELEMENTS IN THE USG FOR THE SHAH TO COME HERE. SAUNDERS COMMENTED THAT AT SOME POINT IN THE FUTURE WHEN THE REVOLUTIONARY FEVER HAD DIED DOWN WE ASSUMED THE IRANIANS WOULD BEGIN TO LOOK LESS AT

WHAT THE REVOLUTION WAS AGAINST AND MORE AT WHAT THE REVOLUTION HAD TO ACCOMPLISH. AGAH DID NOT PICK UP ON THIS ARGUMENT ABOUT PUTTING THE PAST BEHIND US.

5. AGAH'S THIRD POINT ON WHAT THE US MIGHT DO TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WAS TO HELP RESOLVE PENDING COURT SUITS WHICH TIED UP PGOI FUNDS IN THIS COUNTRY. HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED BY THE LEGAL ACTIONS BROUGHT BY FDS WHICH APPARENTLY WILL COME TO TRIAL IN NOVEMBER. WE EMPHASIZED THAT WE WERE TRYING TO ASSIST BUT HAD ONLY LIMITED SCOPE WHEN PROBLEMS WERE TAKEN TO THE COURTS.

6. WHEN AGAH ASKED WHAT IRAN MIGHT DO TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WE BORE DOWN HARD ON THE NEED FOR BETTER SECURITY FOR THE EMBASSY COMPOUND. PRECHT, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT, EXPLAINED THAT WE COULD NOT ALLOW THOUSANDS OF IRANIANS IN THE VISA LINES WHEN WE DID NOT HAVE A DISCIPLINED GUARD FORCE.

7. AGAH MADE SPECIAL MENTION OF HIS FAVORABLE REACTION TO SAUNDERS' RECENT STATEMENT BEFORE THE HIRC. HE HAD READ CAREFULLY "BETWEEN THE LINES" AND THOUGHT THE ATTITUDE OF THE US TOWARDS IRAN HAD IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY SINCE THE DAYS WHEN US OFFICIALS USED TO PRAISE OUR TIES WITH THE SHAH. AGAH SAID HE WOULD BE SENDING A COPY OF THE TEXT TO YAZDI WITH HIS COMMENTS. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE EMBASSY STAFF WOULD BE MEETING TO DISCUSS THE TEXT INFORMALLY. SAUNDERS OFFERED TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EMBASSY IF THEY DESIRED. VANCE
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DE RUQMHR #8222 214 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 020849Z AUG 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3026
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 08222

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STATE 8/2/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN
DRFTD: POL:VLTOMSETH:GO
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL2 CHG RF

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/2/85 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, IR ,US
SUBJECT: U.S. CONTINGENCY PLANNING

1. (U) THERE FOLLOWS AN UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF AN MFA NOTE NUMBER 4600/4 DATED JULY 23:

"THE MINISTERY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN PRESENTS ITS COMPLIMENTS TO THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND HAS THE HONOR TO REFER TO THE DISCUSSIONS ON JULY 16, 1979 BETWEEN H.E. DR. EBRAHIM YAZDI AND H.E. MR. BRUCE LAINGEN, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES@F THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN TEHRAN AND CALL TO THE ATTENTION OF THE EMBASSY THE FOLLOWING POINTS.

1. ON JUNE 21, 1979, GENERAL ROGERS, THEN U.S. ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF AND RECENTLY ASSIGNED AS NATO COMMANDER IN EUROPE, STATED THAT THE U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT IS PLANNING A 110,000-MAN STRIKE FORCE TO ENABLE THE U.S. TO LAUNCH OPERATIONS BY AIRBORNE FORCES ANYWHERE OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA. THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE OIL PRODUCING AREAS OF THIS REGION WERE SPECIFICALLY CITED AS POSSIBLE TARGETS OF OPERATIONS DURING TIMES OF EMERGENCY.

2. IT WAS ANNOUNCED RECENTLY THAT FOLLOWING WHITH HOUSE MEETINGS OF THE POLITICAL STUDIES COMMITTEE ATTENDED BY SEVERAL CABINET MEMBERS ON JUNE 21 AND 22 THAT IT HAD BEEN DECIDED THAT U.S. NAVAL UNITS IN THE PERSIAN GULF WOULD BE AUGMENTED AND THAT THE U.S. NAVAL AND MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WOULD BE EXPANDED.

3. A NUMBER OF SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIALS INCLUDING

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BROWN AND SENATORS CHURCH AND GARY
RT HAVE OPENLY MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF U.S.
MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA.

"THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN CANNOT REMAIN INDIFERENT TOWARD THESE DEVELOPMENTS WHICH CONTAIN A POTENTIAL THREAT TO IRAN'S SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE, AND WISHES TO EXPRESS OFFICIALLY ITS CONCERN IN CONNECTION WITH SUCH PLANS THAT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE AN UNDESIRABLY EFFECT ON THE TWO COUNTRIES' RELATIONS. "

2. (C) CHARGE IN HIS MEETING WITH FM YAZDI ON JULY 25 AND AGAIN WITH FOURTH POLITICAL DEPARTMENT HEAD BAYANDOR ON JULY 25 SAID THAT HE HAD RESPONDED TO YAZDI'S ORAL EXPRESSION OF CONCERN ON JULY 16 AND THAT WE HAD NOTHING FURTHER TO ADD. SINCE THEN HE HAS SENT YAZDI A COPY OF SECRETARY BROWN'S RECENT INTERVIEW IN WHICH HE TOUCHED ON THIS SUBJECT TO YAZDI. LAINGEN
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CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 8222

DE RUQMHR #8247/01 214 **
ZNY SSSSS
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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3014
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 08247

CLASS: SECRET
CHRGE: STATE 8/2
APPRV: CHG:LBLAINGEN
DRFTD: CHG:LBLAINGEN
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: CHG

NODIS

FOR NEWSOM FROM CHARGE

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/2/85 (LAINGEN, L.B.) OR-M
TAGS: APER, IR
SUBJ: AMBASSADORIAL NOMINATION

REF: STATE 189711 AND 188730

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR GENEROUS MESSAGE AND THAT FROM THE SECRETARY AS WELL.

2. YOUR MESSAGE ASKED FOR MY VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF ASSIGNING AN AMBASSADOR HERE, BOTH WITH RESPECT TO TIMING AND ATMOSPHERICS. MY SHORT ANSWER IS TO SAY THAT I BELIEVE OUR INTERESTS IN IRAN WOULD BE SERVED BY THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE NOMINATION OF A NEW AMBASSADOR, PREFERABLY EVEN EARLIER THAN THE TIMETABLE YOU SUGGEST. MY LONGER ANSWER TAKES ACCOUNT OF YOUR UNDERSTANDABLE CONCERN THAT THE ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH WE TAKE THIS ACTION MUST BE SUCH AS TO BE SUPPORTIVE OF THE POLICY ENDS WE SEEK. THIS ATMOSPHERE WILL TELL US A GOOD DEAL ABOUT WHAT THE PGOI IS PREPARED TO DO IN WHAT MUST BE A MUTUAL PROCESS OF REBUILDING A RELATIONSHIP.

3. HAVING SAID THAT, ONE MUST NOTE THAT THE PGOI IS ALSO LOOKING FOR SMOKE SIGNALS FROM US. WE ARE THE ONLY MAJOR POWER OR IMPORTANT IRANIAN NEIGHBOR WITHOUT AN AMBASSADOR HERE. IT IS APPARENT FROM QUESTIONS WE GET FROM VIRTUALLY EVERY QUARTER THAT THE TIMING AND PERSON OF THE NEW AMERICAN AMBASSADOR FIGURE PROMINENTLY IN ATTITUDES TOWARD US AMONG THE PGOI LEADERSHIP. WHATEVER WE MAY THINK ABOUT THE PGOI'S RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE CUTLER AFFAIR AND THE PRESENT STATE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, MOST OF THESE IRANIANS SEE THE CONTINUED ABSENCE OF AN AMBASSADOR AS EVIDENCE THAT WE HAVE YET TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE NEW REALITIES OF IRAN. THE VERY ACT OF NAMING AN AMBASSADOR, THEREFORE, WILL BE SEEN AS A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE FROM US.

4. THERE IS A SPECIAL INTEREST AMONG TWO OTHER QUARTERS REGARDING OUR INTENTIONS. THE FIRST INCLUDES A NUMBER OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS, ESPECIALLY OUR WEST EUROPEAN ALLIES, WHO WILL READ A GOOD DEAL INTO OUR ACTION ON THIS AND WHO EXPECT AND HOPE WE WILL ACT SOON. THE SECOND INVOLVES THE AMERICAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY WITH INTERESTS AND PROBLEMS IN IRAN. THAT COMMUNITY IS ESPECIALLY SENSITIVE TO OUR INTENTIONS CONCERNING AN AMBASSADOR. VIRTUALLY ALL OUR CONTACTS IN THAT QUARTER INDICATE TO US

THAT THE FACT WE HAVE NOT YET ACTED IS A FACTOR ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE IN THEIR BALANCE OF THE PROS AND CONS AFFECTING DECISIONS AS TO FUTURE OPERATIONS IN IRAN.

5. FOR THESE REASONS I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT THAT ACTION TO NAME AN AMBASSADOR NOT BE LONG DELAYED. ALTHOUGH I THINK THE TIMETABLE SUGGESTED IN YOUR MESSAGE IS TOO LONG, IT IS PROBABLY REALISTIC IN TERMS OF THE ATMOSPHERICS. THE BALANCE OF THIS CABLE CONCERNS THAT ASPECT.

6. THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS HERE WILL BE PREOCCUPIED WITH AN ELECTORAL PROCESS DESIGNED TO PUT A CONSTITUTIONALLY ENDOWED GOVERNMENT IN PLACE BY LATE FALL. THE PROCESS PROMISES TO BE MESSY AND THE OUTCOME LESS THAN CERTAIN, BUT BOTH THE PGOI AND THE AYATOLLAH ARE HEAVILY COMMITED TO THE PROCESS AND, BARRING A MAJOR UPSET, A NEW AND HOPEFULLY STRONGER GOVERNMENT WILL ENSUE.

7. I HAVE NO PRESENT REASON TO THINK ITS ATTITUDE WILL DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THAT OF THE PGOI. I HAVE MYSELF BEEN CORDIALLY RECEIVED HERE AT ALL LEVELS. PUBLIC NOISES FROM THE GOVERNMENT CONCERNING US HAVE RECENTLY BEEN GENERALLY POSITIVE. WE SENSE THAT BOTH YAZDI AND BAZARGAN INCREASINGLY RECOGNIZE THE NEED OF MOVING TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING WITH US. THAT APPLIES EVEN MORE SO TO THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP.

8. THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AFFECTING OUR COMPOUND ARE STILL UNCERTAIN. IT IS IMPORTANT THIS BE REGULARIZED BEFORE A NEW AMBASSADOR ARRIVES. WE ARE CAREFULLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THIS CAN BE DONE BY USING THE LEVERAGE THAT THE OPENING OF NORMAL VISA FACILITIES WILL PROVIDE US.

9. THE ASSUMPTIONS OUTLINED ABOVE ARE WITH RESPECT TO
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THE ATTITUDES OF THE REGULAR GOVERNMENT MACHINERY. THERE IS ALSO QOM. AS YOU POINT OUT, THE PUBLIC COMMENTS OF THE AYATOLLAH AND HIS ENTOURAGE HAVE BEEN MORE MODERATE IN RECENT WEEKS. BUT I MUST EMPHASIZE THAT HIS ATTITUDES REST ON WHAT WE BELIEVE TO BE A FUNDAMENTAL DISTASTE FOR THE U.S. MANY OF THOSE AROUND HIM APPEAR TO BE EVEN MORE SUSPICIOUS OF OUR INTENTIONS. THIS ENTOURAGE TENDS TO BE EMOTIONAL AND SHALLOW IN ITS APPROACH TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS. SINCE THIS CIRCLE HAS IMMEDIATE ACCESS TO AND IMPACT ON THE AYATOLLAH'S DAY-TO-DAY STATEMENTS, THERE IS A CONSTANT RISK OF OUTBURSTS FROM THAT QUARTER THAT IS UNPREDICTABLE AND THAT COULD SET US BACK IN THE TIMETABLE YOU SUGGEST. WE WILL SIMPLY HAVE TO WATCH THIS CLOSELY AS TIME GOES ALONG.

10. THERE IS ALSO THE CONSIDERATION, AFFECTING BOTH TIMING AND ATMOSPHERE, OF OUR POSTURE TOWARDS THE SHAH. IN MY VIEW IT IS HIGHLY DESIRABLE THAT THE SHAH NOT COME TO THE U.S. BEFORE WE HAVE AN AMBASSADOR IN PLACE. THE ADDED STRENGTH AND DURABILITY IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS THAT CAN FOLLOW FROM NAMING AN AMBASSADOR WILL HELP COPE WITH THE INEVITABLY ADVERSE REACTION TO GESTURES ON OUR PART TOWARD THE SHAH, ESPECIALLY THAT FROM THE AYATOLLAH.

11. THERE IS FINALLY THE QUESTION OF RECIPROCITY; I.E., THE CORRESPONDING LEVEL OF IRAN'S REPRESENTATION IN WASHINGTON. WE NEED NOT ATTACH PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE TO THIS FACTOR. WE SHOULD APPOINT AN AMBASSADOR HERE WHEN WE CONCLUDE THAT OUR INTERESTS REQUIRE IT, RATHER THAN LINKING IT DIRECTLY TO ACTIONS THE PGOI TAKES. AT THE SAME TIME WE CAN AND SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE PGOI THAT THE BUSINESS OF REBUILDING A RELATIONSHIP IS A TWO WAY PROCESS THAT REQUIRES A CONTINUING INPUT FROM BOTH SIDES.

12 THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE SUGGESTED CONSULTATIONS IN LATE AUGUST OR EARLY SEPTEMBER. I AM INCLINED TO LATTER PERIOD.

13. WARM REGARDS. LAINGEN
BT
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NNNNVV ESB005BRA333
OO RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #8390 2222058
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 1022019Z AUG 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 3980
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 208390

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 8/9/99 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PGOV, PINT, IR

SUBJECT: YOUR MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WHEN YOU SEE PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN AUGUST 11, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE WORTH REVIEWING WITH HIM AS YOU HAVE WITH OTHER SENIOR PGOI OFFICIALS STEPS WE HAVE TAKEN TO IMPROVE AND NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH IRAN. WITHOUT OVERBURDENING HIM ON THIS INITIAL CALL AND RECOGNIZING SPECIAL DIFFICULTIES THAT PGOI CONFRONTS, YOU MIGHT, AT YOUR DISCRETION, SUGGEST TO BAZARGAN THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE SOME PROGRESS ON IRANIAN SIDE IN CLEARING UP DAMAGING PROBLEMS SUCH TAS CHECK, SHERRY AND SHEBANI CASES AND REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS ON EMBASSY COMPOUND. WE WOULD BE DEEPLY GRATEFUL FOR HIS PERSONAL ASSISTANCE IN HELPING TO DISPOSE OF THESE TROUBLESOME BILATERAL PROBLEMS. IF THE COURSE OF YOUR CONVERSATION DOES NOT MAKE IT OPPORTUNE TO RAISE THESE ISSUES, PLEASE DEFER DISCUSSIONS FOR ANOTHER OCCASION.

3. YOU MIGHT TELL BAZARGAN OF YOUR PLANS FOR CONSULTATIONS AT THE END OF THIS MONTH AND SUGGEST THAT HE REFLECT ON ANY MESSAGE THAT HE WOULD LIKE YOU TO CONVEY ON YOUR RETURN TO WASHINGTON. YOU MIGHT SUGGEST THAT HE TAKE SOME TIME TO THINK THIS OVER AND GIVE YOU A FURTHER REPLY IF HE DESIRES PRIOR TO YOUR DEPARTURE. WE WOULD BE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN ANY PRACTICAL MEASURES HE THINKS THE U.S. MIGHT TAKE TO ASSIST THE PGOI IN ITS EFFORTS TO ENHANCE STABILITY AND PROVIDE FOR BETTER LIVES FOR IRANIAN CITIZENS. THERE ARE OBVIOUS LIMITS TO WHAT THE U.S. CAN DO, BUT WHERE APPROPRIATE WE WANT TO BE AS HELPFUL AS WE CAN TO PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN AND HIS GOVERNMENT. COOPER
BT
#8390

DE RUQMHR #9021 225 **
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 131212Z AUG 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3206
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASH DC IMMEDIATE
BT
S E C R E T TEHRAN 09021

CLASS: SECRET
CHRGE: STATE 8/12
APPRV: CHG:LBLAINGEN
DRFTD: CHG:LBLAINGEN/BJH
CLEAR: A/M
DISTR: A/M CHG RF

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/12/85 (LAINGEN, L.B.) OR-M
TAGS: MASS, PEPR, IR
SUBJ: AUGUST 14 MEETING ON MILITARY SUPPLY

1. (S- ENTIRE TEXT; ACTION REQUESTED)

2. AS DEPARTMENT IS AWARE FROM REPORT OF MY CONVERSATION WITH BAZARGAN AND YAZDI ON AUGUST 11, THE MEETING WE HAD ORIGINALLY PROPOSED TO MFA AS A WORKING LEVEL DISCUSSION ON MILITARY SUPPLY PROCEDURES HAS NOW BEEN UPPED TO THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL. BOTH YAZDI AND GENERAL RIAHI WILL BE PRESENT. TIMING IS 11.00 A.M. TUESDAY, AUGUST 14.

3. ONE POLICY QUESTION WE ARE ALMOST CREATAIN TO GET IS WHAT WE MEAN BY OUR INTENTION FOR PRESENT TO RELEASE ONLY NON-SENSITIVE ITEMS IN THE PIPELINE (AND UNDER NEW CASES). SECDEF/ASD:ISA MESSAGE 272322Z JUL 1979 SPEAKS ALSO OF OUR INTENTION TO CONSIDER REQUESTS FOR CLASSIFIED MATERIAL ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.

4. I APPRECIATE THAT WE PROBABLY WANT TO KEEP A DEGREE OF POLICY AMBIGUITY ON THIS MATTER. NONETHELESS ANY ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE THE DEPT COULD GIVE ME PRIOR TO THIS MEETING WOULD BE HELPFUL . LAINGEN
BT
#9021

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 9216

DE RUQMHR #9216 232 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201046Z AUG 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3314
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L

CLASS: LIMITED OFFICIAL
CHRGE: STATE 208/20/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LALAINGEN
DRFTD: CHARGE:LALAINGEN:
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: CHG

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 09216

FOR CHRISTOPHER FROM CHARGE

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: CVIP (CLARK, RAMSEY)
SUBJECT: VISIT TO TEHRAN BY RAMSEY CLARK

REF: STATE 208226

1. THANK YOU FOR AIRTING ME TO TEHRAN VISIT BY RAMSEY CLARK. I HAD TWO LONG AND GOOD TALKS WITH HIM AND HIS ASSOCIATE DON LUCE. THEY HAD MEETINGS WITH BOTH FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI AND WITH THE PRIME MINISTER DURING WHICH THEY TALKED GENERALLY ABOUT THE OUTLOOK FOR OUR RELATIONS AND ALSO ABOUT SEVERAL SPECIFIC JUDICIAL CASES HERE IN WHICH CLARK HAS AN INTEREST IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERN.

2. I AM SURE HE WILL BE GIVING YOU HIS OWN IMPRESSIONS WHEN YOU SEE HIM NEXT. I THINK THEY CAME AWAY FROM THEIR TALKS WITH A GENERAL IMPRESSION THAT THE PGOI LEADERSHIP SEEKS BETTER RELATIONS WITH US BUT THAT SOME RATHER SUBSTANTIAL PROBLEMS REMAIN, PARTICULARLY IN WHAT I WOULD CALL A PSYCHOLOGICAL/EMOTIONAL DOMAIN.

3. CLARK WAS INTERESTED IN OUR EMBASSY COMPOUND SECURITY PROBLEMS HERE AND WE GAVE HIM A TOUR OF THE PLACE, INCLUDING THAT AREA OF THE NEW CONSULAR FACILITY SLIGHTLY DAMAGED BY THE GRENADE ATTACK AUGUST 17. HE SAID HE WOULD TALK TO FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI ABOUT THIS WHEN HE SAW HIM. PARTIALLY AS A CONSEQUENCE I HAD A TELEPHONE CALL THIS MORNING FROM YAZDI INQUIRING AS TO HOW THINGS STOOD AND SAYING THAT HE HAD DIRECTED THE POLICE TO BE IN TOUCH WITH US ABOUT A REGULAR ASSIGNED SECURITY FORCE. I THINK THAT AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THIS AND OTHER EFFORTS WE ARE TAKING, OUR SECURITY SITUATION HERE MAYBE LOOKING UP. LAINGEN
BT
#9216

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 9216

CONFIDENTIAL

ZZ RUQMHR #9385 235 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231214Z AUG 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3385
INFO RUTAIJ/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0011
RUTABA/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0004
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0240
RUTABC/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0003
RUMJPB/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0382
RUDBRP/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0013
RUEJCX/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 0002
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0038
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0025
RUETAM/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0008
RUEAKN/AMEMBASSY FREETOWN 0002
RUFHCR/USINT HAVANA 0004
RUEHJT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 0013
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0276
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0257
RUSBAP/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0139
RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN 0001
RUDIRP/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 0005
RUESNA/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0003
RUDBSA/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 0005
RUDKFM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0015
RUEHGR/AMEMBASSY SUVA 0005
RUDTIR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0016
RUFHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0012
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 09385

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STATE 8/23/79
APPV: CHARGE:LTRAINGEN
DRFTD: POL:VLTOMSETH:GO
CLSFR: ONLY
DISTR: POL2 CHG ECON
RF

POL-3

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/23/85 (TOMSETH, VICTOR I.) OR-P
TAGS: PORG, PR
SUBJECT: COMMITTEE OF 24 VOTE ON PUERTO RICO

REF: STATE 220497

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. DURING AUGUST 22 MEETING WITH FM YAZDI CHARGE EXPRESSED OUR DISAPPOINTMENT IN IRAN'S VOTE IN FAVOR OF THE CUBAN-IRAQI RESOLUTION ON PUERTO RICO. YAZDI FIRST REACTED BY SAYING THAT IRAN HAD NOT VOTED FOR IT, BUT WHEN CHARGE ASSURED HIM THAT IT HAD, YAZDI BACKED OFF, CLAIMING THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN BRIEFED ON THE MATTER.

3. WE DO NOT DOUBT THAT YAZDI DID NOT HAVE ANY IDEA WHAT HIS REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK WAS DOING. AS WE HAVE POINTED OUT IN PREVIOUS REPORTING, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY REMAINS IN CONSIDERABLE DISARRAY, TO THE EXTENT THAT THE POSITIONS IRAN TAKES IN SUCH MULTI-LATERAL FORA AS THE COMMITTEE OF 24 HAVE BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE DETERMINED MORE BY THE CHARACTER OF THE REPRESENTATION IN ATTENDANCE THAN BY WHATEVER VAGUE POLICY PRONOUNCEMENTS THE PGOI MAY HAVE MADE REGARDING THE ISSUES ADDRESSED. ACCORDINGLY, WHEN A SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE, SUCH AS YAZDI HIMSELF, IS ON THE SPOT, DECISIONS WILL TEND TO BE BASED ON A PRAGMATIC ASSESSMENT OF IRAN'S NATIONAL INTEREST.

CONFIDENTIAL

WHEREAS WHEN THE REPRESENTATIVE IS A RELATIVELY JUNIOR PERSON (MORE THAN LIKELY WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS FROM TEHRAN), THE PROBABILITY FOR IDEOLOGICAL EXTREMISM WILL RISE.

4. THE PRESS RELEASES CONTAINED IN REFTEL ARE BEING TRANSMITTED TO YAZDI UNDER COVER OF A LETTER FROM THE CHARGE. WE SEE NO POINT IN ASKING FOR IRAN'S RATIONALE IN VOTING FOR THE RESOLUTION. HAD THE MATTER BEEN APPROACHED RATIONALLY, IRAN MAY WELL HAVE ABSTAINED. LAINGEN

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CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 9385

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1978—204 630

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DE RUQMHR #9392 235 **
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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3390
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 09392

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STATE 8/23/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN
DRFTD: POL:VLTOMSETH:GO
CLEAR: ONY
DISTR: POL2 CHG ECON
RF

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/23/85 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, SHUM, IR
SUBJECT: U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

POL 14-1 HR

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DURING AUGUST 22 CALL ON FM YAZDI CHARGE RAISED MATTER OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAN IN THE CONTEXT OF U.S.-IRANIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS AND PERCEPTION OF THAT RELATIONSHIP IN THE U.S. CHARGE SAID THAT HE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE ASKED ABOUT THIS SUBJECT WHEN HE RETURNED TO WASHINGTON. HE MENTIONED THE CONTINUING LACK OF RESOLUTION OF THE SHERRY CASE AND INCARCERATION OF SHEIBANI, AND REPORTS THAT THREE CHRISTIAN HOSPITALS HAD BEEN CONFISCATED AND THE HOME OF THE EPISCOPAL BISHOP IN ISFAHAN RANSACKED AS SPECIFIC ISSUES OF CONCERN.

3. YAZDI COUNTERED THAT SHERRY HAD BEEN RELEASED AND THAT IT SIMPLY WAS NOT TRUE THAT CHRISTIANS WERE BEING HARASSED. HE HIMSELF, HE CLAIMED, HAD BEEN WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE PAPAL NUNCIO AND JEWISH REPRESENTATIVES TO CLEAR UP A FEW SMALL MATTERS, BUT HE REJECTED THE SUGGESTION THAT MINORITIES IN IRAN WERE BEING MISTREATED IN ANY WAY. HE SAID THAT THE CHRISTIANS, ZOROASTRIANS AND JEWS HAD ALL PARTICIPATED IN THE ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS ELECTIONS, AND FULLY BACKED THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. SOME HAD ASKED THAT THEY BE GIVEN THE RIGHT TO VOTE FOR MUSLIM CANDIDATES AS WELL AS THEIR OWN SECTARIAN CANDIDATES, AND HE, YAZDI, SUPPORTED THEIR POSITION. "WE HAVE NEVER HEARD ANY COMPLAINTS FROM ANY OF THE MINORITIES ON ANY SUBJECT," HE SAID.

4. CHARGE SAID THAT PERCEPTIONS ARE OFTEN OTHERWISE AND MENTIONED TREATMENT OF THE BAHAI COMMUNITY IN THIS REGARD. YAZDI THEREUPON CONCEDED THAT THERE WERE PROBLEMS WITH SOME OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES THAT WERE NOT FULLY UNDER CONTROL. "YOU KNOW THIS FROM YOUR OWN EXPERIENCE AT YOUR EMBASSY," HE SAID. SOME PEOPLE ASSOCIATED WITH THESE "RENEGADE" COMMITTEES, YAZDI SAID, WERE NOT GOOD MUSLIMS. A FEW HAD GOTTEN INVOLVED IN ILLEGAL LIQUOR SALES, AND CONSEQUENTLY MAY HAVE BOTHERED JEWS AND CHRISTIANS IN THEIR EFFORTS TO SECURE SUPPLIES SINCE THESE MINORITIES WERE FREE TO HAVE AND USE LIQUR. ALSO, THERE WERE MANY EX-SAVAK ELEMENTS STILL AT WORK IN IRAN TRYING TO STIR UP ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY FEELING AND TO DISCREDIT THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION ITSELF. SUCH PEOPLE WOULD NOT HESITATE TO ATTACK THE RELIGIOUS MINORITIES, HE SAID.

5. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THESE ACTIVITIES HAD NOTHING

TO DO WITH EITHER THE PGOI OR THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT. AS FAR AS THE LATTER WERE CONCERNED, THE RELIGIOUS MINORITIES WERE FREE TO LIVE AND WORK IN IRAN SO LONG AS THEY ABIDED BY THE STANDARDS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. THE CHARGE AGAIN RAISED THE BAHAIS. YAZDI RESPONDED THAT THE BAHAIS WERE A POLITICAL GROUP WHICH HAD BEEN GIVEN A PRIVILEGED POSITION BY THE SHAH. NONETHELESS, AS LONG AS IRANIAN BAHAIS DID NOT INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN POLITICAL MATTERS AS A POLITICAL GROUP THEY WOULD POSSESS THE SAME RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS AS OTHER IRANIANS. THE CHARGE SAID THAT AMERICAN BAHAIS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE COMMUNITY IN IRAN. YAZDI SAID SOME IRANIANS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE STATUS OF AMERICAN INDIANS.

6. COMMENT: YAZDI STATED THE OFFICIAL POSITION ON MINORITIES WHICH IS NO DOUBT GENUINELY ASCRIBED TO BY THE LEADERSHIP IN THE PGOI AND EVEN THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT. THE FACT REMAINS, HOWEVER, THAT RELIGIOUS ZEALOTS AND GRASS OPPORTUNISTS AMONG THE MUSLIM MAJORITY HAVE SUBJECTED THE RELIGIOUS MINORITIES, INDIVIDUALLY AND COLLECTIVELY, TO CONFISCATIONS OF PROPERTY, SHAKEDOWNS AND HARASSMENT, ACTIVITIES THAT ARE CONTRARY TO OFFICIAL POLICY. THE ATMOSPHERE OF HEIGHTENED RELIGIOUS FERVOR WHICH ACCOMPANIED THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION HAS ALSO TENDED TO EXACERBATE CONCERNS AMONG THE MINORITY COMMUNITIES THAT THEY ARE VULNERABLE TO RELIGIOUS BIGOTRY. IT IS TO THE MUSLIM LEADERSHIP'S CREDIT THAT IT REFUSES ITSELF TO SUCCUMB TO SUCH BIGOTRY. AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS AN UNFORTUNATE FACT THAT MANY OF THESE SAME LEADERS, YAZDI INCLUDED, REFUSE TO CONCEDE THAT BIGOTRY AMONG THEIR CO-RELIGIONISTS CAN EVEN EXIST. LAINGEN

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US Government Printing Office: 1976—204-830

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DE RUQMHR #9429/01 233 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 341
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 09429

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STATE 8/26/79
APPRV: CHARGE:VLTOMSETH
DRFTD: CHARGE:VLTOMSETH:FM
CLEAR: CONS:RMOREFIELD
R: CHARGE POL2 CONS RF CHRON

EDUC

FOR CA AND NEA/IRN

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/25/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P
TAGS: CIVS, PEPR, IR
SUBJECT: STUDENT VISA POLICY

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: DURING AUGUST 22 MEETING, FM YAZDI RAISED THE SUBJECT OF IRANIANS ENROLLED IN SUB-STANDARD EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE U.S. WHILE PERHAPS NOT FULLY APPRECIATING THE RAMIFICATIONS OF WHAT HE WAS SAYING, IMPLICIT IN HIS REMARKS WAS AN IRANIAN RECOGNITION THAT HAVING LARGE NUMBERS OF POORLY QUALIFIED STUDENTS IN AMERICAN DIPLOMA MILLS DOES NOT SERVE IRAN'S NATIONAL INTERESTS. IT DOES NOT SERVE OURS EITHER. ACCORDINGLY, WE BELIEVE THAT THE REOPENING OF OUR CONSULAR SECTION PROVIDES A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO RETURN TO THE BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT — I.E., FIRST, THAT ALL VISA APPLICANTS ARE PRESUMED TO BE INTENDING IMMIGRANTS UNLESS THEY CAN DEMONSTRATE OTHERWISE AND, SECOND, THAT THE STUDENTS DEMONSTRATE THE CAPABILITY OF SATISFACTORALLY CARRYING OUT A FULL-TIME COURSE OF STUDIES. BOTH REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN TOO LOOSELY APPLIED IN EXAMINING THE BONA FIDES OF IRANIAN STUDENT VISA APPLICANTS IN RECENT YEARS. END SUMMARY.

3. DURING AUGUST 22 CALL FM YAZDI TOLD CHARGE LAINGEN THAT IRAN WANTS TO CHANGE THE CHARACTER OF THE IRANIAN STUDENT POPULATION IN THE U.S. TOO MANY OF THESE STUDENTS, HE SAID, ATTEND WHAT HE CALLED "COLONIAL COLLEGES", I.E., SCHOOLS THAT CATER ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY TO FOREIGN STUDENTS. YAZDI IMPLIED THAT THE EDUCATIONS PROVIDED AT SUCH INSTITUTIONS ARE INFERIOR TO THOSE AT SCHOOLS WHICH MOST AMERICANS THEMSELVES ATTEND. THE PGOI, HE SAID, IS COMPILING A LIST OF SCHOOLS IT REGARDS AS ACCEPTABLE. IRANIAN STUDENTS ATTENDING THESE SCHOOLS WILL BE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN HIGH GRADE POINT AVERAGES TO QUALIFY FOR SCHOLARSHIP ASSISTANCE. YAZDI INDICATED THAT MANY U.S. SCHOOLS WILL NOT MEASURE UP TO IRAN'S STANDARDS. HE ALSO HINTED THAT IRAN WILL MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR IRANIAN STUDENTS TO GO ABROAD THAN WAS TRUE IN THE PAST.

4. SOME OF YAZDI'S OTHER REMARKS — THAT THE USG HAS A RESPONSIBILITY TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT OF IRANIAN STUDENTS IN THE U.S. AND AN ILL-DISGUISED THREAT IRAN MIGHT BE FORCED TO SEND ITS STUDENTS TO THE USSR IF WE DO NOT COOPERATE WITH IRAN IN MANAGING ITS STUDENT PROBLEMS — AS WELL AS THE PRESSURE THE PGOI HAS BEEN TRYING TO BRING TO BEAR ON US TO REOPEN OUR

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1979—284-450

CONSULAR SECTION, INDICATED THAT YAZDI DOES NOT YET APPRECIATE THE FULL RAMIFICATIONS OF WHAT HE WAS SUGGESTING TO THE CHARGE. FOR EXAMPLE, IT WAS FAR FROM CLEAR THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE HEAVY CONCENTRATION OF IRANIAN STUDENTS IN ACADEMICALLY SUSPECT DIPLOMA MILLS IS A REFLECTION OF THE POOR ACADEMIC QUALIFICATIONS OF MOST IRANIANS WHO APPLY FOR STUDENT VISAS RATHER THAN A POLICY ON OUR PART TO CONFINE THESE STUDENTS TO SUB-STANDARD INSTITUTIONS. NONETHELESS, HIS CONCERN ABOUT THIS PHENOMENON PARALLELS A LINE OF REASONING THIS MISSION HAS FOLLOWED IN PREVIOUS ANALYSES OF IRANIAN STUDENTS GOING TO THE U.S., I.E., THAT IT IS IN NO ONE'S INTEREST -- NEITHER OUR, IRAN'S NOR THAT OF THE STUDENTS THEMSELVES -- FOR US TO ACCEPT STUDENTS WHOSE PROSPECTS FOR ACADEMIC SUCCESS AND EVENTUAL RETURN TO IRAN ARE MARGINAL.

5. IMPLICIT IN YAZDI'S REMARKS WAS A RECOGNITION THAT IRANIANS WHO ARE NOT PREPARED FORTHE INTELLECTUAL CHALLENGE OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY ENVIRONMENT, THOSE WHO DO NOT HAVE THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE SKILLS TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE LEARNING EXPERIENCE, OR THOSE WHO GO TO THE U.S. LESS OUT OF A DESIRE FOR AN EDUCATION THAN TO ESCAPE CONDITIONS IN IRAN THEY DISLIKE ARE MORE LIKELY TO BECOME A POLITICAL PROBLEM THAN A NATIONAL RESOURCE. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT WHEN CONFRONTED WITH THE IMMEDIACY OF SUCH THINGS AS SIT-INS BY POTENTIAL STUDENT VISA APPLICANTS DEMANDING THAT OUR CONSULAR SECTION BY REOPENED THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WILL NOT BE TEMPTED EITHER TO ATTEMPT TO GET US TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM FOR IT OR MAKE US THE SCAPEGOAT. HOWEVER, TO THE EXTENT THAT WE CAN SERVE OUR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS AS WELL AS CONTRIBUTE TO LONGER TERM POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN IRAN THROUGH A RATIONAL POLICY ON THE ISSUANCE OF STUDENT VISAS, WE SHOULD NOT FLINCH FROM FACING UP TO THE REACTION STIFFER STANDARDS THAN HAVE BEEN APPLIED IN THE RECENT PAST ARE BOUND TO ENDENGER.

6. THIS WILL NOT INVOLVE BENDING THE PROVISIONS OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT (INA). RATHER, IT WILL REPRESENT A RETURN TO THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF THE ACT THAT ALL VISA APPLICANTS ARE ASSUMED TO BE INTENDING IMMIGRANTS UNLESS THEY CAN DEMONSTRATE OTHERWISE. IN

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#9429

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 TEHRAN 09429 R: CHARGE F

THE LAST FEW YEARS IN IRAN, TOO MUCH HAS BEEN MADE OF THE ACADEMIC QUALIFICATIONS OF APPLICANTS FOR STUDENT VISAS. SUCH QUALIFICATIONS CONSTITUTE ONLY ONE PART OF A SET OF FACTORS CONSULAR OFFICERS NEED TO CONSIDER IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT A PARTICULAR APPLICANT MEETS THE BASIC CRITERIA OF NON-IMMIGRANT STATUS. MOTIVATION IS ANOTHER THAT HAS BEEN FREQUENTLY OVERLOOKED. THE BONA FIDES OF APPLICANTS SEEKING TO ESCAPE CONDITIONS IN IRAN THEY FIND UNSATISFACTORY, E.G., TO AVOID MILITARY SERVICE, MUST BE SEEN AS SUSPECT. SIMILARLY, THE AGE OF THE APPLICANT HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT. THE VERY YOUNG, NO MATTER HOW WELL QUALIFIED ACADEMICALLY OR OTHERWISE INNOCENT OF ULTERIOR MOTIVES THEMSELVES, CANNOT BE CONSIDERED GENUINE NON-IMMIGRANTS IF IT IS CLEAR THAT THEIR PARENTS ARE TRYING TO GET THEM OUT OF IRAN BECAUSE OF THEIR OWN FRUSTRATIONS WITH LOCAL CONDITIONS.

7. THERE WILL NEVER BE A BETTER TIME THAN RIGHT NOW TO INSTITUTE THE STRICT STANDARDS THAT WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN APPLYING TO STUDENT VISA APPLICANTS ALL ALONG. SINCE THE CONSULAR SECTION WAS CLOSED IN FEBRUARY, ALMOST THE ENTIRE AMERICAN STAFF HAS BEEN REPLACED. THERE ARE FEW REMAINING HERE WHO CAN BE TIED TO THE LOOSER STANDARDS OF THE PAST. THE PROSPECT OF OPENING A NEW FACILITY, TOO, PROVIDES A SYMBOLIC DEMARCATION LINE OF WHICH WE SHOULD TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE. THERE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE CRIES OF ANGUISH RAISED HERE AS WELL AS IN THE U.S. (WHERE AN IRANIAN [illegible] HAS RAPIDLY DEVELOPED IN RECENT YEARS). MOREOVER, WE CAN EXPECT DEMANDS FROM A VARIETY OF OTHER SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS TO CIRCUMVENT THE INA IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A WAY OUT OF IRAN FOR INDIVIDUALS AND CATEGORIES OF PERSONS WHO MAY BE PERCEIVED TO BE UNDER PRESSURES FROM THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION. WE THINK WE MUST STAND FIRM ON THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT, WHATEVER THE IMMEDIATE EXIGENCIES TO MODIFY OUR STANDARDS. TO DO SO WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH OUR OFTEN STATED DESIRE TO REBUILD OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL INTERESTS AND NEW REALITIES, TO SAY NOTHING OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE INA ITSELF.
TOMSETH
BT
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DE RUQMHR #9467 239 **
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 270541Z AUG 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3451
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASH DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASH DC PRIORITY
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
BT
S E C R E T TEHRAN 09467

LIMDIS
CLASS: SECRET
CHRGE: STATE 8/27/79
APPRV: V. TOMSETH
DRFTD: MG GAST
CLEAR: MG GAST
DISTR: A/M CHG POL

SECDEF FOR ASD:ISA/DSAA, JCS FOR J-4/5, USCINCEUR FOR ECDC/ECJ-4/7

LIMDIS-MILITARY TREAT AS SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/26/85 (GAST, GEN)
TAGS: PEPR, MASS, IR
SUBJECT: IRANIAN DESIRE TO SELL BACK F-14'S

1. (S- ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DURING DISCUSSIONS WITH FM YAZDI ON 22 AUGUST, CHARGE BROUGHT UP NEGOTIATIONS ON F-14, YAZDI SAID MATTER WOULD BE CONSIDERED FURTHER BY THE CABINET.

3. COL GHANIPOUR, 11AF, TOLD OUR F-14 EXPERT ON 25 AUG, THAT HE WAS TO BRIEF AYATOLLAH KHAMENIE, ASSIGNED TO MOND, NEXT WEDNESDAY ON RESOURCES REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN THE F-14. ACCORDING TO GHANIPOUR THE MATTER WILL BE RECONSIDERED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL.

4. THERE IS GROWING EVIDENCE THAT CLERGY AND THE PGOI ARE HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT THE SALE. SOME OF THE CLERGY AND MANY ELEMENTS OF THE 11AF WANT TO KEEP IT.

5. WE WILL INFORM YOU AS WE LEARN MORE.

THIS IS THE END OF MESSAGE TOMSETH
BT
#9467
NNNN

NNNNVV ESB006BRA840
OO RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #7480 2412150
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 292123Z AUG 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 4315
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 227480

Sec 14 [illegible]
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HR

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POL
CHG
CHRON
ECON
RF

E.O. 12065:GDS, 8/29/85 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: SHUM, IR

SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DEPTOFF CALLED IRANIAN CHARGE AGAH AUGUST 29 TO RAISE ISSUES WHICH APPEARED LIKELY TO CAUSE CONCERN ON HUMAN RIGHTS GROUNDS AMONG IRAN'S FRIENDS IN THIS COUNTRY.

3. FIRST CONCERNED RECENT MOVES BY UNIDENTIFIED ARMED GROUPS TO SEIZE RECORDS OR PROPERTY OF CHRISTIAN CHURCHES IN ISFAHAN AND TEHRAN AND ALSO CERTAIN CHURCH-OPERATED HOSPITALS. WE HAD RECEIVED SEVERAL INQUIRIES FROM CHURCH GROUPS HERE AND THOUGHT PGOI OUGHT TO MOVE PROMPTLY TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM. AGAH SAID HE HAD HAD ONE LETTER (POSSIBLY FROM NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES) AND HAD IMMEDIATELY CABLED TEHRAN. HE SAID HE FELT STRONGLY PGOI SHOULD MOVE TO UPHOLD ITS STATED POLICY OF PROTECTION FOR MINORITIES. IF HE DID NOT HEAR SOON FROM MFA HE WOULD TELEPHONE DR. YAZDI. HE WOULD BRING OUR RENEWED EXPRESSION OF CONCERN TO YAZDI'S ATTENTION.

4. SECOND ISSUE WAS WARRANT FOR ARREST OF MATIN-DAFTARY. DEPTOFF SAID MATIN-DAFTARY HAD MANY INFLUENTIAL FRIENDS IN THE US, ESPECIALLY AMONG LIBERAL GROUPS SYMPATHETIC TO THE REVOLUTION. DEPTOFF SAID HE KNEW FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE THAT MATIN-DAFTARY HAD BEEN AN EFFECTIVE SPOKESMAN FOR THE OPPOSITION IN THE YEARS BEFORE THE REVOLUTION HAD SUCCEEDED. HIS FRIENDS IN THE US, FOR EXAMPLE RAMSAY CLARK, WERE CONCERNED FOR HIS WELL BEING. THEIR REACTION TO THE WAY PGOI TREATED HIM COULD BE DAMAGING TO IRAN'S REPUTATION AND WORK AGAINST IRAN'S INTERESTS. AGAH SAID THIS WAS A DIFFICULT SUBJECT. HE COULD ONLY SAY THAT WHETHER MATIN-DAFTARY'S AMBITIONS WERE PERSONAL OR SOCIETAL, IT SEEMED THEY WERE NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE WISHES OF THE IRANIAN MASSES. AGAH

INDICATED HE WOULD REPORT OUR EXPRESSION OF INTEREST TO TEHRAN.

5. FINALLY, DEPTOFF CALLED ATTENTION TO FRONT PAGE PHOTOGRAPH OF EXECUTION OF KURDS, POINTING OUT THAT THIS KIND OF STORY WAS CAUSING IRAN SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN THIS COUNTRY. POINT WAS SELF-EVIDENT AND AGAH MADE NO COMMENT. VANCE
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E.O. 12065: GDS 8/31/85 (ROY, J. STAPLETON) OR-M
TAGS: IP, US
SUBJECT: (U) U.S.- IRANIAN RELATIONS

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IRANIAN CHARGE TOLD EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR [illegible] THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY HIS "REGIONAL SUPERVISOR," THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN, TO INFORM US OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE FOR BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. ACCORDING TO THE CHARGE, HIS FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD ORDERED IRANIAN AMBASSADORS AROUND THE WORLD TO INFORM AMERICAN COUNTERPARTS THAT IRAN HOPED FOR BETTER RELATIONS AND WOULD APPRECIATE, IN RETURN FOR THIS SENTIMENT, A "RECIPROCAL GESTURE" FROM THE U.S. HE HAD NO IDEA HOW WE WERE EXPECTED TO RECIPROCATE.

3. AMBASSADOR SALEH KNOU IN TOKYO WOULD SOON BE CALLING ON AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD WITH THIS MESSAGE. THE CHARGE SAID.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 09786

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STATE 9/5/79
APPRV: CHARGE:VLTOMSETH
DRFTD: CHARGE:VLTOMSETH
CLEAR: NONE
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E.O. 12065: GDS 9/5/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-M
TAGS: PGOV, SOPN, IR
SUBJECT: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND THE NATURE OF THE IRANIAN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

REF: TEHRAN 9778

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. THE EXPULSION OF ALL AMERICAN STAFF MEMBERS OF THE ASSOCIATED PRESS BUREAU ON SEPT 4 (REFTEL) HIGHLIGHTS A CENTRAL ASPECT OF THE IRANIAN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC THAT WE SHOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OF: ITS INEFFICIENCIES NOTWITHSTANDING, THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT KHOMEINI IS CREATING IN IRAN PROMISES TO BE EVERY BIT AS DICTATORIAL AND REPRESSIVE AS THE SHAH'S. DESPITE THE RHETORICAL PREOCCUPATION WITH FREEDOM, IT HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT FOR KHOMEINI THE WORD HAS A MEANING QUITE DIFFERENT THAN THE WESTERN *DEFINITION OF IT. IT DOES NOT, FOR EXAMPLE, ENCOMPASS THE* FREEDOM TO REPORT THE NEWS ACCURATELY IF ACCURACY IS DEEMED CONTRARY TO THE INTERESTS OF ISLAM.

3. OUR INTERESTS IN IRAN TRANSCEND ANY PARTICULAR REGIME, A POINT WE HAVE TRIED TO MAKE WITH THE NEW RULERS HERE IN ORDER TO ALLAY THEIR SUSPICIONS THAT WE CONTINUE TO COLLUDE WITH THE FORMER SHAH. FOR THE MOMENT, IT APPEARS THAT OUR INTERESTS WILL BE BEST SERVED THROUGH WORKING WITH THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF MEHDI BARZRGAN TO RE-ESTABLISH COOPERATIVE BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND THE U.S. WE ANTICIPATE THAT WE WILL WANT TO TAKE A SIMILAR STANCE WHEN AN ELECTED GOVERNMENT IS IN PLACE, PROBABLY LATER THIS YEAR. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO CONCLUDE THAT COOPERATION WITH EITHER THIS GOVERNMENT OR ITS SUCCESSOR IS OUR ONLY POLICY OPTION. IF THE CURRENT TREND TOWARD HARSH DICTATORSHIP IS NOT CHECKED AND REVERSED, WE MAY WELL NOT WANT TO BE CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH THE REGIME RESPONSIBLE FOR IT. TOMSETH
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 10156

E.O. 12065: 9/19/85 (SENS, ANDREW) OR-C
TAGS: EINV, BDIS, IR
SUBJECT: PGOI APPEAL FOR USG INTERVENTION IN EDS CASE

REF: (A) TEHRAN 10155 (B) TEHRAN 9137

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED NOTE FROM MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (SEPTEL) REGARDING THE BLOCKING OF U.S. LOWER COURTS OF 16 MILLION DOLLARS OF IRANIAN NAVAL AND AIR FORCES FUNDS IN THE U.S. IN CONNECTION WITH THE ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS CASE.

3. IN DISCUSSIONS OF THIS NOTE WITH MFA AMERICAN DIVISION CHIEF BAYANDOR, BAYANDOR STRESSED THAT THE PGOI REGARDED THE COURT ACTION AS A POLITICAL ISSUE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND IRAN NOT A LEGAL ONE. THE INTENT OF THE NOTE IS TO RAISE THE CASE AS A POLITICAL ISSUE AND TO ASK THE USG CALLTO THE ATTENTION OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES: THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF RULINGS SUCH AS THOSE IN THE EDS CASE AND TO HAVE MEASURES TAKEN TO HAVE THE ABOVE RULINGS ANNULLED. BAYANDOR WAS PLAINLY CONCERNED THAT THIS CASE MIGHT BECOME A PRECEDENT.

4. EMBOFF POINTED OUT TO BAYANDOR THE SEPARATION OF EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE IN THE U.S. AND THE FACT THAT AN UPPER COURT SHOULD SOON ACT ON THE CASE. SHE SAID WE HOPED CASES SUCH AS THIS COULD BE AVOIDED BY THE PGOI WORKING THESE SORTS OF QUESTIONS BUT WITH THE COMPANIES CONCERNED BEFORE THE CASE REACHED TO COURT STAGE.

5. BAYANDOR WAS APPARENTLY UNIMPRESSED BY THE CONCEPT OF SEPARATION OF POWERS EVEN WHEN EMBOFF POINTED OUT IN REPLY THAT WHILE SEPARATION OF POWERS MIGHT BE ILLUSORY IN SOME COUNTRIES, THEY WERE A REALITY IN THE U.S. BAYANDOR SAID THAT MANY IN THE PGOI TOOK THE COURTS' ACTION AS A SIGN OF U.S. HOSTILITY TO IRAN. IF THE COURTS WERE PERMITTED TO MAKE THESE SORTS OF RULINGS, IT COULD HAVE VERY HARMFUL EFFECTS ON U.S/IRANIAN RELATIONS.

6. BAYANDOR SAID HE FELT CERTAIN THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT COULD BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF THE COURTS IN THE U.S. THE PROBLEMS THIS CASE WAS CAUSING IN RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, WITHOUT INTERVENING IN THE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. BAYANDOR STATED HE WAS CONCERNED

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THAT "THE JUDGES" MIGHT BE PREJUDICED AGAINST IRAN AND WITHOUT ACTION BY THE USG THE COURTS MIGHT DRAG THE CASE ON. COMMENT: WE DO NOT KNOW THE ORIGIN OF THIS APPROACH, BUT BELIEVE THAT PART OF THE VERY HARD LINE BEING TAKEN BY BAYANDOR IS HIS OWN PECULIAR STYLE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

7. IN AN CONVERSATION ON SEPTEMBER 12 WITH BAYANDOR, ECONCOUNS MADE DEMARCHE AS INSTRUCTED IN STATE 236557 AND LEFT AN AIDE MEMOIRE. WE BELIEVE THIS CONSTITUTES AN ADEQUATE REPLY TO BAYANDOR ON THIE EDS ISSUE. ECONCOUNS DID NOT MAKE THE SPECIFIC LINK IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH BAYANDOR, BUT ABSENT CONTRARY INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE DEPARTMENT BY SEPTEMBER 14, PLANS TO EXPLAIN TO BAYANDOR THAT SEPTEMBER 12 AIDE MEMOIRE PROVIDES ONLY RESPONSE TO HIS NOTE, WE ARE IN A POSITION TO GIVE AT THIS TIME. HE WILL REITERATE THAT APPEAL PROCESS NOW UNDERWAY AND IT IS STATE DEPARTMENT POLICY NOT TO FILE AMICUS CURIAE BRIEFS AT SUCH A STAGE IN PROCEEDINGS. THE DEPARTMENT WILL MONITOR DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS CASE CAREFULLY AND, IF THE SITUATION SHOULD WARRANT AN AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF AT ANOTHER STAGE IN THE APPEAL PROCESS, CONSIDER THIS OPTION.
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 10183

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/18/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P
TAGS: PORG, UN, IR, MASS
SUBJECT: IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI TRIP TO UNGA

1. DURING MEETING WITH CHARGE SEPTEMBER 18, FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI INFORMED US THAT IRAN'S DELEGATE TO THE U.N., SHEMRANI, IS HANDLING HIS SCHEDULE AND THAT DEPARTMENT SHOULD CHECK WITH SHEMRANI FOR YAZDI'S TRAVEL PLANS TO THE UNGA AND FOR SCHEDULING OF MEETING WITH SECRETARY VANCE. COMMENT: THIS IS SECOND TIME IN LAST FEW WEEKS THAT YAZDI HAS REFUSED TO GIVE INFORMATION ON HIS TRAVEL PLANS TO EMBASSY OR OTHERS HERE IN IRAN. THE SAME PROBLEM OCCURRED OVER HIS PLANS FOR HIS VISIT TO HAVANA. WE DO NOT KNOW BUT SUSPECT SECURITY CONCERNS LIE BEHIND THIS CAUTION.

2. DURING CONVERSATION, YAZDI MENTIONED HIS INTEREST IN DISCUSSING THE MILITARY SUPPLY QUESTION WHILE HE WAS IN NEW YORK AND SAID HE UNDERSTOOD FROM IRANIAN CHARGE AGAH THAT THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WISHED TO SEE HIM. YAZDI SAID HE INTENDED TO TAKE A MILITARY AIDE WITH HIM FOR THIS MEETING. CHARGE SAID THAT HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT PRECHT IN CONVERSATION WITH AGAH HAD RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF SOMEONE FROM DEFENSE COMING TO NEW YORK TO BRIEF YAZDI. CHARGE ASSUMED THAT THIS MIGHT BE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS MURRAY. WE HAD NOT HEARD THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HIMSELF WOULD BE IN NEW YORK.
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 10155

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STAT 9/12/79
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E.O. 12065: GDS 9/12/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P
TAGS: IR, BDIS, FINV
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTRY NOTE ON ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS

CHRON

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

A. THE FOLLOWING IS THE EMBASSY'S TRANSLATION OF A NOTE OF AUGUST 28, 1979, RECEIVED FROM THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY (FOURTH POLITICAL DEPARTMENT -AMERICA) REGARDING THE CASE OF ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS. THE LANGUAGE AT THE EMBASSY'S TRANSLATION WAS CORRECTED BY DARIOUSH BAYANDOR OF THE AMERICAN DEPARTMENT WHO WROTE THE NOTE.

- "THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN PRESENTS ITS COMPLIMENTS TO THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND HAS THE HONOR TO STATE THE FOLLOWING ON BEHALF OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN CONCERNING THE BLOCKING OF THE $16 MILLION FUND BELONGING TO THE IRANIAN AIR AND NAVAL FORCES IN CONNECTION WITH THE COMPLAINT OF THE ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEM AGAINST THE SOCIAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION OF IRAN, AND IN PURSUANCE OF THE TALKS HELD IN THIS CONNECTION ON AUGUST 14 AND 16 OF THIS YEAR BETWEEN THE OFFICIALS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN AND THE AMERICAN EMBASSY:

- "AS YOUR EMBASSY IS AWARE, THE DISTRICT COURTS OF DALLAS AND NEW YORK HAVE RULED, CONTRARY TO PROVISIONS OF THE CONTRACT, THAT THE SUIT BROUGHT BY EDS AGAINST THE SOCIAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION OF IRAN FALLS WITHIN THEIR JURISDICTION, AND THE NEW YORK COURT HAS SUBSEQUENTLY PUT A RESTRAINING ORDER ON THE SIXTEEN MILLION DOLLAR FUNDS BELONGING TO THE NAVY AND AIR FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN WHICH HAD BEEN EARMARKED FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE OUTSTANDING DEBTS OF THESE FORCES.

- "QUITE APART FROM THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE ISSUE AND THE CLAIMS OF EACH OF THE TWO SIDES AGAINST THE OTHER, THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN DEEMS IT NECESSARY TO CALL THE ATTENTION OF THE EMBASSY TO THE IMPORTANT POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE RULING OF THE AMERICAN COURTS HOLDING IN EFFECT IRANIAN COURTS INCOMPETENT (DESPITE THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONTRACT) AND THE FREEZING OF FUNDS BELONGING TO THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT, AND TO POINT OUT THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS IN THIS CONNECTION:

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10155

- "1) THE FREEZING OF THE FUNDS BELONGING TO THE IRANIAN AIR AND NAVAL FORCES IS NOT ONLY AGAINST THE KNOWN AND ESTABLISHED INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE AND LAWS BUT OPENLY VIOLATES THE UNITED STATES' OWN LAWS SUCH AS PROVISONS OF THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976.

- "2) THE RULING OF THE NEW YORK AND DALLAS COURTS ON THE GROUNDS THAT 'JUDICIAL CHAOS' PREVAILS IN IRAN AND LEGAL SECURITY HAS DISAPPEARED, IS BASED ON UNDUE POLITICAL PREJUDICE ON THE PART OF THE JUDGES INVOLVED.

- "3) THE UNLAWFUL FREEZING OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT'S ASSETS SETS A MOST DANGEROUS PRECEDENT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WILL SHAKE THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONFIDENCE AND TRUST OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN AND POTENTIALLY OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND WILL CAUSE MAJOR DAMAGE TO THEIR MUTUAL COMMERCIAL TIES FOR WHICH KNOWLEDGE OF AND CONFIDENCE IN THE PROCEDURES OF CONSIDERING DISPUTES WHERE THEY MAY ARISE IS ESSENTIAL.

- "IN CONSIDERATION OF THE FACT THAT THE ODD AND ARBITRARY RULING OF THE JUDGES INVOLVED IN THE SUIT IN QUESTION HAS CREATED A SITUATION WHICH CANNOT FAIL TO HAVE A NEGATIVE EFFECT IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN REQUESTS THE AMERICAN EMBASSY THAT DECISIVE AND SPEEDY ACTION BE INITIATED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO CALL THE ATTENTION TO THE JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES OF YOUR COUNTRY TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ISSUANCE OF SUCH RULINGS, AND MEASURES TO BE TAKEN TO HAVE THE ABOVE RULINGS ANNULLED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOR THE REASONS CITED ABOVE.

- THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN AVAILS ITSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW ASSURANCES OF ITS HIGHEST CONSIDERATION." END QUOTE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEHRAN 10285

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/20/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P
TAGS: IR, PGOV, PEPR
SUBJECT: CHARGE'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER

REFS: (A) TEHRAN 10222, (B) TEHRAN 10224, (C) TEHRAN 10229

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: CHARGE MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI TUESDAY, AUGUST 18, FOR ABOUT ONE HOUR TO REPORT ON HIS TRIP TO THE U.S. AND TO GET YAZDI'S IMPRESSION OF THE HAVANA SUMMIT. MEETING WAS HELD IN CORDIAL ATMOSPHERE BUT YAZDI WAS NON-COMMITTAL ON MOST SUBJECTS RAISED SUCH AS SHERRY CASE, SHEBANI, AND GULF DISTRICT. WHEN QUESTION OF FREEDOM OF PRESS WAS RAISED, YAZDI CHARGED AS USUAL THAT WESTERN PRESS WAS IRRESPONSIBLE ON IRAN. END SUMMARY.

3. MEETING WITH YAZDI OPENED WITH A FULL DISCUSSION OF CONSULAR SECTION PROBLEMS, HOW MANY VISAS WE WERE NOW ABLE TO ISSUE, WHAT PERCENTAGE WERE STUDENTS AND HOW WE COULD ASSURE STUDENTS WERE PROCESSED QUICKLY. CHARGE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE HELP WE HAVE BEEN RECEIVING FROM THE TEHRAN POLICE AND NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH WE WERE STILL HAVING PROBLEMS CONTROLLING THE VISA CROWDS, THAT POLICE CONTROL WAS GRADUALLY IMPROVING. CHARGE NOTED THAT OUR REFUSAL RATE WAS RUNNING AS HIGH AS 40 PERCENT BUT THAT WE WERE INTERVIEWING ABOUT 400 APPLICANTS A DAY INCLUDING 35-100 MEDICAL EMERGENCY CASES WHO WERE BEING SEEN ON A SPECIAL BASIS. YAZDI SEEMED ABSORBED IN THIS QUESTION AND PLEASED THAT THE CONSULATE WAS FUNCTIONING.

4. AFTER A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE NAM, UNGA, AND AFGHANISTAN (SEPTELS), CHARGE BRIEFED YAZDI ON HIS RECENT TRIP TO WASHINGTON. BRIEFING WAS DONE VERY FRANKLY IN EFFORT TO MAKE YAZDI AWARE OF WASHINGTON'S PERCEPTIONS OF IRAN AND OF THE ISSUES WHICH ARE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN BOTH TO THE USG AND AMERICANS IN GENERAL.

5. TO OPEN THE CONVERSATION CHARGE SAID THAT HE HAD TRIED DURING HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH USG OFFICIALS AND CONGRESSMEN TO PUT IRAN IN SOME PERSPECTIVE: IRAN WAS NOT A COUNTRY GONE MAD RUN BY BACKWARD MULLAHS, BUT A COUNTRY WHICH HAS GONE THROUGH A SUBSTANTIAL REVOLUTION WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN RESOLVED. FOR INSTANCE IRAN HAS NOT YET COMPLETED ITS DRAFTING OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION. CHARGE SAID HE HAD POINTED OUT THAT US HAS SUBSTANTIAL INTERESTS IN MAINTAINING GOOD RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND THAT HE THOUGHT THESE WERE SHARED BY

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THE PGOI. CHARGE NOTED THAT HIS PRESENTATION HAD BEEN WELL RECEIVED AND THAT THERE WAS STRONG INTEREST IN IRAN ON PART OF SENIOR US OFFICIALS AND CONGRESS.

6. CHARGE, HOWEVER, THEN POINTED OUT FRANKLY TO YAZDI THAT IRAN'S IMAGE IN WASHINGTON IS POOR AND ITS CREDIBILITY SUSPECT. THE KURDISH SITUATION HAS HAD A CONSIDERABLE IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION AND MANY ARE QUESTIONING HOW THE USG CAN HAVE AN ARMS RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN AT A TIME WHEN EXECUTIONS,(INCLUDING A LARGE NUMBER IN KURDISTAN) WERE CONTINUING IN WHAT LOOKED TO AMERICANS TO BE SUMMARY JUSTICE WITHOUT DUE PROCESS AND WITH EXECUTIONS CARRIED OUT IN THE DARK OF NIGHT. HAD CONGRESS BEEN IN SESSION WHEN THE PICTURES OF KURDISH EXECUTIONS APPEARED IN THE PRESS, THERE MIGHT WELL HAVE BEEN A CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION CONCERNING IRANIAN ACTIONS.

7. IN ADDITION, THE CHARGE STATED US BUSINESS HAD NOT BEEN WELL TREATED IN IRAN. FOR INSTANCE SHERRY HAD NOT BEEN PERMITTED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY AND SHEBANI WAS STILL IN JAIL. THE CHARGE SAID WE THOUGHT A STORY MIGHT SOON BE APPEARING IN THE US PRESS ON THE SHERRY CASE PERHAPS CHARGING THE EMBASSY WITH NOT BEING ACTIVE ENOUGH ON HIS BEHALF. HIS CONTINUED DETENTION IN IRAN WAS BEYOND COMPREHENSION; THE CHARGE ASKED THAT YAZDI INTERVENE WITH THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE TO POINT OUT THAT THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE'S OWN REPORT RECOMMENDED SHERRY BE RELEASED. YAZDI WAS NON-COMMITAL ON THIS. (AS SHERRY WAS BEING CLEARED TO LEAVE AT ABOUT THE TIME THIS CONVERSATION WAS TAKING PLACE WE DOUBT THE FOREIGN OFFICE HAD ANY ROLE IN HIS RELEASE.)

8. CHARGE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT PGOI CONTINUES TO DENY US ACCESS TO OUR FORMER MILITARY HEADQUARTERS AND FACILITIES IN IRAN, INCLUDING EXTENSIVE PROPERTY AND PERSONNEL RECORDS.

9. CHARGE THEN MENTIONED BANNING OF THE PRESS AND EXPULSION OF FOREIGN REPORTERS. HE STATED THAT WE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 TEHRAN 10285

REGRET VERY MUCH PGOI ACTIONS AGAINST THE US PRESS. HE HAD HEARD FROM MANY PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON ON THIS SUBJECT, INCLUDING THE CONGRESS. IN GENERAL THERE WAS A RECOGNITION OF US INTERESTS IN IRAN AND A WILLINGNESS TO WORK WITH THE PGOI. THE USG WISHED TO GET ON WITH THE RELATIONSHIP BUT IT HAD TO BE A MUTUAL EFFORT IF IT WAS TO PROGRESS. THE CHARGE THEN ASKED YAZDI IF HE WISHED TO COMMENT ON ANY OF THESE POINTS.

10. YAZDI COMMENTED THAT THE PRESS HAD CERTAINLY NOT PICKED UP ANY FAVORABLE COMMENTS ON IRAN THAT CHARGE MAY HAVE MADE WHILE HE WAS IN THE US. YAZDI THEN LAUNCHED INTO A DISCUSSION OF HOW THE FOREIGN PRESS DISTORTS NEWS IN IRAN AND TREATS THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION VERY UNFAIRLY. YAZDI SAID THAT THE PGOI HAD BEEN WATCHING CLOSELY AND THE US PRESS NEVER CARRIES GOOD NEWS ABOUT IRAN. THE CHARGE REPLIED THAT IRAN WAS UNLIKELY TO GET GOOD PRESS COVERAGE IF IT KEPT ON VICTIMIZING OUT THE PRESS. HE POINTED OUT AGAIN THAT "IRAN CAN NOT SHED ALL RESPONSIBILITY" FOR ITS BAD PRESS. IRAN BEARS RESPONSIBILITY FOR MANY OF THE THINGS THAT HAVE BEEN REPORTED SUCH AS THE LARGE NUMBER OF SUMMARY EXECUTIONS. EVEN SOME SUPPORTERS OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION IN THE US WERE QUESTIONING IF THESE ACTIONS BY THE PGOI WERE CONSISTENT WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE REVOLUTION. CHARGE POINTED TO SECURITY PROBLEMS ON THE EMBASSY COMPOUND, TO ILL TREATMENT OF BUSINESSMEN, AND ACTIONS THAT APPEARED DESIGNED TO REMOVE ALL US JOURNALISTS FROM IRAN. THIS SIMPLY MADE THE PUBLIC THINK IRAN HAD SOMETHING TO HIDE. YAZDI DENIED THIS HOTLY AND STATED THAT HE WOULD BE FULLY READY TO HANDLE ALL QUESTIONS FROM THE PRESS WHEN HE GOT TO WASHINGTON.

11. CHARGE POINTED OUT THAT HE THOUGHT SOME OF THE US PRESS HAD DONE A GOOD JOB OF REPORTING. THE TIME PEOPLE ON KHOMEINI HAD BEEN EXCELLENT FOR INSTANCE. (YAZDI CONCURRED). CHARGE OBSERVED THAT STATEMENTS WHICH WERE CONTINUOUSLY BEING CARRIED ON IRAN NATIONAL RADIO AND TELEVISION ACCUSING US, AMONG OTHER THINGS, OF BEING INVOLVED IN PLOTS WITH SAVAK, THE CIA AND ZIONISTS TO DESTROY THE REVOLUTION WERE BOTH INACCURATE AND UNHELPFUL TO OUR RELATIONSHIP. HE POINTED OUT TO YAZDI THAT PGOI COULD CONTROL THIS TYPE OF ANTI-US PROPAGANDA ON THE NIRT AND SHOULD. YAZDI MADE NO REPLY.

12. INSTEAD YAZDI ASKED IF USG WAS INVOLVED IN ANY WAY IN CIRCULATION IN TEHRAN OF ZEROXED SHEET CALLED THE "BERNARD LEWIS PLAN" SHOWING A PLOT TO DIVIDE UP THE COUNTRY INTO SMALL AREAS BASED ON ETHNIC GROUPS. YAZDI SEEMED TO TAKE THE SHEET SEMI-SERIOUSLY. CHARGE TOLD

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HIM THAT IT WAS NOT WORTH THE MINISTER'S TIME AS IT WAS NONSENSE NOT HELPFUL TO EITHER US OR IRAN, BUT PROMISED TO CHECK WITH WASHINGTON.

13. MEETING ENDED WITH CHARGE AGAIN REQUESTING ANY HELP YAZDI COULD OFFER ON SEERRY AND SHEBANI CASE AND GULF DISTRICT. HE ALSO QUERIED YAZDI ABOUT BAHA'I INCIDENT (SEPTEL).

14. ACTION REQUESTED: WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION DEPARTMENT MAY HAVE ON "BERNARD LEWIS". LAINGEN
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RUSPAF/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0154
ET
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 10325

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/23/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, AF, US
SUBJECT: SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

REF: STATE 250400

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI DEPARTED TEHRAN TODAY FOR UNGA. SUGGEST DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO RAISE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN WITH YAZDI IN NEW YORK.

3. EMBASSY PLANS TO DISCUSS QUESTION WITH HEAD OF MINISTRY OFFOREIGN AFFAIRS 5TH DIVISION SEPTEMBER 24. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE ONLY YAZDI WOULD HAVE AUTHORITY TO TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION.

4. DAO AND MAAG HAVE ALSO BEEN ALLERTED TO REFTEL AND WILL BRIEF THEIR HIGH LEVEL IRANIAN CONTACTS AS APPROPRIATE IF OCCASION ARISES IN NEXT FEW DAYS.
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BT
C O N N I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 10342

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/24/79 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P
TAGS: IR, PORG, MASS
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH YAZDI: GULF DISTRICT;
US PRESENCE IN PERSIAN GULF

REF: TEHRAN 10193

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DURING CONVERSATIONS WITH YAZDI OCTOBER 3, WE SUGGEST SECRETARY VANCE RAISE QUESTION OF OUR ACCESS TO COMMISSARY, GULF DISTRICT AND OTHER MILITARY PROPERTIES SUCH AS MOTOR POOL AND ARMY COMMUNICATION COMMMAND (ACOM) FACILITY.

3. FOLLOWING DEATH OF AYATOLLA TALEGHANI, THE TALEGHANI COMMITTEE WHICH FORMERLY CONTROLLED COMMISSARY IS TURNING OVER CONTROL OF COMMISSARY AND OTHER PROPERTIES (BOTH US AND IRANIAN) EITHER TO OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER OR TO ARMY. WE ARE NOT CERTAIN WHO ACTUALLY CONTROLS ACCESS TO THE GULF DISTRICT. WE HOPE THAT COMMISSARY AND THE GULF DISTRICT MAY END UP IN HANDS OF PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE. IF SO, YAZDI WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO CONTROL DISPOSITION OF COMMISSARY AND GULF DISTRICT. WHILE YAZDI HAS NOT BEEN RESPONSIVE TO OUR APPROACHES IN THE PAST, WE THINK IT NOW MIGHT BE WORTH ANOTHER TRY.

4. IN HIS DEPARTURE STATEMENT AUGUST 23, YAZDI REPORTEDLY TOLD PRESS THAT BESIDES DISCUSSING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WITH VANCE, YAZDI SAID HE WILL ALSO DISCUSS AN AMERICAN PLAN TO LAND COMBAT TROOPS IN THE PERSIAN GULF TO PROVIDE STABILITY IN THE REGION. SUCH A MOVE BY THE US, HE SAID, WILL NOT IN ANY WAY HELP DEFUSE ANY OF THE REGION'S CONFLICTS".

5. COMMENT: TEHRAN PRESS HAS BEEN FOLLOWING WITH INTEREST VARIOUS STATEMENTS BY USG OFFICIALS REGARDING FORMATION OF RAPID REACTION FORCES. THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF SPECULATION HERE THAT USG INTENDS TO OR HAS INCREASED ITS COMBAT MARINE FORCES IN THE GULF AREA; THAT WE MAY INTEND TO SEND IN FORCES TO AFGHANISTAN; AND THAT US MIGHT BE CONSIDERING SOME ACTION AGAINST OIL FIELDS IN MIDDLE EAST. LATEST VERSION OF THIS IS KAYHAN STORY AUGUST 24 QUOTING KHOMEINI'S REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UAE MODARESSI THAT FIVE TO SIX THOUSAND US TROOPS ARE STATIONED IN JUFAIR BASE IN BAHRAIN. IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL IF SECRETARY COULD DISCUSS WITH YAZDI DISPOSITION OF OUR FORCES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND PERSIAN GULF SO HE WILL HAVE FULL UNDERSTANDING OF OUR INTENTION IN THE AREA. CHARGE TOOK OPPORTUNITY DURING CALL ON MINISTRY OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE MINISTER MINACHI TODAY TO DESCRIBE PRESS REPORT OF U.S. TROOPS IN BAHRAIN AS TOTALLY WITHOUT FOUNDATION AND UNHELPFUL TO ATMOSPHERE AFFECTING US IRAN RELATIONSHIP. LAINGEN
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(4) HHS

International Communication Agency

United States of America
Washington, D.C. 20547

CONFIDENTIAL

September 26, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: State/NEA - Mr. Harold H. Saunders

FROM: ICA/NEA - R. T. Curran

SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy Communication Between United States and Iran October 1979 - February 1980

Based on discussions in your office on September 7, ICA agrees that some cautious exploration of additional opportunities for communication between the United States and Iran in the public diplomacy area is in order in the next four or five months.

As a guiding practice, we will try to encourage institutional linkages, a concept of communication endorsed on September 7. These linkages will stress the two-way flow of relations. At this time it *must* be recognized that their development depends on creating an atmosphere of trust and respect. In initial stages, friendly and understanding one-on-one personally developed ties are essential. Through such personal rapport can be *built* carefully determined institutional linkages which, in turn, can nurture further mutual relationships. Likely fields for initiating or reestablishing contact include Iranology, the humanities, physical sciences, English teaching, and physical education.

Still continuing, albeit in a low-key, modest fashion with currently limited, one-way — Iranians to the United States — *programs, is the work of the* Fulbright Commission. The United States should maintain its financial support of these operations as a well-established and core institutional link between private and public

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Subject to General Declassification Schedule of Executive Order 12065. Automatically Downgraded at Two Year Intervals and Declassified on September 26, 1985.

educators and institutions in both countries. Similarly, judiciously planned activities of the American Institute for Iranian Studies should be fostered.

Within this general approach and responding to the recommendations of the Charge' and our Public Affairs Officer, we will examine the following venues for some restrained initiatives which may be considered if Iranian authorities make it clear that our interest in enhanced relationships is reciprocated:

1. Propose visits to Iran by carefully selected scholars and public figures. Whenever possible, the visits will be privately arranged. Individuals should have credibility and relevance to present-day Iran.

2. Encourage invitations to Iranian Islamic scholars and, possibly, Iranian religious figures to the Hejira anniversary celebrations in the United States. Events during the visit should also include similar representatives from other Islamic societies to stress the multi-national nature of the observances. Sponsorship should be privately arranged with the Hejira Anniversary Committee playing a major role.

3. Discuss with private entities such as the Johnson Foundation or university-based seminars including the East-West Center, bringing groups of Iranian scholars to the United States to consider non-controversial topics. Preferably the meetings should be multi-national. Possible fields are literature, creative writing or, more pragmatically, library development and library science.

4. Work with a few carefully selected foreign student advisers and admissions officers at universities sophisticated in handling Islamic and Iranian students a) to assess during this period of change in Iran evolving needs and attitudes of Iranian students so as b) to look toward plans for a possible student conference or other type dialogue in the United States at some future propitious date.

5. Explore with American educational institutions which take part in linkages or support other educational exchange operations in Islamic third-countries, such as those of the University of Nebraska at Omaha in Pakistan, possibilities for inviting Iranian students and academics to take part in such seminars or projects which foster intellectual understanding and on-going contact.

6. Consider augmentation of current ICA/IAS English-teaching and cultural institutions provided that administrative claims for past damages and sequestrations are given cognizance by Iranian authorities.

7. Be alert to opportunities to invite Iranians to take part in multi-regional exchange programs, particularly those in mass media.

NOTE:

The VOA confirms plans to increase broadcast time to Iran in Persian by one hour a day about the turn of the new year. It will add a thirty-minute morning show featuring news and news-related material and an additional thirty minutes to the front end of the current half-hour evening show. The extended evening show will provide greater opportunity for in-depth coverage and cultural material. Considerations cover: events in Iran outside the political sphere, a series on Iranian Islamic studies and Centers in the United States, and interviews with American scholars and Iranologists and appropriate public figures representing a wide spectrum of political and foreign policy viewpoints.

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EXDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/26/85 (HOLBROOKE, R.) OR-M
TAGS: CVIP (VANCE, CYRUS)
SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION: VANCE/SONODA
- BILATERAL AT UNGA

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. FOLLOWING IS SECTION OF SONODA-VANCE BILATERAL AT UNGA SEPTEMBER 26 DEALING WITH IRANIAN AFFAIRS. BEGIN TEXT:

SONODA THEN RELATED A CONVERSATION HE HAD WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF IRAN TWO DAYS BEFORE. SONODA SAID THAT JAPAN/IRANIAN RELATIONS ARE VERY GOOD AND HE TOLD THE FOREIGN MINISTER JAPAN IS PREPARED TO COOPERATE IN IRAN'S NATION-BUILDING EFFORTS. AT THE SAME TIME, HE TOLD THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT IRAN NEEDS THE COOPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND OTHERS AND SUGGESTED THAT THEY TALK WITH US. THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER RESPONDED THAT IT WAS NOT IRAN'S INTENTION TO EXCLUDE COOPERATION WITH THE WEST AND AT THE PROPER TIME THEY WOULD TALK TO US.

THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION TO SONODA FOR HIS STATEMENTS TO THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND NOTED THAT HE WOULD MEET WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER IN NEW YORK NEXT WEEK. NEW YORK

SONODA SAID HE WAS IMPRESSED BY THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND FELT THAT HE WAS A SERIOUS PERSON. END TEXT.
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEHRAN 12828

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM CHARGE

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/1/79 (LAINGEN, L.B.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, UNGA, PINR, IR
SUBJECT: BILATERAL WITH IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, OCTOBER 3

1. (CONFIDENTIAL-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. YOU MEET WITH YAZDI AT A TIME THAT MAY MARK A SIGNIFICANT WATERSHED IN IRANIAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. WHILE IT IS IMPORTANT FOR ANY OBSERVER TO AVOID HASTY JUDGMENTS ABOUT THIS PLACE, IT IS HARD TO AVOID THE CONCLUSION THAT THE CLERICS ARE NOW IN THE MOOD TO STEAMROLLER VIRTUALLY ANY AND ALL OPPOSITION TO THEIR DESIGNS FOR AN ESSENTIALLY THEOCRATIC STATE, WITH ISLAM AS THE IDEOLOGY AND THE ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY POSSIBLY PROVIDING CONTROLLING PARTY APPARATUS. ITEMS:

- A. THE KURDISH "REBELLION" HAS BEEN PUT DOWN IN A WAY INTENDED TO SERVE AN OBJECT LESSON FOR OTHER MINORITIES.

- B. THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT AND ITS LEADERSHIP HAVE BEEN BRANDED COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES AND OTHER OPPOSITION ELEMENTS SIMILARLY WARNED.

- C. A CLERIC-DOMINATED COUNCIL IS RAMRODDING THROUGH A CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW PROCESS THAT WOULD SEEM TO INSTITUTIONALIZE AN IRON-CLAD SHIA ISLAMIC CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENTAL APPARATUS.

- D. EXECUTIONS ARE CONTINUING, EVEN OF COMMON CRIMINALS, DESPITE TALK OF AMNESTY. QUM SEEMS DETERMINED TO AVOID ANY SHOW OF JUDICIAL MERCY OR COMPASSION.

- E. THE HEAD OF THE REVOLUTION-BORN PASDARANS ("GUARDIANS OF THE REVOLUTION") HAS JUST TAKEN OVER AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE.

- F. NAZEH'S OUSTER AT NIOC IS A FORCEFUL AND VERY PUBLIC REMINDER TO THE SECULARISTS OF QUM'S DETERMINATION TO PREVENT ANY LESSENING OF ITS CONTROL OVER WHAT MATTERS, INCLUDING THE OIL SECTOR.

- G. A KIND OF PARANOIA PERSISTS OVER AN ALLEGED
- CONSPIRACY BY THE WESTERN PRESS AGAINST THE
- IRANIAN REVOLUTION. (THERE ARE NO AMERICAN
- JOURNALISTS NOW RESIDENT HERE.)

- H. THE U.S. CONTINUES TO BE DENOUNCED BY KHOMEINI
- AS MASSIVELY INVOLVED WITH INTERNATIONAL ZIONISM
- IN FRUSTRATING THE HOPES OF THE PALESTINIANS;
- INDEED KHOMEINI SEEMS TO SEE HIMSELF AND THE
- REVOLUTION AS BECOMING THE REAL UNIFYING FORCE
- THROUGHOUT THE AREA IN THE STRUGGLE FOR PALESTINIAN
- RIGHTS.

3. THERE IS MORE, BUT THIS IS ENOUGH TO UNDERSCORE THE POINT THAT FOR THE MOMENT THE CLERICS ARE IN A FLOOD TIDE OF ASCENDANCY. THERE WOULD SEEM TO BE NOTHING THAT WILL PREVENT THEIR SOLIDIFYING THEIR POLITICAL CONTROL IN THE EVOLVING CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE -- NOT THE MILITARY, NOT BAKHTIAR FROM PARIS, NOT POPULAR DISILLUSIONMENT OVER THE LACK OF MUCH BREAD AND BUTTER RETURNS FROM THE REVOLUTION, NOT BAZARGAN AND OTHER MODERATES IN THE PGOI. (BAZARGAN IS QUOTED IN AN INTERVIEW IN TODAY'S PRESS WITH ORIANA FALLACI AS SAYING "... FROM AN OFFICIAL POINT OF VIEW THE GOVERNMENT RUNS THE COUNTRY BUT IN AN IDEOLOGICAL AND REVOLUTIONARY SENSE KHOMEINI AND HIS COUNCILS CONTROL." TRUE INDEED.)

4. WHAT COULD ARREST THE TREND PERHAPS, BUT ONLY WITH TIME, WOULD BE A GREATER APPRECIATION THAN NOW EXISTS OF THE PROBLEMS OF GOVERNING A PLURALISTIC BODY POLITIC AND A PARTIALLY MODERNIZED ECONOMY SUCH AS IRAN'S WITH RELIGIOUS PRECEPTS THAT SEEM TO PROVIDE SO LITTLE ROOM FOR PARTICIPATION BY THE SECULAR ELEMENTS OF THIS COUNTRY.

5. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER KHOMEINI APPRECIATES THIS AT ALL, AND THERE THE RETURNS ARE NOT ENCOURAGING. EVEN IF HE DOES THERE IS A REAL QUESTION WHETHER EVEN HE COULD PREVAIL AGAINST A SUBSTANTIAL TIDE NOW RUNNING AND AN ENTOURAGE IN QUM THAT BY ALL ACCOUNTS IS EVEN MORE OBDURATE THAN KHOMEINI.
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 TEHRAN 10529

6. THE EASY ANSWER IS THAT AN INEXORABLE PROCESS IS UNDERWAY THAT WILL SWEEP ASIDE THE MODERATE FORCES AND THAT WILL EVENTUALLY ALSO SEE BAZARGAN OUSTED, IN THE MANNER OF NAZEE AT NIOC.

7. I AM NOT SO SURE. I FIND MUCH LESS GROUND FOR OPTIMISM THAN A MONTH AGO, BUT KHOMEINI IS NO FOOL POLITICALLY AND MAY YET APPRECIATE THE NEED FOR SOME ACCOMMODATION TO THE MODERATES (WHICH BAZARGAN WEAKLY PUT STILL GAMELY REPRESENTS) TO ASSURE CONTINUED POLITICAL STABILITY AS HE SEEKS TO ASSURE WHAT MATTERS TO HIM, AND THAT IS PRIMACY OF ISLAM IN THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FABRIC OF FUTURE IRAN.

8. YOU MAY WISH TO PROBE WITH YAZDI HOW HE SEES FUTURE TRENDS IN THIS AREA. HE IS A DEEP BELIEVER, A REVOLUTIONARY WHO IS AS CLOSE AS ANY IN THE PGOI TO KHOMEINI BUT WHO MAY APPRECIATE THE NEED TO BALANCE HIS IDEALISM WITH REALISM. HE HAS SAID AS MUCH TO ME, AND I AM PREPARED TO BELIEVE HIM. YOUR CONVERSATION WITH HIM, THE FIRST HIGH LEVEL CONTACT WE HAVE HAD WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP, IS CRUCIAL TO OUR PURPOSES HERE. IN AFFIRMING TO HIM THAT WE ACCEPT THE NEW REALITIES IN IRAN, AND INDEED THAT WE WISH IRAN WELL IN DEVELOPING ITS NEW INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT, YAZDI SHOULD ALSO KNOW THAT WE ARE TROUBLED BY A RIGIDITY AND AN ABSENCE OF A HUMAN FACE IN THE REVOLUTION THAT SEEMS TO LEAVE SO LITTLE SCOPE FOR THE RIGHTS OR INTERESTS OF MORE MODERATE ELEMENTS IN TODAY'S IRAN. KHOMEINI CARES LITTLE ABOUT IRAN'S IMAGE IN THE UNITED STATES BUT THERE ARE OTHERS, LIKE YAZDI, WHO DO.
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EXDIS

E.O.12065: RDS 10/04/99 (SAUNDERS, H.) OR-M
TAGS: OVIP (VANCE, CYRUS)
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUNDER' MEETING WITH
FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI

1. (S ENTIRE TEXT).

2. IN THE EVENING OF OCTOBER 3, FOLLOWING SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH YAZDI, SAUNDERS MET WITH HIM AND HIS ASSOCIATES FOR OVER TWO-HOUR REVIEW OF STATE OF US/IRANIAN RELATIONS. MUCH TIME WAS SPENT IN YAZDIS REHERSAL OF OUR PAST SINS AND INABILITY TRULY TO COMPREHEND THE NATURE OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION. SAUNDERS ATTEMPTED WITHOUT EVIDENT SUCCESS TO LEAD YAZDI TOWARD THE PERSPECTIVE OF A EVIDENT SUCCESS TO LEAD YAZDI TOWARD THE PERSPECTIVE OF A NEW US/IRANIAN RELATIONSHIP BASED ON PRESENT REALITIES AND A FUTURE WE COULD WORK OUT TOGETHER.

3. YAZDI MADE CLEAR THAT HE FELT THAT THE AMERICAN WORLD-VIEW , WHICH HAD LED US TO SUPPORT THE SHAH, WOULD MAKE IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR US TO ACCEPT THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AND ESPECIALLY THE ECONOMIC LOSS THAT ENTAILED, 3.G. THE IMPORTANT MARKET FOR US ARMS. HE INSISTED THAT IRAN MUST BE TREATED WITH "EQUALITY AND RESPECT" AND BRIDLED AT ANY APPROACH THAT WE MIGHT MAKE ON HUMAN RIGHTS OR OTHER ISSUES THAT SUGGESTED WE WERE DICTATING TO IRAN. HE AGAIN SHOWED SPECIAL SENSITIVITY TO THE HANDLING OF MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, SUGGESTING THAT THERE MIGHT BE A CONSPIRACY AGAINST IRAN. HE WAS NOT WELL-BRIEFED ON THESE ISSUES AND THUS THE ARGUMENTS

HE ADVANCED WERE SIMPLISTIC. DESPITE THE HARD LINE TAKEN BY YAZDI, THE CONVERSATION WAS FAIRLY RELAXED, QUITE FRANK AND GENERALLY POSITIVE IN DIRECTION. IF YAZDI SHOWED NO SIGNS OF A CHANGED, ATTITUDE, PERHAPS FARHANG AND AGAH APPRECIATED THE US APPROACH AS SINCERE AND WELL INTENTIONED.

4. SAUNDERS RAISED THERE BILATERAL ISSUES AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE GENERAL DISCUSSION:

-) A NEED TO CLEAN UP THE U.S. MILITARY FACILITIES AND PROPERTY IN IRAN. YAZDI READILY AGREED THIS SHOULD BE DONE WITHOUT DELAY AND WHEN SAUNDERS SUGGESTED A JOINT US/IRAN COMMITTEE, YAZDI SAID HE THOUGHT ONE HAD RECENTLY BEEN ESTABLISHED. ON THE IRANIAN SIDE, IT WAS COMPOSED OF THE MFA, REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE AND SEVERAL OTHER ENTITIES. SAUNDERS SUGGESTED IT COULD MOVE CASE-BY-CASE TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS. IF SUCH A COMMITTEE HAS NOT BEENESTABLISHED, THE EMBASSY SHOULD FOLLOW UP WITH THE MFA TO IMPLEMENT YAZDI'S AGREEMENT.

?) SHEBANI CASE: SAUNDERS MADE AN APPEAL FOR THE RELEASE OF SHEBANI, POINTING TO THE POSITIVE EFFECT IT WOULD HAVE ON THE BUSINESS CLIMATE. YAZDI SAID HE HAD SPOKEN TO THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ABOUT THE CASE, BUT THE PROSECUTOR DID NOT GIVE HEED TO HIS VIEWS. WE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR WHAT YAZDI HAD DONE IN THE SHERRY CASE AND HOPED THAT HE WOULD BE EQUALLY HELPFUL IN THE SHEBANI CASE. NO COMMITMENT.

:) THE BAHA'IS: SAUNDERS DESCRIBED THE CONCERNS OF AMERICAN BAHAIS AND ASKED YAZDI IF THERE WAS ANYTHING WE COULD SAY TO AMERICANS THAT WOULD EASE THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT THE AVERAGE BAHAIS IN IRAN. WE FELT THAT THE SITUATION FOR OTHER MINORITIES WAS IMPROVED AND THAT WE HAD BEEN ABLE TO REASSURE AMERICANS THAT JEWS AND OTHERS WERE NOT BEING BADLY TREATED. WE WOULD LIKE TO DO THE SAME FOR THE BAHAIS, YAZDI REHEARSED IRANIAN FEELINGS ABOUT THE BAHAIS ALONG FAMILIAR LINES. CERTAIN INDIVIDUAL BAHAIS HAD SERVED, THE SHAH AND WOULD BE PUNISHED FOR THEIR CRIMES. AS FOR THE AVERAGE BAHAIS, THEY WOULD NOT BE PERSECUTED BUT WOULD BE FULLY PROTECTED UNDER IRANIAN LAWS. VANCE

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 SECTO 08226

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS 10/4/99 (SAUNDERS, H.) OR-M
TAGS: OVIP (VANCE, CYRUS)
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI

1. (ENTIRE TEXT).

2. ON OCTOBER 3, SECRETARY MET FOR ONE HOUR WITH YAZDI WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY CHARGE ASAD, MANSOUR FARHANG AND [illegible] (PROTOCOL). THE SECRETARY WAS ACCOMPANIED BY [illegible], NEWSOM, SAUNDERS, FISK AND PRECHT (NOTETAKER).

3. YAZDI'S TONE WAS UNFRIENDLY, PROVOCATIVE AND DISTRUSTFUL THROUGHOUT, NOTWITHSTANDING OCCASIONAL REMARKS ABOUT IRAN'S DESIRE FOR FRIENDLY RELATIONS. HE BEGAN BY ASKING THE SECRETARY WHETHER THE U.S. ACCEPTED THE CHANGES IN IRAN. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT WE DID AND HAD TRIED TO MAKE THAT CLEAR IN A NUMBER OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS. WE WISHED IRAN'S LEADERS WELL AND HAD SET IN MOTION CERTAIN FORMS OF COOPERATION. WE WERE PREPARED TO GO FURTHER IF IRAN WISHED. WE WANTED TO JOIN WITH IRANIANS IN COMBATING THE MISTRUST THAT EXISTED AND IN PUTTING THE PAST BEHIND US. WE WISHED TO MOVE FORWARD TO A NEW RELATIONSHIP.

4. YAZDI SAID THESE VIEWS HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO HIM IN THE PAST BY OUR CHARGES. STILL HE FELT THAT WE DID NOT TRULY UNDERSTAND AND ACCEPT THE REALITY OF THE NEW IRAN. HE REFERRED TO CHARGE LAINGEN'S CONVERSATION WITH THE INTERIOR MINISTER AS AN UNWARRANTED INTERFERENCE IN IRAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND ASKED WHY THE U.S. DID SUCH THINGS. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT WE WISHED TO EXPRESS OUR CONCERNS. WE HOPED THAT WE COULD BE ABLE TO SAY WHAT WE FELT PRIVATELY; WE WOULD WELCOME THE SAME KIND OF APPROACH ON THE PART OF THE IRANIANS IF THEY HAD CONCERNS WITH THE U.S. NEITHER SIDE SHOULD FEEL OBLIGED TO GO TO THE PRESS. FREE, FRANK AND PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WERE AN INGREDIENT OF TRUE

2

FRIENDSHIP.

5. YAZDI WENT ON TO CRITICIZE U.S. COMMENTS ON IRAN'S INTENTION TO SUPPORT THE NAM RESOLUTION ON ZIONISM AND RACISM. WHY DO YOU DEFEND ISRAEL, HE ASKED. THERE WERE OTHER SIMILAR, UNFRIENDLY GESTURES BY THE U.S. AT THIS POINT, YAZDI BEGAN TO CITE THE PROBLEMS HE HAD WITH THE U.S.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 SECTO 03226

EXDIS

6. THE FIRST ISSUE WAS MILITARY CONTRACTS AND THE HANDLING OF THE TRUST FUND. IRAN DID NOT ACCEPT THE FEBRUARY 5 MOU WHICH CAUSED IRAN TREMENDOUS PROBLEMS. WE NEEDED TO CLEAN UP THE PAST AND CLEAN UP THE MILITARY CONTRACTS. THE SECRETARY SAID WE WERE PREPARED TO DO JUST THAT BEGINNING THE FOLLOWING DAY IN A MEETING WITH STATE AND DOD OFFICIALS.

7. YAZDI ASKED WHAT THE U.S. POLICY WAS ON MILITARY CONTRACTS. HE SAID THAT IRAN HAD RECEIVED NO BILLS SINCE 1978 AND COMPLAINED THAT THE SPRUANCE SHIPS HAD BEEN CANCELLED WITHOUT REFERENCE TO IRAN FOR PRICE DISCUSSIONS. IRAN DID NOT KNOW HOW MUCH IT WAS BEING CHARGED. YAZDI ASKED WHAT WAS U.S. POLICY ON RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED SPARES.

8. THE SECRETARY SAID BASICALLY OUR POLICY WAS TO SELL IRAN WHAT IT NEEDED. IF THERE WERE SPECIAL CASES, WE WOULD REVIEW THEM. THERE MIGHT BE PROBLEMS WITH SOME CLASSIFIED SPARE PARTS, BUT WE WERE WILLING TO EXAMINE EACH ITEM ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. LET US ISOLATE AND REVIEW EACH DIFFICULT CASE, THE SECRETARY SAID. BAYANDOR RAISED THE PROBLEM OF COMPUTER TAPES FOR THE F-14 PROGRAM, WHICH NOBODY AT THE TABLE WAS FAMILIAR WITH.

9. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT EACH SALE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT WAS SUBJECT TO A BILATERAL AGREEMENT NOT TO TRANSFER IT TO THIRD COUNTRIES WITHOUT PRIOR U.S. APPROVAL. YAZDI QUICKLY INDICATED THAT IRAN ACCEPTED THOSE AGREEMENTS.

10. SECOND ISSUE RAISED BY YAZDI WAS PROBLEMS WITH PRIVATE COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND U.S. COURTS.

11. THE SECRETARY SAID WHEN MATTERS REACHED THE COURTS THEY MUST BE DECIDED ACCORDING TO THE LEGAL PROCESS. WE

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CRITICAL OF THE U.S. PRESS AND USG FOR THEIR FAILURE TO CRITICIZE CRUELTIES UNDER THE SHAH.
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WOULD BE PLEASED TO CONSULT AND ADVISE WITH THE IRANIANS BUT THERE WERE PRACTICAL LIMITS AS TO WHAT WE COULD DO. YAZDI MADE AN APPEAL FOR A USG BRIEFING TO THE COURTS AND SUGGESTED THAT IF THE USG DID NOT INTERVENE IN ATTACHMENT ACTIONS, IRAN MIGHT NOT CONSIDER ITS INVESTMENTS SAFE. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION OF PENDING CASES AND YAZDI CONCLUDED ASKING FOR AN OVERALL USG POLICY TOWARDS DEALING WITH COMMERCIAL DISPUTES. NEWSOM SAID THAT WE HAD TRIED TO BE HELPFUL WITH U.S. FIRMS AND CITED SEVERAL EXAMPLES. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE IRANIANS MIGHT THEMSELVES SPELL OUT IN A PUBLIC STATEMENT HOW THEY WANTED AMERICAN FIRMS TO PROCEED.

12. THE THIRD ISSUE WAS THE SITUATION OF IRANIANS WHO HAD COMMITTED CRIMES AT HOME AND FLED TO THE U.S. YAZDI CITED THE CASE OF A MILITARY OFFICER RASMI WHO WAS IN LOS ANGELES. THE U.S. MUST FIND A WAY TO SEND HIM BACK TO IRAN FOR TRIAL. YAZDI THEN RAISED THE CASE OF TWO IRANIANS WHO HAD FLED TO LOS ANGELES WITH ALLEGEDLY STOLEN MONEY. THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED THIS PART OF THE DISCUSSION BY SAYING WE WOULD REVIEW OUR POLICIES AND PRACTICES WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO SEE IF WE COULD BE HELPFUL.

13. FOR HIS FOURTH ISSUE, YAZDI REFERRED TO REPORTS SOME AMERICANS HAD HAD WITH THE SHAH IN MEXICO. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT AMERICANS WERE FREE TO MEET WITH THE SHAH AND THERE WAS NOTHING THE USG COULD DO ABOUT IT. YAZDI ASKED OUR POLICY TOWARD THE SHAH. THE SECRETARY SAID IT WAS CLEAR. WE HAVE TOLD HIM THAT AT THIS POINT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT HE SHOULD COME TO THE U.S. WHAT THE FUTURE WOULD HOLD WE WERE UNABLE TO SAY.

14. POINT FIVE WAS THE AMERICAN MEDIA AND ITS BAD TREATMENT OF IRAN. THE SECRETARY SAID THE BEST WAY OF HANDLING THE MEDIA WAS TO HAVE NEWSMEN COME TO IRAN, SPEAK FRANKLY TO THEM AND LET THEM SEE THE GOOD AND THE BAD THE REVOLUTION HAD PRODUCED. IF THEY WERE KEPT OUT OF IRAN THEY WOULD NEVERTHELESS CONTINUE TO WRITE AND THEIR OUTLOOK WOULD CERTAINLY BE NEGATIVE. YAZDI ASKED IF WE ATTEMPTED TO BRIEF THE PRESS. THE SECRETARY REVIEWED THE OUTLINE OF STATEMENTS WE HAD MADE ABOUT IRAN AND SAID IT WAS NOT OUR PRACTICE TO DESCRIBE IRANIAN CONDITIONS FOR THE U.S. PRESS. NEWSOM ADDED THAT ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT QUESTIONS WAS ISLAMIC JUSTICE. THIS WAS A SENSITIVE ISSUE AND AS LONG AS IT EXISTED, THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE REVOLUTION WOULD BE OBSCURED. THIS LED YAZDI TO A DEFENSE OF TRIALS AND EXECUTIONS THAT HAD TAKEN SOME LIVES. THERE WILL BE SOME MORE, HE SAID. HE DESCRIBED THE REVOLUTION AS THE CLEANEST IN WORLD HISTORY AND WAS BARELY

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15. THE SECRETARY ASKED YAZDI WHAT IRANIAN POLICY WAS TOWARDS THE U.S. YAZDI REPLIED TO HAVE FRIENDLY RELATIONS BASED ON MUTUAL RESPECT AND EQUALITY. WE CANNOT TOLERATE A "BIG BROTHER ATTITUDE", HE SAID. "WE CANNOT TOLERATE THE ATTITUDES FROM THE PAST, YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE REVOLUTION MUST BE TRANSLATED IN SOME TANGIBLE ACTIONS. WE HAVE FOUGHT FOR OUR POSITION AND WE ARE NOT GOING TO CHANGE OUR ATTITUDE". HE MADE REFERENCES TO DOCUMENTS SHOWING U.S. ASSOCIATION WITH SAVAK AND OTHER GROUPS UNDER THE SHAH. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT AS FAR AS FRIENDLY RELATIONS BASED ON MUTUAL RESPECT AND EQUALITY WERE CONCERNED, WE WERE IN FULL AGREEMENT.

16. THE NEXT ITEM ON YAZDI'S LIST WAS THE DEMAND BY U.S. IMPORTERS FOR 100 C/C PAYMENT OF LETTERS OF CREDIT. HE DID NOT SEEMED WELL BRIEFED ON THIS ISSUE AND DID NOT PRESS IT, BUT NOTED THAT IRAN WOULD RESPONS IN KIND IF THE U.S. ADOPTED A NEGATIVE POLICY.

17. THE CONVERSATION THEN RETRACED MUCH OF THE GROUND ON QUESTIONS OF MILITARY SUPPLY WITH THE SECRETARY REAFFIRMING THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO ISOLATE THESE MATTERS AND SORT OUT DIFFICULT CASES TO OUR MUTUAL SATISFACTION.

18. YAZDI ASKED THAT SECRETARY ABOUT U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE PERSIAN GULF. THE SECRETARY SAID WE WANTED TO COOPERATE WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION, TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH THEM, MAINTAIN TRADE AND TO ASSIST THEM WHEN AND AS THEY DESIRED. WE RECOGNIZE THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND THEIR RIGHT TO CHART A POLITICAL COURSE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR OWN PRINCIPLES. YAZDI ASKED IF THE U.S. WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RECENT INITIATIVE BY OMAN TO STIMULATE REGIONAL SECURITY MEASURES. THE SECRETARY WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH THE INITIATIVE AND SAID THAT WE HAD CERTAINLY NOT PROMPTED THE OMANIS. ONCE WE LEARN MORE OF THEIR PLANS, IF WE LIKED THEM, WE MIGHT,

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MAKE FAVORABLE COMMENT.

19. YAZDI ASKED ABOUT THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE. THE SECRETARY SAID THIS FORCE WAS A CONCEPT DATING FROM THE 1960'S IN WHICH A MILITARY CONTINGENT WOULD NOT BE COMMITTED TO SPECIFIC ROLES SUCH AS NATO, BUT WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO DEFEND U.S. INTERESTS WORLDWIDE WHERE NECESSARY. THE FORCE WAS NOT DIRECTED AT THE PERSIAN GULF. YAZDI ASKED IF THE FORCE WAS DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. THE SECRETARY SAID THERE WAS NO CONNECTION WHATSOEVER.

20. YAZDI ASKED FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE KURDS. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WAS NONE OF OUR BUSINESS. WE WERE NOT INVOLVED; WE WERE PLAYING NO PART IN THE DISPUTE. YAZDI ASKED ABOUT ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT. THE SECRETARY SAID WE DID NOT KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT. THE PROBLEM WAS FOR THE PEOPLE OF IRAN TO DEAL WITH, NOT FOR OUTSIDERS. YAZDI ASKED IF ISRAEL WERE INVOLVED, WHAT WOULD BE THE U.S. ATTITUDE. THE SECRETARY SAID WE HAD NO INFORMATION THAT SUCH WAS THE CASE. WHEN WE DISAPPROVED OF ISRAELI ACTIONS, HOWEVER, AS IN LEBANON, WE MADE OUR VIEWS KNOWN.

21. YAZDI SAID THAT THE IRANIANS HAD INFORMATION THAT IRAQIS HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN KURDISTAN AND KHUZISTAN. SOME IRAQIS HAVE BEEN EXECUTED, OTHERS WERE IN PRISON. HOW WERE U.S. RELATIONS WITH IRAQ? THE SECRETARY SAID OUR RELATIONS WERE NOT VERY GOOD WITH IRAQ. WE HAD TOLD THEM THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS, BUT THE IRAQIS HAD NOT RESPONDED.

22. NEWSOM SAID THAT U.S. HAD ABSOLUTELY NO INTENTION OF BECOMING INVOLVED IN IRAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IF IRAN HAS ANY SUCH EVIDENCE, THEY SHOULD BRING TO OUR ATTENTION FACTS AND ALLEGATIONS WITHOUT HESITATION SO THAT WE COULD CLEAN THEM UP. YAZDI ASKED WAS IT POSSIBLE AMERICANS WERE INVOLVED WITHOUT THE SECRETARY'S KNOWLEDGE. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES. HE WOULD KNOW ABOUT ANY PROPOSALS FOR SUCH INVOLVEMENT AND THERE WERE NONE. SUCH ACTIONS BY PRIVATE CITIZENS WOULD BE CONTRARY TO U.S. LAW.

23. YAZDI SAID IRANIANS WERE SUSPICIOUS OF MR. KISSINGER AND HIS TRIPS TO SEE THE SHAH IN MEXICO AND THE PROBABLE LINK TO INTERNAL PROBLEMS IN IRAN. WERE WE NOT IN TOUCH WITH KISSINGER ABOUT HIS TRIPS TO MEXICO? THE SECRETARY SAID, OF COURSE, HE SPOKE TO KISSINGER ABOUT THE SHAH, BUT THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF PLOTTING AGAINST IRAN.

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E.O. 12065: GDS 10/4/85 (GRAVES, JOHN E.) OR-M
TAGS: SCUL, IR
SUBJECT: PAO'S MEETING WITH DR. BEHZADNIA, HEAD OF FOREIGN PRESS DEPARTMENT AT THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE

1. DR. BEHZADNIA APPEARED HARRIED, TIRED, AND DISTRACTED BY SEVERAL INTERRUPTIONS AT THE OUTSET OF OUR MEETING IN HIS OFFICE. ONCE OUR DISCUSSION GOT FULLY UNDERWAY, HOWEVER, HE BECAME INCREASINGLY CORDIAL AND FORTHCOMING, ALLUDING TO HIS YEARS IN THE U.S. WHERE HE PRACTICED MEDICINE AND TO THE WARM RELATIONS HE HAD WITH PATIENTS, COLLEAGUES AND NEIGHBORS.

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1975—204-630

2. I BEGAN BY NOTING FRYLY THAT I HAD NOT COME TO LODGE A PROTEST OR INTERVENE IN THE AFFAIRS OF IRAN. HIS REACTION CLEARLY INDICATED HE UNDERSTOOD MY ALLUSION TO THE DISCUSSION OUR CHARGE HAD WITH INTERIOR MINISTER SABAGHIAN AND THE SUBSEQUENT PREPOSTEROUS ACCUSATIONS AGAINST THE CHARGE WHICH APPEARED IN THE IRANIAN PRESS.

3. I EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE EXPULSION OF AMERICAN JOURNALISTS, NOTING THAT NO AMERICANS WERE AT PRESENT ACCREDITED AS RESIDENT CORRESPONDENTS. I ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF HIS OFFICE'S POLICY, NOTING THAT THERE HAD BEEN REFERENCES RECENTLY IN THE PRESS TO "BANNED FOREIGN NEWS SERVICES." HE INSISTED THAT NO ORGANIZATIONS WERE BANNED AS SUCH, ONLY INDIVIDUALS GUILTY OF FALSE REPORTING. I THEN ASKED HIM IF HE THOUGHT EXPELLING CORRESPONDENTS WOULD RESULT IN IMPROVED REPORTING ON IRAN. HE SAID NO, BUT ADDED HE HAD NO CHOICE. I THEN REMINDED HIM OF OUR STATE DEPARTMENT AND WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING SESSIONS FOR REPORTERS AND ALSO DESCRIBED THE SERVICES RENDERED TO FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS BY USICA PRESS CENTERS. DR. BEHZADNIA AGREED THAT SUCH BRIEFINGS AND SERVICES WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE IN IMPROVING IRAN'S IMAGE ABROAD THAN EXPELLING JOURNALISTS BUT THEN SADLY ADDED, "PEOPLE WE WORK WITH DO NOT UNDERSTAND THIS WAY."

4. DR. BEHZANDIA THEN LAUNCHED INTO A LONG TIRADE AGAINST FALSE AND HOSTILE REPORTING, CITING FAIRLY COGENT EXAMPLES AND EXPRESSING THE CONVICTION THAT , BECAUSE THE AMERICANS AND GERMANS HAD SUFFERED BUSINESS LOSSES AND BECAUSE THEY HAD CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE SHAH, THE GERMAN AND AMERICAN PRESS IS ILL-DISPOSED TOWARD THE REVOLUTION.

5. I TOOK THE OCCASION TO EXPRESS THE VIEW THAT THE IRANIAN PRESS PRESENTED A FALSE IMAGE OF THE U.S. AND ITS POLICIES AND THAT HE AND I HAD A SIMILAR PROBLEM ON OUR HANDS, CITING AS EXAMPLE THE DISTORTIONS OF OUR CHARGE'S

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TALK WITH MINISTER SABAGHIAN. HE AGREED AND MADE THE DISTINCTION AT LENGTH BETWEEN THE VIEWS OF INDIVIDUALS AND GOVERNMENTS, SAYING HOW MUCH HE LOVED AMERICA AND AMERICANS. HE WAS, HOWEVER, OUTRAGED BY THE FACT THAT THE U.S. GAVE REFUGE AND PROTECTION TO THE SHAH'S FAMILY AND COLLABORATORS. I NOTED THAT HE HAD BENEFITED FROM THIS SAME AMERICAN HOSPITALITY AND REMINDED HIM THAT HE HAD EARLIER IN OUR DISCUSSION DESCRIBED HOW DURING HIS YEARS IN THE U.S. HE HAD WORKED PUBLICLY TO CALL ATTENTION TO THE MISDEEDS OF THE SHAH.

6. OUR HOUR-LONG DISCUSSION ENDED ON A NOTE OF CORDIALITY WITH DR. BEHZADNIA INVITING ME TO COME AND TALK WITH HIM AGAIN SOON ABOUT OUR MUTUAL CONCERN WITH BAD REPORTING.

7. COMMENT: I CAME AWAY FROM THE DISCUSSION WITH DR. BEHZADNIA WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT HE IS WELL-DISPOSED TO AMERICANS, KNOWS A GREAT DEAL ABOUT THE U.S. AND IS FRUSTRATED BY THE CONTEXT WITHIN WHICH HE MUST NOW WORK TO CONSOLIDATE THE REVOLUTION WHICH HE ENTHUSIASTICALLY PROMOTED DURING THE LAST YEARS OF THE SHAH'S REGIME. I ALSO GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT HE IS SINCERELY PUZZLED AND FRUSTRATED BY AMERICAN REPORTERS' PENCHANT TO REPORT THE SENSATIONAL AND THEIR BASIC LACK OF SYMPATHY FOR ISLAM AND IRAN'S REVOLUTION. GRAVES
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E.O. 12065: GDS - 10/06/85 (H. PRECHT)

TAGS:MASS, IR, US

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH FONMIN YAZDI ON DEFENSE ISSUES

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ON OCTOBER 4 YAZDI, ACOMPANIED BY MILITARY AND MFA OFFICERS, HELD A THREE-HOUR MEETING ON DEFENSE ISSUES WITH UNDERSECRETARY BENSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY MCGIFFERT, AND GENERAL GRAVES. MEETING WAS CHARACTERIZED BY FRANK, SOMETIMES BLUNTLY-STATED IRANIAN QUESTIONS OR OBJECTIONS. WHILE THE AIR WAS THICK WITH SUSPICION, THERE WAS LITTLE ACRIMONY. US SIDE WAS EXTRAORDINARILY PATIENT AND UNDERSTANDING, REPEATEDLY INDICATING WILLINGNESS TO REVIEW ISSUES ON THEIR MERITS AND TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WHERE FEASIBLE. A DETAILED MEMCON WILL BE POUCHED. SUMMARY FOLLOWS.

3. UNDERSECRETARY BENSON OPENED BY INDICATING OUR WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH AND ASSIST IRAN ON DEFENSE MATTERS WHERE THAT WAS DESIRED BY BOTH SIDES AND FEASIBLE. SHE REAFFIRMED US INTEREST IN IRAN'S INDEPENDENCE, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND SECURITY. SHE POINTED OUT THAT US, AS WELL AS IRAN, HAS DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS WHICH AFFECT OUR RELATIONS.

4. SECRETARY MCGIFFERT REVIEWED US POLICY TOWARDS THE PERSIAN GULF REGION IN GENERAL AND INDICATED OUR WILLINGNESS TO ESTABLISH A NEW DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN AS POLITICAL CONDITIONS PERMIT. IT WAS CLEAR THAT NEITHER SIDE WISHED TO RETURN TO THE PREVIOUS RELATIONSHIP AND THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW FORMS OF COOPERATION WOULD

HAVE TO BE RELATED TO IMPROVEMENT IN OUR POLITICAL TIES. OVER THE NEXT YEAR, MCGIFFERT SAID, IT SEEMED WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON CLEANING UP THE TRUST FUND AND WORKING OUT RESUMED FLOW OF SPARE PARTS.

5. GENERAL GRAVES PRESENTED AN OVERVIEW OF TRUST FUND MANAGEMENT EXPLAINING THE BACKGROUNDFOR THE FEBRUARY 3 MOU AND THE EFFORTS DOD HAD MADE TO PROTECT US AND IRANIAN INTERESTS. YAZDI, ASSISTED ACTIVELY BY BARAMI AND SAFARI, RAISED QUESTIONS PREVIOUSLY FLAGGED BY THE EMBASSY:

- -- FINAL BILLINGS FOR CLOSED OUT FMS CASES: GRAVES SAID WE WOULD PROVIDE A LIST AND OVERALL AMOUNTS OF SUCH CASES. MORE EXTENSIVE DETAIL COULD BE OBTAINED IF THE IRANIANS SENT PERSONNEL TO THE US TO HELP DIG IT OUT.

- -- RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED SPARES: WE TOLD YAZDI WE WOULD BE WILLING TO REVIEW EACH CLASSIFIED RELEASE ON ITS MERITS. SOME REQUESTS SUCH AS TECHNICAL DATA NEEDED FOR AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS MIGHT BE PROVIDED WITHOUT SENSITIVITY. RELEASE OF MORE SENSITIVE ITEMS WOULD RAISE QUESTION OF IRAN'S REAFFIRMATION OF JUNE 197; BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. IN THAT AGREEMENT,

BOTH SIDES AGREED TO PERMIT SECURITY TEAMS TO INSPECT STOARGE FACILITIES FOR CLASSIFIED DATA. YAZDI PROFESSED IGNORANCE OF AGREEMENT AND SAID THERE WOULD BE STRONG RESERVATIONS IN IRAN AGAINST ALLOWING AMERICAN INSPECTORS TO VISIT IRANIAN BASES. "WE MIGHT PREFER TO LOSE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN EQUIPMENT." HE ASKED FOR A COPY OF THE AGREEMENT, WHICH WE PROVIDED. WE SUGGESTED THAT HE STUDY THIS ISSUE AND HOLD FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH US BEFORE REACHING A DEFINITIVE POSITION. WE SAID IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO SEND A SECURITY TEAM TO TEHRAN TO DISCUSS OUR CONCERNS WITH THE IRANIANS.

Tank results available - Dr. Cordesman will [illegible]

- -- BELL 214 HELICOPTER ENGINES: GENERAL GRAVES SAID WE WOULD MEET WITH THE IRANIANS TO REVIEW POSSIBLE RESUMPTION OF WORK ON IMPROVING THE ENGINE.

- -- F-15 SPARE PARTS: GENERAL GRAVES SAID WE WERE CONTINUING TO SEEK CUSTOMERS FOR DIVERSION OF REMAINING QUANTITIES; BUT IN THE CASE OF SOME PARTS,

THE QUANTITIES ORDERED ORIGINALLY EXCEEDED THE PROVISIONING DECIDED UPON BY THE OTHER F-16 USERS. IN THESE CASES, DIVERSION WAS MORE DIFFICULT. GRAVES EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT FURTHER.

- -- IRANIAN SPARE PARTS IN THE PIPELINE: SAFARI ASKED FOR A LIST OF ITEMS WHICH WERE SCHEDULED FOR DELIVERY. GRAVES AGREED TO ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE THIS INFORMATION.

- -- RF4ES: GRAVES EXPLAINED BACKGROUND OF CANCELLATION OF AIRCRAFT ORDER AND HIGH EXPENSE INVOLVED IN REESTABLISHING PRODUCTION LINE. WE WOULD

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PROVIDE IRANIANS WITH FULL INFORMATION.

- -- HARPOON MISSLES: RELEASE WAS LINKED TO AGREEMENT ON SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN IRAN.

- -- PRICING OF DIVERTED IRANIAN EQUIPMENT, ESPECIALLY SPRUANCE SHIPS: WE EXPLAINED THAT IN ORDER TO OBTAIN BUYERS, IT WAS NECESSARY TO PRICE EQUIPMENT AT PGOI'S COST (I. E., EXCLUDING INFLATION AND PECULIAR IRANIAN COSTS) IN ORDER TO DIVERT ITEMS AND RECEIVE PAYMENT EXPEDITIOUSLY TO AVOID TRUST FUND BANKRUPTCY. THIS WAS ESPECIALLY TRUE IN THE CASE OF

PERSUADING US CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS FOR SPRUANCE SHIPS WHICH WERE IN ADDITION TO ESTABLISHED NAVY SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM. YAZDI MAINTAINED THAT IRAN SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSULTED ON PRICE ESTABLISHED FOR DESTROYERS. HE SAID THIS REMAINED A MATTER FOR DISCUSSION.

- -- THIRD COUNTRY SUPPORT FOR IRANIAN MILITARY: YAZDI SAID IT WAS PGOI POLICY TO DIVERSIFY SUPPORT FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT BY USING US-LICENSED EUROPEAN SUPPLIERS. MCGIFFERT SAID WE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO SUCH ARRANGEMENT. OUR RULE WAS IF WE OURSELVES WOULD SUPPLY THE ITEM WE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO IRAN'S OBTAINING IT THROUGH A EUROPEAN SOURCE. IF WE WOULD NOT SUPPLY, THERE WOULD BE NO APPROVAL OF A LICENSE TO A THIRD COUNTRY. WE ALSO RESTATED PRACTICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN DIVERSIFIED SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS.

6. IN RESPONSE TO MR. MCGIFFERT'S QUESTION REGARD-

ING WHAT KIND OF FUTURE RELATIONSHIP HE SAW, YAZDI SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE CURRENT FMS ACCOUNT CLEANED UP, THE SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED EQUIPMENT ISSUE RESOLVED AND THEN GO BACK TO PAYING CASH ON AN INDIVIDUAL ITEM-BY-ITEM BASIS.

7. GENERALLY THE MEETING SEEMED TO HAVE HAD A POSITIVE EFFECT. ALTHOUGH WE WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE DIFFERENCES WITH THE IRANIANS ON MANY POINTS, ONLY THE SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED DATA SEEMS LIKELY TO BECOME A SERIOUS POLITICAL ISSUE IN THE NEAR TERM. IF THE EMBASSY IS APPROACHED ON THIS ISSUE, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE WOULD BE GLAD TO DISCUSS OUR SECURITY CONCERNS IN DETAIL WITH THE PGOI WHEN THAT CAN BE CONVENIENTLY ARRANGED. VANCE
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E.O. 12065: GDS 10/9/85 (PRECHT, HENRY)

, AGS: PINT, IR

SUBJECT: YAZDI ON INTERNAL POLITICS

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. THERE WAS VIRTUALLY NO OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO YAZDI 'OFF THE RECORD" CURING HIS STAY IN NEW YORK. TWO ITEMS OF INTEREST:

-- AS NOTETAKERS SCRIBBLED, HE TOLD US THAT THE NEW CONSTITUTION'S FIFTH ARTICLE ESTABLISHING A RELIGIOUS FIGURE AS SUPREME LEADER WOULD HAVE "NO EFFECT" ON THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. THERE WOULD STILL BE A POPULARLY ELECTED PRESIDENT AND MAJLIS WHICH, HE IMPLIED WOULD EXERCISE REAL POLITICAL POWER. AN AMERICAN CONFIDENT OF MANY RADICAL IRANIANS UNDERSTANDS THAT YAZDI ASPIRES TO THE PRESIDENCY.

--BILL BUTLER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS EXPRESSED PRIVATELY TO YAZDI HIS CONCERN FOR THE WELL-BEING OF MATIN-DAFTARY. YAZDI ASSURED BUTLER THAT MATIN-DAFTARY WOULD NOT BE HARMED. BUTLER HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE PGOI WAS NOT SERIOUSLY TRYING TO APPREHEND MATIN-DAFTARY. YAZDI INVITED BUTLER TO VISIT IRAN. WE ENCOURAGED BUTLER TO ACCEPT. HE SAID THE ICJ WOULD NEED AN "EVENT" OF SOME KIND, E.G. THE REPLACEMENT OF REVOLUTIONARY COURTS BY CIVILIAN TRIBUNALS, TO JUSTIFY A VISIT. IN THAT CONTEXT THE ICJ WOULD SEE A VISIT AS LENDING SUPPORT TO GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO STABILIZE THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. VANCE
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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

Used 10.24.79

TO : L/NEA - Mr. Small

DATE: Oct 10, 1979

FROM : NEA/IRN - Henry Precht

SUBJECT: Iranians Wanted for Criminal Offenses in Iran

During his meeting with the Secretary, Foreign Minister Yazdi raised the concern of his government that Iranians were finding refuge in the U.S. from criminal prosecution at home. He cited two examples:

-- The case, raised with us in a diplomatic note from the Iranian Embassy, of two men who allegedly stole funds from a social insurance organization and fled to Los Angeles. The Iranian government alerted INPERPOL. Arriving in the U.S. they may have made false oral declarations of the funds in their possession and one of the two signed a Customs form that mis-stated the amount of money in his possession. We have been in touch with the Federal District Attorney's office in Los Angeles and I believe prosecution of at least one of the two men is being considered. I believe they are free on $25,000 bond. The funds that the two men had (total $218,000) are in the custody of Customs pending resolution of the ownership question.

-- The second case concerns an officer of the Iranian Ground Forces -- a certain Razmi -- who Yazdi said was charged by the previous government with responsibility for the Abadan theater fire in August 1978. The Iranian government wants him returned to Iran for trial.

Dr. Yazdi asked the Secretary what was U.S. policy on such cases. We explained the limitations imposed on us by the absence of an extradition treaty, but the Secretary said we would consult with the Department of Justice to determine

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GDS, 10/10/85

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whether we could be helpful in some way.

I believe it would be appropriate to meet with the Department of Justice lawyers to discuss what response we might give to the Iranians.

cc: P - Mr. Suddarth
NEA - Mr. Constable
Amembassy Tehran

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MEMO TO: L/NEA - Mr. Dave Small

Subject: Iranians in the U.S.

I have the impression from conversations with officers of the Department of Justice and SEC that our law enforcement agencies are not generally aware of the presence in the U.S. of many former Iranian officials and businessmen who were involved with, or informed about, questionable practices by American firms in Iran. Some of these persons are resident here while others are only temporary visitors. For example, most of the royal family, including Princess Ashraf's husband, Mehdi Busheri and son Shahram Pahlavi, are probably in this country. The Ashraf branch was generally thought to be involved in a large number of questionable business deals. In addition, General Hassan Toufanian, who was the Shah's arms procurement chief, has recently arrived in this country. General Toufanian, I believe, has extensive knowledge of the Grumman and Textron cases.

I believe it would be appropriate to inform the concerned agencies of the foregoing and offer to assist to the extent we can in locating Iranians who might have information useful for investigations. This information should be conveyed in a discreet manner as we would not want the whereabouts of ex-officials to become known publicly.

Henry Precht
NEA/IRN

cc: NEA - Mr. Constable
P - Mr. Suddarth

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E.O. 12065:N/A
SUBJECT: JUMHURI ISLAMI HEIGHTENS ANTI-U.S. REPORTING

REF: TEHRAN 10808

1. THE OCTOBER 10 JUMHURI ISLAMI REPORTED ON A SMALL DEMONSTRATION IN FRONT OF THE U.S. EMBASSY YESTERDAY BY THE ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION OF TEHRAN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS AND THE MUSLIM STUDENTS OF SHARIF UNIVERSITY (FORMER ARYAMEHR), IN PROTEST AGAINST U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN KURDESTAN. THE ARTICLE INCLUDED A PROVOCATIVE PHOTO OF THE BODY OF ONE OF THE 52 REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS BURNED DURING THE AMBUSH AT SARDASHT WITH THE CAPTION "HUMAN RIGHTS, AMERICAN STYLE! LOOK AT THIS PICTURE OF A YOUNG REVOLUTIONARY GUARD WHO WAS BURNED TO DEATH BY PAID U.S. AGENTS. THIS IS THE TRUE IMAGE OF U.S. WORLD POLICY: KILLING, BURNING, AND DESTROYING FOR ONLY ONE AIM - PLUNDER." THE ARTICLE DESCRIBED THE THE DEMONSTRATORS AS ANGRILY LIFTING THEIR FISTS IN THE AIR, SCREAMING "DOWN WITH AMERICA." THEY CARRIED A RESOLUTION ACCUSING "IMPERIALISTS", "EXTREME LEFTISTS", INTERNATIONAL ZIONISTS IN THE GUISE OF THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP), ASHRAF PAHLAVI AND PALIZBAN OF BEING ACTIVE PARTICIPANTS IN ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES. THE JUMHURI ISLAMI REPORTER ENDED HIS PIECE WITH THE ASSERTION THAT THE SARDASHT MASSACRE WAS THE ACT OF THE KDP, "THE PAID AGENTS OF THE U.S.".

2. COMMENT: GIVEN THE INFLUENCE OF JUMHURI ISLAMI AS THE AUTHORITATIVE SPOKESMAN FOR THE CLERICAL LEADERSHIP, PUBLIC OPINION WILL OBVIOUSLY BE MOLDED BY WHAT THE NEWSPAPER HAS BEEN PUBLISHING FOR THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS. THE ANTI-U.S. REPORTING AND ANALYSES IN THIS SPECIFIC PRESS HAS HEIGHTENED WITH OUTRIGHT ACCUSATIONS OF U.S. AGENTS INVOLVED IN INCIDENTS IN KURDESTAN AND KHUZESTAN AS WELL AS U.S. PLOTS TO UNDERMINE IRANIAN-ARAB RELATIONS. AS A RESULT OF THIS CONTINUING TREND I INTEND TO MEET WITH THE EDITOR OF JUMHURI ISLAMI, MIR HUSSEIN MOOSAVI, ASAP. ROSEN
BT
#0826

NNNN

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976 - 201-526

Scott

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RR RUQMER
DE RUEKJCS #3643 2840021
ZNY SSSSS/BBBBB
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FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//ASD:ISA//
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BT
S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR 1750
MAJOR GENERAL GAST
DSAA (LTG GRAVES) SENDS

MAAG
Charge
Gast

SUBJ: YAZDI MEETING

REF: A. STATE 262958 (262305Z OCT 79)
B. YOUR 1007327 OCT 79

1. THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL COMMENTS CONCERNING YAZDI MEETING ARE FORWARDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION. NONE OF THE ISSUES DISCUSSED BELOW SHOULD BE RAISED BY YOU DURING YOUR MEETING WITH DR. CHAMRAN, BUT THE INFORMATION MAY BE HELPFUL IF HE TOUCHES ON THESE ISSUES.

2. REF A DESCRIBES EXPLANATION PROVIDED ON PRICING OF DIVERTED ITEMS. YAZDI DWELLED AT SOME LENGTH ON THIS SUBJECT. WE ARE SOMEWHAT CONCERNED THAT GOI MAY PURSUE THIS MATTER TO THE POINT OF INSISTING ON A RETROACTIVE INCREASE TO THE PRICES THAT WE HAVE

PAGE 2 RUEKJCS 3643 S E C R E T SPECAT
SET FOR DIVERTED ITEMS. IF SO, THEY WOULD BE RUNNING INTO A "DEAD END" SINCE WE COULD NOT ACCOMMODATE ANY REQUEST FOR REPRICING. HOWEVER, IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THEY WILL JUST COMPLAIN FOR A PERIOD OF TIME AND THEN DROP THE SUBJECT. WE ARE PROVIDING A LETTER TO DR. YAZDI TO EXPLAIN IN DETAIL WHY WE PRICED THE CG-9938 IN THE MANNER WE DID.

3. WE CAN NOT CHARACTERIZE SAFARI AND BAHRAMI PARTICIPATION AS EITHER HELPFUL OR UNHELPFUL; CERTAINLY THEY WERE NOT ANTAGONISTIC. WE ARE PUZZLED AS TO WHY BOTH REQUESTED DATA THAT THEY ALREADY HAD RECEIVED; I.E., SAFARI'S REQUEST FOR THE LIST OF PIPELINE MATERIALS AND BAHRAMI'S REQUEST FOR THE LIST OF CLOSED CASES. WE MUST ADMIT THAT THE REPEATED REQUESTS FOR DATA ALREADY FURNISHED ARE BEARING A BIT THIN. WE REITERATED TO BAHRAMI THE INVITATION TO SEND PGOI OFFICIALS TO SAAC TO REVIEW CASE FILES.

4. FYI. WHILE THE OVERALL MEETING WENT AS WELL AS COULD BE EXPECTED, I DID MISSPEAK ON ONE OCCASION IN DESCRIBING THE F-16 SPARE

PARTS SITUATION. THIS MAY HAVE LEFT YAZDI WITH AN EXAGGERATED IMPRESSION OF THE PROBLEM. IN RESPONSE TO AN INQUIRY AS TO WHY THE SPARES COULD NOT ALL BE ABSORBED, I JOKINGLY INDICATED THAT IN SOME INSTANCES WE HAD A 50-YEAR SUPPLY. THIS, OF COURSE, WAS

PAGE 3 RUEKJCS 3643 S E C R E T SPECAT
AN OVERSTATEMENT WHICH UNFORTUNATELY COULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO SAFARI'S POSITION. THE FACT IS THAT SINCE THE TERMINATION OF THE PEACE ZEBRA PROGRAM IN FEBRUARY 79, THE ESTIMATED TERMINATION LIABILITY OF F-16 SPARES HAS BEEN REDUCED FROM $266.6M TO $46.3M. THE REDUCTION WAS DUE TO DIVERSIONS AND ABSORPTIONS OF SPARES. THE REMAINING SPARES CANNOT BE ABSORBED (OR SO IT APPEARS AT THIS TIME) SINCE PROVISIONING FACTORS PROVIDED BY THE GOI WERE SUBSTANTIALLY HIGHER THAN USAF PLANNING FACTORS. THIS WAS CONSISTENT WITH POLICY USED BY IIAF IN PROVISIONING FOR F-4, F-5, F-14 AND C-130 AIRCRAFT ACQUIRED PREVIOUSLY, AND IS DUE TO LENGTH OF TIME INVOLVED IN THE REPAIR PIPELINE AND THEIR THEN DESIRED UTILIZATION RATE OF 25 HOURS PER MONTH PER AIRCRAFT. THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THE IIAF PROVISIONING DECISION WAS WRONG AT THE TIME, BUT GIVEN PGOI PROPENSITY TO EXAMINE PAST DECISIONS IN VIEW OF CURRENT CONDITIONS RATHER THAN CONDITIONS OBTAINING AT THE TIME THE DECISION WAS MADE, IT MAY BECOME AN ISSUE. I AM IN THE PROCESS OF WRITING TO YAZDI TO CLARIFY THE REMARK. END FYI.
DECL 10 OCT 85
BT
#3643

FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4295
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 10880

DRAFTED: POL:PASWIFT:GO
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL2 CHG ICA
ECON CONS CHRON
RF

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/11/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, IR
SUBJECT: YAZDI PRESS CONFERENCE, OCTOBER 10

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. TEHRAN PRESS OCTOBER 10 BECAME COMPLETELY CONFUSED OVER FONMIN YAZDI'S ANSWER TO QUESTION ON WHETHER FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD REVOKED ALL AGREEMENTS WITH U.S. OR NOT.

3. ACCORDING TO RELIABLE PRESS CORRESPONDENT WHO WAS AT THE CONFERENCE, YAZDI TOLD PRESS THAT FOREIGN MINISTRY DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO REVOKE AGREEMENTS., FOREIGN MINISTRY SOME TIME AGO HAD RECOMMENDED TO THE GOVERNMENT THAT BOTH THE 1921 AGREEMENT WITH THE RUSSIANS AND THE 1959 AGREEMENT WITH THE US BE REVOKED. HE HAD HEARD NO REPLY ON HIS RECOMMENDATION.

4. WHEN QUERIED MORNING OCTOBER 11, ON CONFUSED PRESS ACCOUNTS, MFA 4TH POLITICAL DIVISION ACTING CHIEF PARSA KIA WAS PLAINLY NON-PLUSSED. HE CHECKED INTO QUESTION AND CALLED EMBASSY BACK WITH REPLY THAT YAZDI HAD NOT SAID THAT AGREEMENTS WITH THE U.S. WERE CANCELLED. THAT "WHAT HE HAD MEANT TO SAY" WAS THAT THESE AGREEMENTS ARE STILL UNDER STUDY AND THAT THOSE THAT WERE NOT IN HER NATIONAL INTERESTS WOULD BE CANCELLED.

5. JUMHUPI-YE-ISLAMI, EMBASSY'S OLD ENEMY, DID FULL REPORT ON YAZDI PRESS CONFERENCE PLAYING UP YAZDI'S ENNUMERATION OF PROBLEMS WITH U.S. (SEE SEPTEL USICA). JUMHURI-YE-ISLAMI, HOWEVER, ALSO CARRIED FOLLOWING VERY HELPFUL OPENING YAZDI STATEMENT:
QUOTE: DR. YAZDI IN CONNECTION WITH HIS MEETING WITH U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE STATED THIS WAS THE FIRST MEETING OF U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF IRANIAN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. WE MET IN UN AND THEY EXPRESSED THEIR WILL TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND USA AND THEY ACCEPTED THE REALITY OF IRANIAN REVOLUTION, BECAUSE IT WAS REVOLUTION IN THE TRUE SENSE OF MEANING WHERE ALL THE MASSES HAVE TAKEN PART. INTEREST WAS EXPRESSED FOR THE FRIENDSHIP OF IRAN. WE SAID WE ARE HAPPY WITH SUCH AN INTEREST, WE HOPE YOU MAY PROVE THE FRIENDSHIP BY ACTION NOT WORDS. BUT EXPRESSION OF INTEREST IS NOT ENOUGH, THERE ARE PROBLEMS ON THE WAY: ONE .... END QUOTE

6. COMMENT: WE ARE AFRAID THAT THIS HELPFUL DESCRIPTION WILL BE LOST UNDER THE WEIGHT OF THE REST OF YAZDI'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 10880

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 10880

COMMENTS. LAINGEN
BT
#0880

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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 10880

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1979 - 301-546

TO: Mr Laingen

SUBJECT: Purchase of Peace Zebra (F-16) Spares by USG

REF: Your note to ARMISH-MAAG, 10/14/79, Peace Zebra Spares (Attached)

1. The PGOI has been kept informed on the Peace Zebra spare problem. MAAG has offered to give IAF briefing on Air Force programs as provided in Washington on 22-24 Aug 79 by AFLC, AFSC and ATC.

2. Concerning the portion of question about purchase of spares "ourselves," the problem is two fold: (1) We do not have the requirement, and (2) We do not have financial ability (appropriated monies) to make the buy. The PGOI provisioned very poorly when laying out initial spares requirements. As a result, they overbought in a magnitude that neither we nor the combined purchases of F-16 can presently absorb. At the time these requirements were being directed by PGOI officials, USAF personnel were telling them it was "too much." In the past, when money was abundant, IIAF priorities high within their own government, it was not uncommon for the then officials to disregard our comments. As a result there are no other potential purchasers with dollars available.

3. In sum, we don't see any way to be more forthcoming with PGOI on this case. As has been explained to PGOI there is a possibility their losses may be reduced, over time if purchases can be made. We don't believe congress would approve a buy with a view to use of these parts over long range (5 to 10 years), ~~but~~ to get PGOI off the hook. Even if we did, PGOI would complain about "Bargain Price."

SCOTT

DE RUQMHR #1004 289 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161431Z OCT 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4281
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 11004

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STAT 10/16/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN
DRFTD: POL:EASWIFT:GO
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL2 CHG ICA
ECON CONS CHRON
RF 9/WEB

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/16/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P
TAGS: SHUM, IR, PINT
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES

REF: TEHRAN 10847

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DURING OCTOBER 10 DISCUSSION OF IRANIAN PRESS ATTACKS ON US OVER KURDESTAN, ACTING CHIEF OF MFA FOURTH POLITICAL DIVISION, PARSA KIA, ONCE AGAIN BROUGHT UP SUBJECT OF CHARGE'S TALK WITH INTERIOR MINISTER SABAGHIAN ON HUMAN RIGHTS. PARSA KIA IS INTELLIGENT, FRIENDLY TO US AND HIMSELF VERY WORRIED OVER THE "EXCESSES" OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT. HE SEEMED MAINLY CONCERNED WE HAD RAISED THE QUESTION WITH SABAGHIAN RATHER THAN COMING THROUGH FONMIN YAZDI. THE FOREIGN OFFICE, HE SAID, COULD BE COUNTED ON TO KEEP SUCH DISCUSSIONS PRIVATE. IN ADDITION, FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI KNEW HOW TO TRANSLATE THE US'S REMARKS INTO LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD DO THE MOST GOOD IN QOM OR AT LEAST WOULD NOT RAISE SO MUCH TROUBLE. US VIEWS, HE ASSURED US, WOULD, HOWEVER, GET THROUGH.
US VIEWS, HE ASSURED US, WOULD, HOWEVER, GET THROUGH.

3. PARSA KIA POINTED OUT STANDARD SECULAR INTELLECTUAL LINE THAT "REVOLUTION NOT YET FINISHED." AS YOU KNOW, HE SAID, THERE ARE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND WHILE WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THESE THINGS CEASE WE CAN NOT YET CONTROL THE SITUATION.

4. COMMENT: WHILE EMBASSY SYMPATHIZES WITH ANGUISH OF PEOPLE LIKE PARSA KIA AND REGRETS THE STORM THAT SABAGHIAN'S COMMENTS CAUSED AT A VERY INOPPORTUNE MOMENT, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF US PROTEST ON EXECUTIONS HAS RAISED EMBASSY'S CREDIT IN EYES OF MANY MODERATE IRANIANS. USG DISAPPROVAL PLAINLY TOUCHED VERY SENSITIVE NERVE ENDING IN IRAN, INDICATIVE PERHAPS OF THE GROWING UNEASE EVEN AMONG SUPPORTERS OF THE REVOLUTION AT THE OCCASIONAL EXCESSES OF THEIR NEW GOVERNMENT. WE NOTE, BY THE WAY, THAT SABAGHIAN WAS A FORMER MEMBER OF THE IRAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE. LAINGEN
BT
#1004

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 11004

1

DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Oct 18 1979
In reply refer to:
I-10028/79

His Excellency
Ibrahim Yazdi
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Islamic Republic of Iran
Tehran, Iran

Dear Mr. Minister:

During our meeting on October 4, 1979 considerable discussion ensued concerning the acquisition by the United States Navy of the four CG-993 ships originally ordered by Iran. This letter provides additional details supporting our sincere conviction that the manner in which this transaction was managed, including its pricing, served the mutual best interest of our governments. I hope that you will agree that the form which the transaction took was influenced significantly by the practical and political necessities which both of our governments faced at the time.

The Executive Branch of the United States Government made the decision in late February 1979 to request the approval of our Congress to procure the two CG-993's which Iran had cancelled under the Memorandum of Understanding of February 3. At that time Iran had not indicated its desires concerning either continuation or cancellation of the remaining two ships. There were insufficient funds in the trust fund to finance the contract to completion, even for just two ships. There had been payments from the Iranian trust fund of approximately $580 million for the $1.6 billion ship program. The projected contract termination cost for the program was $207 million on February 3. Therefore, Iran would have incurred a total loss of $787 million if the contract had been terminated. Acquisition of the ships by the United States Navy has established the potential substantially to reduce Iran's program costs to a level much below the level of full termination of the program. The final program costs which must remain chargeable to Iran will include cancellation of the original order for fifth and sixth ships; program development for the program generation center; unique studies, documentation, and administrative services for Iran; and crew training. These costs were incurred years before the Government of Iran cancelled the order for the four ships.

As I explained during our recent meeting, the United States would have had no choice but to terminate every contract placed on behalf of the Government of Iran, including the ship contract, if the balance of the Iran FMS trust fund had been reduced to zero. Frankly, there was no indication in February and March 1979 that Iran was in an immediate position to make substantial payments to the trust fund. This was borne

out when Iran found itself unable to pay a $267 million foreign military sales billing presented in May 1979. The receipt into the trust fund of Iran's equity in the ships, therefore, provided the only realistic method for keeping the trust fund solvent over the near term. The trust fund balance was only $56.4 million when the initial United States Navy payment of $490 million for the ships was deposited in late July.

We recognize that the price at which the United States Navy acquired the ships did not include inflation. However, the Executive Branch would not even have attempted to obtain the ships at their cost in 1979 dollars, because there would have been no hope of obtaining Congressional approval. Earlier in the year the United States Navy had submitted a supplemental budget request to obtain one CG-993 ship at an estimated price of $543 million. Congress took no action on the request, and it was clear that it intended to reject any purchase at the higher price. Thus, the price at which the Iranian ships could be acquired was a major factor in our decision to attempt to acquire them.

In requesting Congressional authorization and appropriations to purchase the four CG-993's the Executive Branch made clear that the primary reason for proceeding with the acquisition was to improve the United States Navy. Nevertheless, members of Congress and the news media repeatedly raised the question of whether Iran would profit from the resale and whether we were more interested in "bailing out" Iran or improving our own defense. We explained again and again that on resale of items orginally ordered by Iran our policy was to assure that Iran neither profited nor lost with respect to material which could be used by other customers. So that you can better appreciate the prevailing attitude toward resales and pricing, I am enclousing the published record of some of the testimony before the Congress. Pages 377 through 469, Part 4 of the Hearings on Military Posture, deal expressly with the procurement of the CG-993's. Pages 411 through 448, Part 2 of the Hearings, deal with the possible procurement of other items which had been ordered by Iran. The dialogue included in these Hearings indicated that the justification for the ship procurement was cost effectiveness. Considering the amount of Congressional criticism of the CG-993 ship purchases, I believe that setting the price of the actual cost to Iran of the material being acquired by the United States Navy was critical to the eventual favorable vote by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Our Congress has examined this issue thoroughly, and the overwhelming majority of the members believe that this policy is fair to both parties. They would be highly critical of any effort to change it.

I recognize that the United States Government has the obligation to explain the many actions taken during that turbulent period to insure the continued solvency of the Iran trust fund and thus to provide us the legal means to continue your foreign military sales program at a level of our mutual choice. Had the trust fund become insolvent, there would have been not only political but also legal impediments associated

with the resumption of a mutually beneficial military supply relationship. We have been able to prevent these legal impediments. We will continue to provide such information as we can to answer questions concerning the past, but we hope that the preponderance of our mutual energies will be expended toward developing a new military supply relationship responsive to the needs and desires of Iran.

Sincerely,

Ernest Graves

ERNEST GRAVES
LIEUTENANT GENERAL, USA
DIRECTOR
DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY

Enclosures
Hearings on Military Posture
(Part 2 and Part 4)

DE RUQMHR #1152 295 **
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 2211022 OCT 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4370
BT
S E C R E T TEHRAN 11152

CLASS: SECRET
CHRGE: STAT 10/22/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN
DRFTD: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN:
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: CHARGE

NODIS
CHEROKEE

FOR UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM

E.O. 12065: RDS-2 10/22/99 (LAINGEN, L.B.)
TAGS: PEPR, IR, US
SUBJECT: SHAH'S ILLNESS

REF: STATE 275032

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. DURING MEETING THAT PRECHT AND I HAD THIS MORNING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI, I GAVE HIM THE TEXT OF OUR CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE ON FORMER SHAH'S ILLNESS AND REVIEWED WITH HIM DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE IN REFTEL TO POINTS RAISED OCTOBER 21 IN OUR MEETING WITH BAZARGAN.

3. HE RAISED TWO POINTS. FIRST, HE ASKED WHETHER OUR CLEAR UNDERSTANDING (CONVEYED TO SHAH'S REPRESENTATIVES) THAT SHAH WOULD NOT ENGAGE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES WHILE IN THE U.S. ALSO EXTENDED TO FARAH. YAZDI SAID PGOI REGARDS HER AS CURRENTLY MORE POLITICALLY INVOLVED THAN SHAH, CITING ALLEGED CONTACTS WITH BAKHTIAR AND INTERVIEW WITH UNSPECIFIED FRENCH PERIODICAL. WE TOLD HIM THAT WE WERE CONFIDENT THE UNDERSTANDING EXTENDED TO FARAH AS WELL. HE ASKED THAT OUR PRESS GUIDANCE BE MODIFIED TO BE SPECIFIC ON THIS POINT. (RECOMMENDATION: I HOPE WE CAN MEET THIS REQUEST.)

4. HIS OTHER POINT WAS TO RAISE AGAIN THE PGOI REQUEST THAT AN IRANIAN DOCTOR RESIDENT IN U.S. BE ALLOWED TO REVIEW AND CONFIRM THE VALIDITY OF THE MEDICAL FINDINGS. I REVIEWED ORALLY WITH HIM WHAT I HAD IN STATE 275031 (STILL CABLED AT TIME OF OUR MEETING) AND SAID THAT I WOULD BE IN TOUCH LATER ON THIS POINT. (RECOMMENDATION: WE BELIEVE THIS SUGGESTION CAME ORIGINALLY FROM BAZARGAN HIMSELF, AND HE AND YAZDI APPEAR TO ATTACH CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO IT AS MEANS OF DEALING WITH POSSIBLE ADVERSE REACTION LOCALLY. I HOPE WE CAN FIND WAY TO BE RESPONSIVE.) YAZDI SAID HE WOULD BE IN POSITION TO GIVE US NAMES.

5. I TOLD YAZDI WE WERE IN PROCESS OF DEVELOPING ENHANCED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WITH OUR PERSONNEL AGAINST POSSIBLE CONTINGENCY OF HOSTILE PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS AND AGAIN EMPHASIZED MY HOPE THAT ADDED POLICE SECURITY WOULD BE PROVIDED US. HE SAID HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY REQUEST THAT SUCH ADDED PROTECTION BE PROVIDED, NOTING THAT MFA (CHIEF OF PROTOCOL) WOULD BE OUR POINT OF CONTACT. LAINGEN

[redacted]

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DE RUEHC #5082 2951526
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
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S E C R E T STATE 275082

10/23

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CHEROKEE, EYES ONLY FOR LAINGEN

E.O. 12065: RDS-2, 10/22/99 (NEWSOM, DAVID D)

TAGS: PEPR, IR, US

313897 - Dr. Yazdi

SUBJECT: THE SHAH'S ILLNESS

REF: TEHRAN 11152

1. FOLLOWING IS REPLY TO QUESTIONS RAISED IN REFTEL, WHICH YOU SHOULD COMMUNICATE TO YAZDI.

A. WE HAVE ALTERED RELEVANT SECTION OF OUR PRESS GUIDANCE, AND INFORMED SHAH'S REPRESENTATIVE AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE WE WOULD EXPECT THAT NEITHER HE (THE FORMER SHAH) NOR MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY WOULD ENGAGE IN ANY POLITICAL ACTIVITIES WHILE IN THE UNITED STATES. UNQUOTE

B. WE CANNOT SPEAK FOR THE PRIVATE MEDICAL AUTHORITIES IN CHARGE OF THE TREATMENT IN THE U.S.. IF YAZDI WISHES TO SEND US NAMES WE WILL BRING MATTER TO ATTENTION OF MEDICAL AUTHORITIES... WE CAN AT THIS TIME MAKE NO COMMITMENT.

Informed Dr. Yazdi of these points on 10/23. He said he would send me the names of the Dr's.

CHRISTOPHER
BT
#5082

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CC RUFHC RUEHDM RUFRFG
DE RUCMHR #1180 2951342
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 221334Z OCT 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4392
INFO RUFHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0033
RUFRFG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0131
BT
S E C R E T TEHRAN 11180

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/22/85 (LAINGEN, L.B.) OR-M
TAGS: MASS, IR
SUBJECT: RUMOR OF WEAPONS TRANSFER

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. DURING MEETING OCTOBER 22 WITH FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI, CHARGE ASKED IF THERE ANY SUBSTANCE TO RUMORS THAT U.S.-ORIGIN MILITARY EQUIPMENT MIGHT BE TRANSFERRED BY IRAN TO SYRIA. YAZDI CATEGORICALLY DENIED ANY SUCH TRANSFERS HAD OCCURRED OR WERE CONTEMPLATED.
LAINGEN
BT
#1180

NNNN
VZCZC 298

S E C R E T //NODIS// TEHRAN 11202

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 230951Z OCT 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4404
BT
S E C R E T TEHRAN 11202

CLASS: SECRET
CHRGE: STAT 10/23/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN
DRFTD: POL:HPRECHT:GO
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL2 CHG

NODIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/23/85 (LAINGEN, L. BRUCE) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, IR, US
SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. IN COURSE OF DISCUSSION OF US-IRAN RELATIONS, CHARGE AND VISITING DEPTOFF REVIEWED THE MEASURES WE HAVE TAKEN RECENTLY AND ASKED FON MIN YAZDI FOR FURTHER CONCRETE SUGGESTIONS TO ASSIST PGOI IN BUILDING ITS EFFECTIVENESS AND TO STRENGTHEN BILATERAL TIES. YAZDI REPLIED THAT WE WERE AWARE OBVIOUSLY THAT IRANIAN SECURITY SERVICES NO LONGER EXISTED. CONSEQUENTLY, PGOI LACKED INTELLIGENCE ON ACTS OF SABOTAGE IN KHUZESTAN AND KURDESTAN. WHO WAS BEHIND THESE ATTACKS? THE IRANIANS SUSPECTED ISRAEL AND IRAQ, BUT NEEDED MORE INFORMATION. YAZDI KNEW THAT USG HAD MUCH INFORMATION--"KNEW EVERTHING"-- ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REGION; PGOI HOPED WE WOULD SHARE IT.

3. WE REPLIED THAT IRAN CERTAINLY OVERRATED OUR INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES, BUT WE WOULD BE PLEASED TO EXCHANGE ASSESSMENTS WITH IRAN. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF PGOI WOULD SHARE WITH US INFORMATION IT HAS TO ASSIST OUR INQUIRIES. WE HAD NO INFORMATION SUGGESTING ISRAEL WAS INVOLVED WITH IRAN'S TROUBLES.

4. COMMENT: YAZDI CLEARLY ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE, REFLECTING THE INSECURITY OF THIS REGIME. IT WAS THE ONLY INITIATIVE FOR ASSISTANCE HE MADE TO US, APART FROM "CLEARING UP THE PAST" I.E. TRUST FUND. LAINGEN
BT
#1202

NNNN

S E C R E T //NODIS// TEHRAN 11202

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DE RUQMHR #1237/01 297 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 242641Z OCT 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4429
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 11237

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STAT 10/24/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN
DPFTD: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN:EM
CLEAR: NEA/IRN:HPRECHT; */M
:COL.CSCOTT
DISTR: CHARGE

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 12/24/85 (LAINGEN, L.B.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IR
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH YAZDI

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. CHARGE AND VISITING COUNTRY DIRECTOR PRECHT HAD AN HOUR'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI ON OCTOBER 22. SEPTELS COVER SOME OF THE SPECIFIC ITEMS DISCUSSED. EXCHANGE WITH YAZDI WAS BUSINESSLIKE AND FRIENDLY, WITH YAZDI SOMEWHAT MORE OPEN IN HIS ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PROCESS OF BUILDING A NEW RELATIONSHIP THAN HE HAS BEEN IN OTHER CONVERSATIONS IN RECENT WEEKS.

3. PRECHT DESCRIBED FROM HIS WASHINGTON VANTAGE POINT SOME OF THE PUZZLEMENT FELT BY USG OVER RECENT ATTITUDES DISPLAYED BY PGOI CONCERNING U.S. ACTIVITIES IN AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS IRAN. FRANKLY WE HAVE BEEN SURPRISED BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH OUR MOTIVES IN IRAN AND OUR POSTURE TOWARDS THE REVOLUTION SEEM TO BE CONSTANTLY SUSPECT. PRECHT EMPHASIZED THAT OUR APPROACH WAS QUITE DIFFERENT. THE IDEA THAT WE WERE HOSTILE TOWARD THE REVOLUTION WAS 180 DEGREES DIFFERENT FROM OUR ACTUAL POLICY TOWARD IRAN AND OUR INTERESTS HERE. OUR INTEREST IS IN AN IRAN INDEPENDENT AND WITH ITS INTEGRITY INTACT, A GOVERNMENT INCREASINGLY STABLE, AND CAPABLE OF DEALING WITH PROBLEMS AS THEY ARISE. WE WISHED THE PGOI WELL IN ITS EFFORTS BECAUSE TO THE EXTENT THAT THE PGOI MAKES PROGRESS TOWARDS STABILITY OUR OWN INTERESTS IN IRAN ARE FURTHERED. QUITE FRANKLY, PRECHT NOTED, WE SEE NO VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT AND THEREFORE HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO INTEREST IN DOING ANYTHING BUT HELPING IN ANY WAY WE CAN TO CONTRIBUTE TO ITS SUCCESS.

4. IN THAT CONTEXT THE USG GENUINELY SEEKS TO WORK WITH THE PGOI IN RESOLVING SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AS THEY ARISE. WE BELIEVE SOME PROGRESS IS BEING MADE, BOTH IN THE AREA OF BUSINESS CONTRACTS AND IN MILITARY SUPPLY. ON LATTER SUBJECT, PRECHT GAVE YAZDI A LETTER FROM GENERAL GRAVES CONFIRMING PROGRESS IN REDUCING TERMINATION CHARGES ON F-14 SPARE PARTS CONTRACTS. WE WOULD SHORTLY BE SENDING OVER ANOTHER LETTER FROM GENERAL GRAVES DESCRIBING THE RATIONALE FOR THE POSITION WE HAD TAKEN ON PRICING OF THE SPRUANCE DESTROYERS. AS WE HAD STATED EARLIER, WE WERE READY TO SIT DOWN WITH PGOI REPRESENTATIVES FROM MOND AND MFA IN A WORKING GROUP TO ADDRESS THESE AND OTHER PROBLEMS GROWING OUT OF MANAGEMENT OF THE TRUST FUND. TO CDR. KAMKAR OUR READINESS TO PROCEED IN WHATEVER WAY

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1978—204-835

THE PGOI SUGGESTED. COL. SCOTT HAD ALSO RECENTLY MADE AVAILABLE TO MOND A DETAILED LIST OF CLOSED OUT FMS CASES; THIS INFORMATION HAD ALREADY BEEN PROVIDED IN MID-SEPTEMBER AS A PART OF AN OVERALL REVIEW OF PENDING AND CLOSED OUT FMS CASES, BUT THE DATA HAD NOW BEEN BROKEN OUT IN A SEPARATE PACKAGE TO ASSIST PGOI UNDERSTANDING. WE HAD ALSO SOME TIME BACK MADE AVAILABLE A BREAKOUT, BY ITEM AND BRANCH OF SERVICE, OF SPARE PARTS READY TO BE MOVED IN THE PIPELINE. WE ALSO HOPED THAT A JOINT U.S.-IRANIAN COMMITTEE COULD BE SET UP CONCERNING CLOSED OUT U.S. MILITARY FACILITIES. (WE WERE LATER ADVISED THAT YAZDI WILL CHAIR A MEETING OF THIS COMMITTEE ON OCT. 28.)

5. YAZDI'S RESPONSE TO ALL THIS WAS GENERALLY POSITIVE. HE AGREED THAT PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE IN THE BUSINESS FIELD. HE SAID HE APPRECIATED PRECHT'S REMARKS ABOUT THE ATTITUDE WITH WHICH THE USG APPROACHED THE RELATIONSHIP. FOR ITS PART, THE PGOI WISHED TO HAVE A GOOD AND PRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. BUT IT WAS NECESSARY FIRST TO TACKLE AND DISPOSE OF PROBLEMS FROM THE OLD RELATIONSHIP SO THAT THE NEW ONE WOULD START ON A HEALTHY BASIS. PRECHT EXPRESSSD THE VIEW THAT PROGRESS HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE AND THE HOPE THAT BUILDING A NEW RELATIONSHIP DID NOT FIRST NECESSITATE RESOLVING ALL PENDING PROBLEMS IN THEIR ENTIRETY.

6. PRECHT OBSERVED THAT OUR MUTUAL TASK WOULD BE FACILITATED IF A MORE ACCURATE PUBLIC PERCEPTION IN THE U.S. OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN COULD BE ACHIEVED. IT DID NOT HELP TO HAVE A SITUATION WHERE ALL AMERICAN JOURNALISTS HAD BEEN ASKED TO LEAVE IRAN. HE WONDERED WHETHER YAZDI'S EFFORTS IN NEW YORK WITH AMERICAN JOURNALISTS HAD PRODUCED RESULTS. YAZDI GAVE NO INDICATION OF IMMEDIATE RESULTS BUT WENT ON TO EXPRESS HIS IRRITATION WITH AP FOR A RECENT REPORT, WIDELY DISTRIBUTED, TO THE EFFECT THAT IRANIAN OIL PRODUCTION HAD FALLEN TO JUST OVER A MILLION BARRELS. THIS WAS THE KIND OF REPORTING THAT MADE IRANIANS SUSPECT A FUNDAMENTAL CONSPIRACY AGAINST
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IRAN IN THE U.S. PRESS. PRECHT AND CHARGE REMINDED YAZDI THAT THE PRESS IN THE U.S. AND ELSEWHERE WAS AN IMPERFECT INSTITUTION, BUT THAT ON BALANCE IT WAS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE FOR IRAN TO HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO A SITUATION WHERE NO AMERICAN JOURNALISTS WERE REPORTING ON CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN, PARTICULARLY ON POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE REVOLUTION SUCH AS THE JEHAD FOR RECONSTRUCTION.

7. A FAIRLY EXTENSIVE EXCHANGE ON THE SITUATION IN KURDESTAN PRODUCED NOTHING NEW. YAZDI'S REAL OR IMAGINED SUSPICIONS ABOUT ISRAELI ACTIVITIES WERE EVIDENT. HE DISMISSED AS CLEARLY UNFOUNDED REPORTS SUCH AS THAT ACCUSING THREE FORMER AMERICAN AMBASSADORS CONNIVING ON KURDESTAN. NONETHELESS HE PERSISTED WITH THE VIEW THAT THE U.S., WITH THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY HE KNEW IT HAD, MUST BE AWARE OF FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN KURDESTAN. IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF SOME OF THIS COULD BE SHARED WITH THE PGOI. (SEPTEL) THE FUNDAMENTAL PGOI OBJECTIVE, YAZDI SAID, WAS TO FIND A PEACEFUL BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT IN KURDESTAN. THE ARMY WAS NOT A PREFERRED INSTRUMENT FOR SETTLING THE PROBLEM NOR, HE INDICATED, WAS IT A VIABLE ONE. IRAN DID NOT HAVE EFFECTIVE MILITARY OR SECURITY FORCES NOW; IT HAD A LONG WAY TO GO BEFORE EFFECTIVE FORCES OF THIS KIND COULD BE RESTORED.

8. PRECHT SAID WE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO SEE GREATER NUMBER OF KEY IRANIANS, CITING BEHESTI AS SOMEONE WE WANTED TO MEET WITH. AFTER SOME HESITATION YAZDI ASKED HIS ASSISTANT TO ARRANGE THE MEETING PLUS CALL ON AYATOLLAH MONTAZERI (YAZDI'S IDEA), ATTENDANCE AT FRIDAY PRAYER GATHERING AND MEETING WITH FOROUHAR. YAZDI WAS ALSO REMINDED OF STANDING PRESS ATTACHE REQUEST TO SEE QOBTZADEH.
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 281814

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: PSDC, IR

SUBJECT: EID-E GHORBAN MESSAGE

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY VANCE TO FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI AT APPROPRIATE TIME:

QUOTE: DEAR MR. MINISTER, IT IS MY PLEASURE TO EXTEND TO YOU MY BEST WISHES ON THE OCCASION OF EID-E GHORBAN. MAY YOU BE SUCCESSFUL IN YOUR EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF YOUR PEOPLE. I LOOK FORWARD TO BUILDING ON OUR RECENT EXCHANGE OF VIEWS IN NEW YORK AND TO A FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

BEST REGARDS, CYRUS VANCE. UNQUOTE.

2. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DOES NOT PLAN TO RELEASE TEXT POT HAS NO OBJECTION IF PGOI WISHES TO DO SO. VANCE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L //STADIS// TEHRAN 11422

DE RUQMHR #1422 302 **
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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4530
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 11422

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STAT 10/29/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN
DRFTD: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN:EM
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: CHARGE

STADIS

FOR UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM FROM CHARGE

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/29/85 (LAINGEN, L.B.) OR-M
SUBJECT: PGOI DELEGATION TO ALGERIA

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. BY SEPTEL WE ARE REPORTING THAT THE PGOI WILL BE REPRESENTED AT ALGERIAN CELEBRATIONS NOVEMBER 1 BY PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN, FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI AND APPARENTLY DEFENSE MINISTER CHAMRAN AS WELL.

3. WE HAVE SEEN FROM THE WIRELESS FILE THAT YOU AND BRZEZINSKI AND OTHERS WILL REPRESENT THE U.S. DURING THESE CELEBRATIONS. I THINK IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL IF ONE OR MORE OF YOU COULD FIND AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK WITH MEMBERS OF THE PGOI DELEGATION AND BAZARGAN IN PARTICULAR. I MENTIONED THIS CASUALLY TO BAZARGAN TODAY AT A SOCIAL FUNCTION AND HE SEEMED VERY OPEN TO THE IDEA. FROM MY VANTAGE POINT, THE MORE CONTACT WITH THIS GROUP THE BETTER. LAINGEN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L //STADIS// TEHRAN 11422

US Government Printing Office: 1978—204-830

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INFO RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 1410
RUTAMA/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA IMMEDIATE 0817
RUFRPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 5551
RUDKAT/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 4079
RUQMTR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 328
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 1642
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S E C R E T ALGIERS 3025

CHARGE

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RABAT FOR DAS CONSTABLE

E.O. [illegible]: GDS 10/30/89 (HAYNES, ULRIC, [illegible])OR-M
TAGS: PFOR, OVIP, AG, US

SUBJ: [illegible]TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION OF ALGERIAN REVOLUTION

REF: A. STATE 281874, B. MONROVIA 8577, C. TRIPOLI 1761,
D. STATE 282564

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. DEPENDING ON TIMING OF POSSIBLE MEETING BETWEEN DR. BRZEZINSKI AND GOA PRESIDENT BENDJEDID AND/OR FONMIN BENYAHIA, FOLLOWING ARE POSSIBLE CONTACTS FOR SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN DR. BRZEZINSKI AND LEADING MEMBERS OF OTHER DELEGATIONS TO BE PRESENT FOR CELEBRATIONS (REF A, PARA 11):

A) SPAIN - SPANISH AMBASSADOR TO ALGERIA SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED MEETING BETWEEN DR. BRZEZINSKI AND GOS MINISTER OF THE PRESIDENCY (I.E., SECRETARY GENERAL OF GOVERNMENT) PEREZ-LLORCA AND GOS DFA DIRGEN FOR AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST AGUIRRE-DE-CARCER;

B) FRANCE - FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO ALGERIA IS EXPLORING POSSIBLE INTEREST OF SECGEN OF QUAI DE LOUSS IN MEETING WITH DR. BRZEZINSKI OR OTHER APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL AMERICAN VISITORS;

C) LIBYA - IF GOL PRESIDENT QADHAFI DOES ATTEND CELEBRATIONS, LIBYAN AMBASSADOR TO ALGERIA SHOWED CAUTIOUS INTEREST IN PROPOSING MEETING WITH DR. BRZEZINSKI (REFTEL C);

D) IRAN - IRANIAN CHARGE IN ALGERIA INDICATED HE TODAY WAS CABLING TEHRAN TO DETERMINE POSSIBLE INTEREST OF PM BAZARGAN OR OTHER MEMBERS OF GOI DELEGATION IN MEETING WITH DR. BRZEZINSKI OR OTHER APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL AMERICAN VISITORS (REFTEL D).

3. THE ABOVE REFLECTS LIVELY INTEREST ON PART OF ALL CONCERNED WITH FOREIGN POLICY CURRENTLY IN ALGIERS (GOA OFFICIALS, DIPLOMATS, PRESS) IN FACT THAT USG HAS FIELDED A HIGH-POWERED DELEGATION BY VIRTUE OF ITS HAVING DR. BRZEZINSKI AS PART OF IT. ONCE IN ALGIERS, OPPORTUNITIES FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI AND OTHERS TO MAKE SUBSTANTIVE CONTACTS WILL CERTAINLY ABOUND. DELEGATION AND OTHERS SHOULD NOTE THAT ALL LOCAL OBSERVERS CONSIDER DR. BRZEZINSKI AS MAJOR USG PROPONENT OF POLICY OF SUPPLYING ARMS TO MOROCCO. HAYNES

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4554
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 11481

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STAT 10/31/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN
DRFTD: POL:VLTOMSETH:EM
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: CHARGE POL-2 CHRON
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E.O. 12065: RDS-4 10/31/89 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P
TAGS: PINR, IR
SUBJECT: BIOGRAPHIC DATA: KAMAL KHARRAZI

KAMAL KHARRAZI, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, APPEARS TO BE IN HIS MID-THIRTIES. HE AFFECTS A REVOLUTIONARY (PERHAPS ISLAMIC?) BEARD, BUT OTHERWISE IS FASTIDIOUS IN APPEARANCE AND DRESS. KHARRAZI IS NOTHING IF NOT SERIOUS. HE DOES NOT STRIKE ONE AS HAVING MUCH SENSE OF HUMOR. KHARRAZI STUDIED EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE U.S., ATTENDING FIRST THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA FOR A YEAR AND THEN THE UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON FROM WHICH HE RECEIVED HIS PH.D WHILE THERE HE PRESUMABLY BECAME ASSOCIATED WITH FOREIGN MINISTER EBRAHIM YAZDI WHO WAS ALSO FOR MANY YEARS A RESIDENT OF TEXAS. HE RETURNED TO IRAN IN 1976. KHARRAZI DOES NOT SEEM ILL-DISPOSED TOWARD THE U.S., ALTHOUGH IT IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE HIS REAL FEELINGS THROUGH AN ARMOR OF RESERVE. DURING A MEETING WITH THE CHARGE OCTOBER 30 HE SEEMED GENUINE IN HIS EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION FOR THE EFFORTS THE CHARGE HAD MADE TO FACILITATE THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION OF U.S.-IRANIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS, BUT AT THE SAME TIME HE GAVE NO INDICATION THAT THIS SENTIMENT WAS BASED ON EMOTION. KHARRAZI INDICATED IN THE SAME CONVERSATION THAT HE IS MARRIED. HE SPEAKS GOOD, IF SOMEWHAT ACCENTED AND OCCASIONALLY GRAMMATICALLY INCORRECT ENGLISH. LAINGEN
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2. During Emboff poloff call on Acting Chief of MFA fifth Division Parsakia on other subjects, October 31, Parsakia raised subject of Shah in US and made an emotional, unofficial, and personal plea to Emboff (for about 45 minutes) to explain to USG why Shah must leave US. Parsakia made following points.

3. He and Director General for Europe and the Americas Etazam were working hard to try to avoid a crisis in relations with the United States but it was almost impossible. They had not wanted the PGOI to send an official note on the Shah and had watered it down as far as possible, but outside pressures on the Foreign Ministry were too strong.

4. [redacted] PGOI leaders (i.e., Bazargan and Yazdi) were powerless and decisions on how to act on the Shah's continued presence in the US would not be made by them. The Foreign Ministry would be able to repair the damage done to US-Iranian [redacted] if the Shah left immediately after he is released from the hospital [redacted] there will be a crisis. Parsakia pointed to how decisions had been made by Khomeini on other foreign affairs issues such as relations with Egypt, and intimated, but did not directly state, that the Shah's continued presence in the US might well result in a breaking of relations between Iran and the US.

5. Parsakia said that PGOI leaders were willing to have the Shah in Mexico but the US was a different case. The PGOI was convinced that the Shah would use his residence in the US as Khomeini had in Paris to continue subversive efforts against the PGOI. [redacted] Parsakia pointed out there are 200,000 Iranians in the US and that the shah has limitless funds at his command (he used the figure which is now becoming common usage of 20 Billion.).

Parsakia pointed out that Iran was a porous rumor mill but that the PGOI leaders had never had any rumors that the Shah had cancer. For this reason they were very suspicious of the Shah's illness. They also did not understand why the Shah had to have his medical care in the US.

6. Parsakia said that the leaders of the PGOI, by which he plainly meant Khomeini and his entourage were not politicians and did not understand the diplomatic process. They did not look to the future results which any decision might bring. Parsakia said that they (the leaders in Qom) were watching very carefully to see whether or not the Shah was permitted to stay in the US. If he was, they would immediately move. (He did not say how, but the inference was to break relations.)

7. During conversation, Parsakia also pointed to Senator Jackson interview on Meet the Press which he said had hit the upper levels of the Foreign Ministry like a bombshell. Yazdi had immediately sent for the full transcript which they had to see the context of Jackson's remarks. Yazdi regards Jackson as a very powerful US leader and was wondering if Jacksons remarks could have been intended as some sort of message from the USG. Emb off assured Parsakia it was not.